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
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USSR Report

MILITARY AFFAIRS

MILITARY HISTORY JOURNAL

No 3, March 1985



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1 August 1985

USSR REPORT

MILITARY AFFAIRS

MILITARY HISTORY JOURNAL

No 3, MARCH 1985

Except where indicated otherwise in the table of contents the following is a complete translation of the Russian-language monthly journal VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL.

CONTENTS

Friendship and Fraternity of the Soviet Peoples--One of the Sources of the Great Victory (pp 3-10)	
(M. D. Popkov)	1

A MILITARY SCIENTIFIC CONFERENCE OF THE USSR MINISTRY OF DEFENSE AND THE CHIEF POLITICAL DIRECTORATE OF THE SOVIET ARMY AND NAVY DEDICATED TO THE CENTENNIAL BIRTHDAY OF M. V. FRUNZE

Introductory Speech (pp 11-12)	
(V. G. Kulikov)	10

REPORTS

M. V. Frunze--An Outstanding Military Leader and Theoretician of the Soviet State (pp 13-20)	
(S. K. Kurkotkin)	13

The Military Political Activities of M. V. Frunze (pp 21-28)	
(A. A. Yepishev)	23

SCIENTIFIC PAPERS

M. V. Frunze--A Revolutionary of the Leninist School (pp 29-31)	
(A. G. Yegorov)	32

The Contribution of M. V. Frunze to the Development of Strategy and Operational Art (pp 31-34)	
(M. M. Kozlov)	36

M. V. Frunze on the Training and Indoctrination of Soviet Military Personnel (pp 34-37)	
(I. N. Shkadov)	39

M. V. Frunze and Soviet Military Science (pp 37-40)	
(O. A. Losik)	44
M. V. Frunze on the Moral Factor in Modern War (pp 40-43)	
(D. A. Volkogonov)	48
The Military Pedagogical Views of M. V. Frunze (pp 43-45)	
(G. I. Obaturov)	52
M. V. Frunze on the National Nature of Defending the Socialist Fatherland (pp 45-46)	
(G. M. Yegorov)	55
M. V. Frunze on the Importance of Military Experience for the Theory and Practice of the Organizational Development of the Soviet Armed Forces (pp 47-48)	
(P. A. Zhilin)	57
Concluding Speech (pp 50-55)	
(V. G. Kulikov)	61
SOVIET MILITARY ART	
The National Air Defense Troops in the Great Patriotic War (pp 56-65)	
(A. I. Koldunov)	67
Military Transport During the Years of the Great Patriotic War (pp 66-74)	
(A. S. Klemin)	78
DOCUMENTS AND MATERIALS	
Certain Documents on the Eastern Pomeranian Operation (pp 75-80)	
(I. Yaroshenko, A. Bulan'ko, V. Sutulov)	88
MASTERY AND HEROISM	
Naval Infantry in the Battles to Liberate the Soviet Arctic (pp 81-86)	
(I. I. Kartavtsev) (not translated)	
CRITICISM AND BIBLIOGRAPHY	
Review: Shakhurin on Aviation Industry During War Years (pp 87-89)	
(S. I. Rudenko)	99
Review: Karelian Front, 1941-1945 (pp 89-91)	
(S. A. Kuzovatkin)	103
Current Events, Facts, Findings (pp 92-94)	
(Unattributed) (not translated)	
FROM READER CONFERENCES	
In the Southern Group of Forces (pp 95-96)	
(P. T. Kunitskiy) (not translated)	

FRIENDSHIP AND FRATERNITY OF THE SOVIET PEOPLES--ONE OF THE SOURCES OF THE GREAT VICTORY

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 3, Mar 85 (signed to press 22 Feb 85) pp 3-10

[Article by Col Gen M. D. Popkov, member of the military council and chief of the Political Directorate of the Ground Forces]

[Text] The Soviet people and the personnel of our Armed Forces are preparing to solemnly observe the 40th anniversary of the Great Victory, a major and joyous event, a holiday of combat glory of the Soviet people, of the courage and valor of its military. Along with us the memorable jubilee will be celebrated by our friends and supporters abroad and by all progressive mankind.

The victory over Nazi Germany and its allies demonstrated with particular force the advantages of socialism and its enormous economic, sociopolitical and spiritual capabilities and confirmed the mighty vital strength of Marxist-Leninist ideology.

The Leninist Communist Party was the inspirer and organizer of the Soviet people's victory. Under its urging the Soviet people went into battle against the Nazi invaders. "The Great Patriotic War," pointed out the Decree of the CPSU Central Committee "On the 40th Anniversary of the Victory of the Soviet People in the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945," "convincingly demonstrated the monolithic unity of the party and the people, the indestructibility of the alliance of the working class, the kolkhoz peasantry and the labor intelligentsia, the friendship and fraternity for the Soviet people."¹

Founded by V. I. Lenin and the Communist Party, the Soviet Armed Forces are a new, socialist type of army. In contrast to the armies of the capitalist states, the military organization of the young Soviet republic was established as a combat alliance of the workers of all nationalities. The decree signed by V. I. Lenin on the founding of the Red Army proclaimed that service in it was a duty of all the Soviet citizens without any restrictions along national lines. This confirmed in legislation the consistent and firm carrying out of the party's Leninist nationality policy in the area of military organizational development.

The formation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in December 1922 was the outstanding result of carrying out the Leninist nationality policy by the

Communist Party and the ideas of proletarian internationalism. The voluntary uniting of the Soviet republics into a strong union state ensured the all-round economic, sociopolitical and spiritual development of all our nation's peoples.

The unshakable alliance of the working class, the peasantry and the people's intelligentsia comprises the social basis for the friendship and fraternity of the peoples and for the strengthening of defense might. The elimination of economic and cultural backwardness in the former national borderlands contributed to the rapid growth there of the size of the working class. It assumed the leading role in the life of each Union republic. The peasantry set out on a new, socialist path of development. Our own intelligentsia was formed. Progressive changes in the social structure of the nations were reflected most favorably in the Armed Forces. The number of servicemen with their roots in the working class increased in the Army and Navy. A new type of soldier was formed, a Soviet soldier, a patriot and internationalist and a dependable defender of the socialist fatherland. Today in the ranks of our army, as was pointed out by the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, Comrade K. U. Chernenko, are the representatives of all the nationalities of our country. The ties of military friendship arising here will link many of them later for all their lives.²

The strength of the Soviet Socialist State, the might of its Armed Forces and the friendship and fraternity of our nation's peoples were most fully apparent during the years of the Great Patriotic War. The fraternity of the Soviet peoples was further strengthened and was evident as never before in the mortal engagement against the enemy.

In planning the treacherous attack on the Soviet Union, the Nazi political and military leadership was counting that with the first strikes by the Nazi Army the multinational Soviet state would disintegrate. However, these hopes of the Nazis and all the imperialist reaction were not to come about. The victories of socialism were equally precious to all the Soviet peoples. The Great Patriotic War, the severest of the wars which mankind has ever known, showed that the social, political and spiritual unity formed during the years of Soviet power among the workers of our nation and the men of the Armed Forces was insurmountable. Under the leadership of the Communist Party, all of the Soviet peoples rose to a holy struggle against the accursed enemy. They rallied even closer around the Leninist party to repel the aggression and defeat the Nazi invaders.

Military formations were organized in each republic, oblast and kray. Having received equipment and weapons and undergoing brief military training, a majority of these was sent directly to the front. Just in 1941-1942 in Kazakhstan alone, around 240,000 riflemen and 40,000 soldiers of different specialties were trained the more than 12 divisions and separate brigades were organized and dispatched to the front. Over the first 2½ years of the war, Tajikistan sent to the front hundreds of thousands of soldiers. Uzbekistan also provided several rifle and cavalry formations for the front. Scores of rifle brigades and cavalry divisions were organized in Turkmenia, Kirghizia, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia, Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia. As a total the national republics organized and dispatched to the front over 80 divisions and separate brigades.³

Even on the very first day of the war, the Nazi invaders encountered stubborn resistance from the Soviet troops. "Defend each inch of Soviet land and fight to the last drop of blood for our cities and villages!", "Stand until death!" and "Not one step back!" -- these appeals of the party Central Committee became a law in the life of the troop collectives. The men and commanders representing all the nationalities were united by a wholehearted love for the motherland, a loyalty to the party and people and a burning hate for the Nazi enslavers.

For each Soviet soldier -- Russian and Ukrainian, Belorussian and Kazakh, Uzbek and Tajik, Latvian and Estonian, Armenian and Georgian, a soldier of any nationality -- the defense of the Soviet fatherland was a sacred duty. The men of all nationalities fought heroically against the hated enemy. For example, in one of the political reports from the political directorate of the First Baltic Front there were numerous instances of unprecedented feats by the men of different nationalities committed during the offensive battles of the summer of 1944. The Udmurt and Red Armyman U. Shakirov participated in an assault battalion in one of the attacks. He was the first to break into the enemy trench, hitting the Nazis with grenades and automatic rounds. Facing the enemy in combat, the courageous soldier destroyed 15 Nazis and took 14 prisoner. Shakirov also fought skillfully in subsequent battles.

In the crossing of the Western Dvina River, the Kazakh, Pvt S. Abduzhabbarov, distinguished himself. Heading a group of soldiers, under heavy enemy fire, he broke into the population point of Strelka and destroyed several Nazis, capturing an officer and two soldiers. Having turned over the prisoners to escorts, Abduzhabbarov took over a medium machine gun captured from the enemy and downed 10 Nazis. Fighting boldly and intrepidly, the loyal son of the Kazakh people, Pvt Abduzhabbarov, ensured the success of his subunit in this area.

For heroism and courage shown in carrying out combat missions of the command, Shakirov and Abduzhabbarov were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

Fighting courageously against the Nazi invaders were the Tajik, Sgt R. Iskhakov, the Armenian, Jr Sgt G. Mkrtchyan, the Uzbek, Pvt S. Bakhabov and others. The mass heroism of the Soviet troops became one of the important factors of our victory.

The letters written as commands from the Soviet people to the men were full of the heroic inspiration of internationalism and fraternal friendship. Thus, the letter from the Uzbek workers to the Uzbek soldiers stated: "Your people are the offspring of the Soviet Union. Russian, Ukrainian, Belorussian, Azerbaijani, Georgian, Armenian, Tajik, Turkmen, Kazakh and Kirghiz together with you for 25 years, day and night, built our big home, our land, our culture. Now the home of your elder brother, the Russian, the home of your brothers, the Belorussian and Ukrainian, has been invaded by the German brigands.... But if the robber has taken away your brother's home, return it to him, this is your duty, Uzbek soldier! This is your duty, all Soviet soldiers!"⁴

The workers of the republics and oblasts, in sending off their sons to fight against the enemy, admonished them to carry out feats for the glory of the motherland, the USSR, and followed their deeds on the front. Full of an ardent love for the fatherland and a profound feeling of friendship and fraternity of peoples, these letters of command played an enormous role in the international indoctrination of the Army and Navy personnel.

Each day of fighting gave rise to constantly new heroes of which all our nation was proud. For courage and valor, more than 7 million men were awarded orders and medals and more than 16,600 men became Heroes of the Soviet Union. Among them were representatives of more than 60 nations and nationalities of the USSR. These included: 8,182 Russians, 2,072 Ukrainians, 311 Belorussians, 161 Tatars, 108 Jews, 96 Kazakhs, 91 Georgians, 90 Armenians, 69 Uzbeks, 61 Mordvins, 44 Chuvash, 43 Azerbaijani, 39 Bashkirs, 32 Ossetians, 18 Mari, 18 Turkmens, 15 Lithuanians, 14 Tajiks, 13 Latvians, 12 Kirghiz, 10 Komi, 10 Udmurts, 9 Karelians, 9 Estonians, 8 Kalmyks and so forth. This fact is still another confirmation of the friendship of peoples in our country.⁵

The Soviet people in the enemy rear also showed the great strength of patriotism and the unshakability of our society's international unity. The sons and daughters of different nationalities and the representatives of many republics and oblasts who because of various circumstances ended up on enemy-occupied Soviet land joined the ranks of the people's avengers, the partisans and underground members. Fighting shoulder to shoulder with the Russians, Ukrainians and Belorussians against the common enemy were Kazakhs, Kirghiz, Uzbeks, Armenians, Azerbaijani and representatives of other nationalities of the Soviet Union.

The partisan movement over the entire war was a mass and profoundly popular one and had universal support among broad strata of the population. It encompassed all the enemy-occupied territory. In a number of western rayons and oblasts, Soviet power was maintained by the efforts of the citizens and by the partisan and underground actions and in individual instances partisan zones and areas existed where the occupier did not even put his foot. In the summer of 1943, over 200,000 km² of Soviet land were under full partisan control.⁷ The world-amazing heroic struggle of the Soviet partisans on the temporarily occupied Soviet territory was strong support for the combat operations of the Red Army and a secure defense of the Soviet peoples in the enemy rear.

The unstinting and self-sacrificing struggle of the partisans and underground members received universal recognition and high praise from the party and the Soviet state. The medal "Partisan of the Patriotic War" was awarded to more than 127,000 persons and more than 184,000 persons received other awards. Some 249 of the most outstanding participants in the nationwide struggle in the enemy rear received the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.⁸

"The partisan struggle," wrote M. I. Kalinin, "which involved all the Soviet nationalities inhabiting those territories where the Germans entered clearly demonstrated to the outside world the democraticness of Soviet power, the nation-wide affection for it and the firm determination to fight for its preservation, for the independence of the Soviet nation. There can be no more convincing proof of the moral and political unity of the Soviet peoples!"⁹

The fighting confraternity of all the Soviet nations and peoples on the fronts of the great battle against Naziism and on the territory temporarily occupied by the enemy was reinforced by the unstinting work of the rear. Under the leadership of the Communist Party the Soviet people in the rear of the nation responded with heroic labor to the party appeal "Everything for the Front, Everything for Victory!" and supported and strengthened a firm confidence in the invincibility of the socialist motherland in the men of our Army and Navy. "A great feat during the war years," said the Decree of the CPSU Central Committee "On the 40th Anniversary of the Victory of the Soviet People in the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945," "was performed by the workers of the rear. The workers, kolkhoz members, scientists, engineers and designers by their wholehearted labor won the battle for metal and grain, fuel and raw materials, for creating powerful Soviet weapons."¹⁰

During days of severe testing, V. I. Lenin taught, each worker should hold in first place before himself the question: "...Have we done everything to help the war, have we made a sufficient effort, has enough help been given to the front?"¹¹ These Leninist instructions became part of the blood and body of the Soviet people. The workers of the Soviet rear did everything possible to strengthen the military and economic might of the socialist state. The goal which each Soviet patriot posed for himself was to produce more shells, cannons, aircraft, tanks, more oil, coal, food and medicines.

Over the entire war the Soviet people in the rear, surmounting the greatest difficulties, showing enormous steadfastness and unstintingly forged the weapons of victory. "In labor as in combat!" and "To work not only for oneself but for a comrade who has left for the front!"--our people in the rear worked under such slogans. The Soviet people, feeling a profound love for their soldiers, provided them with everything necessary for victory. Suffice it to say that during the time of the war, the nation's industry produced more than 482,000 guns, 102,000 tanks and SAU [self-propelled artillery mount], 112 combat aircraft, around 20 million rifles, carbines, submachine guns and machine guns.¹²

This work of enormous scale and importance was within the reach of only a close and united family of Soviet peoples who drew even closer together in the struggle against the hated enemy and in carrying out the single goal of providing the front with everything necessary for victory. Already by March 1942, the output of defense products just in the Eastern regions of the nation equaled the level of their production over the entire Soviet territory on the eve of the war.

The new attitude toward labor, born out of socialism and multiplied by the desire to do everything possible to achieve victory, became a factor of enormous importance. "Weapons, ammunition, food and supplies are moving to the front," pointed out the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, in an order of 7 November 1943, "in an unending flow. The Urals and Kuznetsk Basin, Moscow and the Volga, Leningrad and Baku, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, Georgia and Armenia, all our republics and oblasts have become a powerful arsenal for the Red Army."¹³

During the difficult war years the rural workers were examples of courage and labor heroism. Regardless of the temporary loss of great grain-growing areas, the kolkhoz peasantry over the entire provided the Red Army and the nation with

a sufficient amount of food and raw materials. For example, in 1942, the planted area had increased by almost 3 million hectares in the eastern regions of the RSFSR, Kazakhstan, Central Asia and Transcaucasia.

The Soviet intelligentsia worked unstintingly for the good of the motherland and during the years of severe testing by its unstinting labor made an inestimable contribution to the cause of defeating the enemy. Under the harshest wartime conditions, scientists, designers, engineers and technicians were able to ensure our indisputable superiority over the science and technology of Nazi Germany.

United by a single will and a single zeal and indoctrinated in the ideals of Leninism, the working class, the kolkhoz peasantry and the Soviet intelligentsia --all our multinational Soviet people--by heroic labor together with the men of the Armed Forces forged the victory over the enemy, having carried out a feat the equal to which has never been known by mankind. For heroism shown in the rear, some 16 million persons alone received the medal "For Valorous Labor in the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945."¹⁴

During the years of the war against Nazi Germany, aid to the front was expressed in numerous patriotic initiatives of the Soviet people aimed at seeking out additional means of financial and material help for the front. This movement developed in all the republics. Over the war years more than 16 billion rubles were sent to the defense fund from the nation's population. Using these funds hundreds of tanks and combat aircraft, scores of submarines and naval launches and much other military equipment were built for our Army and Navy. Fighting on the different fronts were units established from the personal savings of the workers including the tank columns "Tambovskiy Kolkhoznik," "Kolkhoznik Kazakhstana," "Azerbaydzhanskiy Kolkhoznik," "Kolkhoznik Kirgizii," "Kolkhoznik Tadzhikistana," and the air divisions imeni 25-Letiye Bashkirskey ASSR, "Valeriy Chkalov" (Gorkiy Oblast), "Sovetskiy Tatarstan," "Sovetskoye Primorye," the division of armored trains imeni Geroy Sovetskogo Soyuza M. Gadzhiyev and others.¹⁶

The party gave great importance to the ideological and party political work in the troop, including to indoctrinating the servicemen in a spirit of friendship of the Soviet peoples and a readiness to fight in a single formation against the Nazi invaders. The necessity of this was caused primarily by the presence in the army of representatives from all the nations and nationalities of our country. "The war showed that the Soviet Union is a united, close-knit family of peoples," said M. I. Kalinin in a talk with the frontline agitators in 1943, "and that we have a solidarity which the world has never seen before."¹⁷

The Communist Party, in indoctrinating the Soviet people and the men of the Red Army in a spirit of Soviet patriotism and internationalism and friendship of our country's peoples, during the days of the war turned constantly to Lenin's ideological heritage. Lenin advised that a "maximum of equality" and conscientiousness be shown to the other nationalities and he taught a respectful attitude toward national languages and to the customs and traditions of the peoples. During the period of the Great Patriotic War this Leninist legacy was widely embodied in the work of the commanders, the political bodies, the party and Komsomol organizations with the men of non-Russian nationalities.

On 17 September 1942, the directive was issued of the Main Political Directorate of the RKKA "On Indoctrinational Work With the Red Armymen and Junior Commanders of Non-Russian Nationality." This demanded that the commanders and political workers "show sensitivity and concern for the Red Armymen of non-Russian nationality, not allow the belittling of their national feelings or the slightest injustice to them...that military friendship be encouraged in every possible way between the men of different nationalities."¹⁸ The directive helped to strengthen work with the men of non-Russian nationality. The best of them who had a good general educational and political training, who had a good knowledge of Russian and a national language, in the units and formations were assigned as agitators, the editors of combat leaflets and the leaders of political exercise groups. The training of cadres of political workers from among servicemen of non-Russian nationality was improved.

During the years of the Great Patriotic War in the operational army scores of newspapers were turned out in the languages of the Soviet peoples. These were published in Georgian, Armenian, Azerbaijani, Kazakh and other languages.

In the indoctrination of the men of non-Russian nationality extensive was made of such forms and methods of agitation and propaganda work as meetings, reports, talks, political information sessions and reading newspapers in the languages of the fraternal Soviet peoples. Receptions were organized by the military councils of the armies and by the command of the field forces for Red Armymen and commanders of non-Russian nationality who had distinguished themselves in battle and national soldier artistic amateur activities were also active. In the units and formations there were meetings for the newly arrived soldiers and commanders with soldiers from the same homeland and the solemn turning over of the weapons of heroes who had fallen in battle to their combat comrades.

All the ideological and political indoctrination with the men, including those of non-Russian nationality, developed their ideological maturity, strengthened combat readiness and capability of the units and formations as well as military discipline, it strengthened patriotic feelings and hate for the Nazi invaders and reinforced military friendship with the fraternal peoples.

Today our motherland, the USSR, is flourishing with creative forces. The USSR has built a developed socialist society in which mature social relations have been established with legal and actual equality for all nations and nationalities. On the basis of this equality, a new historical community of people, the Soviet people has come into being in our state. The ongoing strengthening of fraternal friendship among all the peoples of our multinational motherland has told favorably also on the Armed Forces. Our Army and Navy are an inseparable part of the Soviet people and embody the traits and qualities inherent to a socialist multinational society. Each troop collective in the Army and Navy is a multinational and close-knit family which can successfully carry out important and complex tasks. Shoulder to shoulder, arm in arm the men of all the nationalities of our fatherland carry out their uncompromising military service. They are profoundly aware of the growing danger in the international situation created by the reactionary circles of the United States and its allies, they ardently support the peace-loving policy of the CPSU and the Soviet state, they are steadily improving their military skills and increasing vigilance and combat readiness. Serving today in the ranks of the defenders of our socialist

motherland are the sons and grandsons of the heroes of the Great Patriotic War. "They have not lived through the severe testing," emphasized the 26th CPSU Congress, "which befell their fathers and grandfathers. But they are loyal to the heroic traditions of our army and people. Each time when the interests of national security and the defense of peace so require, when it is necessary to help the victims of aggression, the Soviet soldier presents himself to the world as a selfless and courageous patriot and internationalist ready to surmount any hardships."¹⁹

The Communist Party is working so that each Soviet citizen and soldier of the Armed Forces is profoundly aware that to carry out one's patriotic and international duty means to work creatively and conscientiously, to improve the quality and efficiency of one's labor and combat training, to take an active part in carrying out the tasks of all the people, to make a personal contribution to the cause of further strengthening the economic and defense might of our multinational motherland and world socialist commonwealth.

In our times each military collective is multinational in its composition. Thus, according to the data of sociological research, in the military districts men of 60-90 nationalities are usually serving, 40-50 in the formations, 20-30 in the units and on the ships and 7-15 in the subunits.²⁰

The tasks of the patriotic and international indoctrination of the personnel and of further improving work in the multinational troop collectives are discussed regularly at sessions of the military councils of the districts, groups of forces, in the political bodies, party and Komsomol organizations. Particular attention is paid to a thorough study of the professional and moral qualities of the young recruits and to effective political indoctrination with them.

Wholehearted love for one's multinational fatherland is combined in the Soviet military with a feeling of fraternal friendship for the peoples and armies of the socialist commonwealth countries as well as solidarity with all peoples fighting for social and national liberation.

The personnel of the Armed Forces are greeting the 40th anniversary of the Great Victory with new accomplishments in training and service. In carrying out the decisions of the 26th Party Congress, the subsequent plenums of the CPSU Central Committee and the instructions of the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, Comrade K. U. Chernenko, on defense questions, the men assure the party and the Soviet people that day after day they will increase vigilance and combat readiness and will constantly guard the peace and security of the USSR.

FOOTNOTES

¹ PRAVDA, 17 June 1984.

² See: KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 29 May 1984.

³ "Partiya i armiya" [The Party and the Army], Moscow, Politizdat, 1977, p 179.

- ⁴ "Na zov Rodiny" [To the Motherland's Call], Tashkent, 1943, pp 20-21.
- ⁵ "Geroi Sovetskogo Soyuz" [Heroes of the Soviet Union], Moscow, Voenizdat, 1984, p 245.
- ⁶ [Not in text]
- ⁷ "Istoriya vtoroy mirovoy voyny 1939-1945" [The History of World War II of 1939-1945], Moscow, Voenizdat, Vol 12, 1982, p 51.
- ⁸ "Geroi Sovetskogo Soyuz," p 177.
- ⁹ M. I. Kalinin, "O kommunisticheskom vospitanii i voinskom dolge" [On Communist Indoctrination and Military Duty], Moscow, Voenizdat, 1967, p 660.
- ¹⁰ PRAVDA, 17 June 1984.
- ¹¹ V. I. Lenin, PSS [Complete Collected Works], Vol 41, pp 117-118.
- ¹² "Istoriya vtoroy mirovoy...", Vol 12, p 168.
- ¹³ I. Stalin, "O Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyne Sovetskogo Soyuz" [On the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union], Moscow, Gospolitizdat, 1950, p 130.
- ¹⁴ "Istoriya vtoroy mirovoy...", Vol 12, p 51.
- ¹⁵ [Not in text]
- ¹⁶ PRAVDA, 21 November 1974.
- ¹⁷ M. I. Kalinin, op. cit., p 582.
- ¹⁸ TsAMO SSSR [Central Archives of the USSR Ministry of Defense], folio 32, inv. 795436, file 6, sheet 129.
- ¹⁹ "Materialy XXVI s"yezda KPSS" [Materials of the 26th CPSU Congress], Moscow, Politizdat, 1981, p 66.
- ²⁰ KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL, No 23, 1982, p 81.

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INTRODUCTORY SPEECH

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 3, Mar 85 [signed to press 22 Feb 85) pp 11-12

[Speech by MSU V. G. Kulikov, USSR first deputy minister of defense and commander-in-chief of the Joint Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact States at a military scientific conference of the USSR Ministry of Defense and the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy devoted to the centennial birthday of M. V. Frunze]

[Text] Comrades! Allow me on behalf of the Minister of Defense, MSU, Comrade S. L. Sokolov, to open the military scientific conference devoted to the centennial birthday of Mikhail Vasil'yevich Frunze, a prominent political and state leader, an outstanding military leader and theoretician and one of the organizers and founders of the Soviet Armed Forces.

Our conference is being held at a remarkable time. Preparations have begun widely in the nation for elections to the supreme soviets of the Union and autonomous republics and to the local soviets. The Soviet people and the men of the Armed Forces are working steadily to properly celebrate the 40th anniversary of the victory of the Soviet people in the Great Patriotic War and the next 27th CPSU Congress.

The Communist Party, in guiding the creative activities of the Soviet people in improving developed socialism, has carried out a firm and consistent policy aimed at preventing war and halting the arms race. "We state decisively," emphasized the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and Chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet, Comrade K. U. Chernenko, "that we will not retreat from this policy which conforms to the fundamental interests not only of the Soviet people but also the other peoples of the world."¹

At the same time, in considering the complexity of the international situation, our party has adopted the necessary measures to strengthen national defense capability and increase the combat readiness of the Armed Forces. In these activities it has been guided by Lenin's immortal legacy and by its experience in socialist construction and organizing the defense of the revolutionary victories of the Soviet people. In the treasurehouse of this priceless experience, an important place is held by the rich military-theoretical heritage of Mikhail Vasil'yevich Frunze, the student and associate of V. I. Lenin.

The political and military activities of Mikhail Vasil'yevich Frunze occurred in the stormy revolutionary times when the age-old foundations of the autocratic-landowner system were crumbling, and when the broadest masses of the Russian proletariat under the leadership of the Bolshevik Party headed by its leader, V. I. Lenin, had united for a liberating class struggle.

Young Frunze, being in the thick of revolutionary events, became one of their active participants. As a 19-year-old youth, he joined the Bolshevik party, having unswervingly chosen his way in life, the way of a courageous fighter for a new life. And Frunze always remained loyal to this noble path.

Even in the Revolution of 1905-1907, M. V. Frunze directed the first soviet of worker deputies in Ivanovo-Voznesensk and headed the combat militias of workers who fought on the barricades of Krasnaya Presnya in Moscow. The high gifts of a state, party and military leader were evidenced by M. V. Frunze in the Great October Socialist Revolution. Under his leadership the first socialist transformations commenced in the towns of Shuya and Ivanovo-Voznesensk. He participated in eliminating the leftist SR revolt in Moscow and Yaroslavl.

During the years of the Civil War, M. V. Frunze was at many of its crucial sectors and commanded three fronts. At Buguruslan and Belebey, Ufa and Orsk, in Turkestan, in the south of the Ukraine and in the Crimea, troops under the command of M. V. Frunze dealt a crushing defeat to the White Guards and interventionists. In these engagements, the exceptional talent of M. V. Frunze became evermore widely apparent as a leader of the new, socialist type of army, an army born for the reliable defense of the Soviet nation.

During the first postwar years, the elaboration and solution to many major problems of the organizational development of the Armed Forces and the strengthening of the defense might of the Soviet state are linked with the name of M. V. Frunze. The military reform of 1924-1925 was carried out under his leadership and this played an important role in improving the organizational structure, the system of command and control, the training of military personnel, as well as increasing the military and political training of the troops.

In the history of our state and the Soviet Armed Forces, M. V. Frunze has gone down as a major military theoretician. Many theoretical concepts of Frunze's have entered the organizational practices of our Armed Forces, they were confirmed in the years of the Great Patriotic War and are of major theoretical and practical importance in our times.

And today, in dedicating a scientific conference to the centennial birthday of Mikhail Vasil'yevich Frunze, we again turn to his diverse practical activities and rich military theoretical heritage in order to still more profoundly disclose, appreciate and utilize them in the work of further strengthening the nation's defense capability and raising the combat readiness of the Soviet Armed Forces.

Invited to our conference are representatives of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces, the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy, the USSR Armed Services, the main and central directorates of the USSR Ministry of

Defense, the military academies and scientific research institutions, the Academy of Social Sciences Under the CPSU Central Committee, the Marxism-Leninism Institute Under the CPSU Central Committee, the USSR Academy of Sciences, the Soviet War Veteran Committee, DOSAAF, the Znaniye [Knowledge] Society, workers of the Central Television and Press, as well as representatives from the party and social institutions of Vrunzenskiy Rayon of the City of Moscow.

Participating in the work of the conference is the daughter of M. V. Frunze, Tat'yana Mikhaylovna Frunze.

Allow me to welcome all of you, dear comrades, and announce the military-scientific conference devoted to the centennial birthday of M. V. Frunze open.

FOOTNOTE

¹ PRAVDA, 15 December 1984.

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10272

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M. V. FRUNZE--AN OUTSTANDING MILITARY LEADER AND THEORETICIAN OF THE SOVIET STATE

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 3, Mar 85 [signed to press 22 Feb 85) pp 13-20

[Article by MSU S. K. Kurkotkin, USSR deputy minister of defense and chief of the rear services of the USSR Armed Forces]

[Text] Mikhail Vasil'yevich Frunze combined in himself the qualities of an outstanding revolutionary, a prominent party, state and military figure, a legendary military leader and talented military theoretician. All his activities were based upon a firm foundation of Marxist-Leninist theory which he profoundly mastered in a period of active revolutionary work.

Revolutionary work provided M. V. Frunze with exceptionally diverse experience and a broad viewpoint. In the process of it he developed iron will, the ability to organize and lead the masses under the most diverse conditions, to understand a complicated and rapidly changing situation, as well as a desire to master military knowledge. In improving these qualities in a struggle against the revolution's enemies, Frunze devoted particular attention to profoundly studying the military works of K. Marx, F. Engels and V. I. Lenin. He had a good knowledge of the special military literature and the works of the prominent Russian military leaders. Mikhail Vasil'yevich continued to work constantly in studying military affairs after the end of the Civil War. K. Ye. Voroshilov wrote that Mikhail Vasil'yevich Frunze became a military leader and leader of the armed proletarian forces, having lived through the difficult school of an underground Bolshevik and this largely made up for the gaps in the special military knowledge of this outstanding man.¹

With the assuming by Mikhail Vasil'yevich of the position of commander of the 4th Army of the Eastern Front at the end of January 1919, a new stage commenced in his life closely tied to the organizational development of the Red Army, to the immediate involvement in leadership over military operations during the years of the Civil War and foreign intervention, and the development of the Soviet Armed Forces and military science in the postwar years. For a period of 7 years, M. V. Frunze held responsible military positions. Over such a short time he immortalized his name by his deeds.

Even by his first steps in the position of army commander Mikhail Vasil'yevich showed unusual qualities of a military leader. The prominent military specialist

F. F. Novitskiy who for many years worked next to M. V. Frunze thus described his activities in the position of army commander: "From the very first days of his military service, having immediately assumed a major position of army commander, that is, a position which in the old times would have occurred at the end of a military career, Mikhail Vasil'yevich immediately began to carry out his military work in the full sense of the word brilliantly and according to all the rules and laws of military science."²

Mikhail Vasil'yevich Frunze possessed a natural military talent, creative thinking, the ability to anticipate the development of events, enormous will power and decisiveness and high organizational abilities. He was a military leader of the new, proletarian type, and the expressor and proponent of the Communist Party's policy and ideology in the army.

M. V. Frunze brought into the ranks of the young Red Army, high ideological loyalty, organization, iron discipline and the revolutionary boldness inherent to the Bolshevik Party.

M. V. Frunze showed great organizational abilities and generalship art in the posts of the commander of the Southern Group of Forces of the Eastern Front, the Eastern, Turkestan and Southern Fronts in defeating the armed forces of Kolchak and Vrangeli' and the internal counterrevolution in Turkestan. Under the leadership of Mikhail Vasil'yevich, offensive operations were worked out and executed which significantly enriched soviet military art. These operations brought M. V. Frunze fame as a military leader, an authentic organizer of revolutionary victories.

The generalship activities of M. V. Frunze were carried out under the constant leadership of V. I. Lenin. The multivolume biography of the revolution's leader and the directives of the main and front command contain hundreds of documents confirming the close link of M. V. Frunze with V. I. Lenin. Mikhail Vasil'yevich had an unusually high regard for the instructions of the leader, seeing in them a link between political strategy and its specific embodiment in the armed struggle. From Lenin he learned a broad political and military viewpoint and the art of persuading and organizing the masses to defend Great October. According to the description of M. V. Frunze, V. I. Lenin was the inspired strategist and tactician who showed the greatest qualities as the "leader of the proletarian revolution, as a leader not only in the area of pure policy but also policy which grew into armed struggle, into insurrection and then into civil war."³

A characteristic trait of M. V. Frunze as a military leader was a careful and thorough study of the situation, a dialectical consideration of all the factors and elements which could influence the course and outcome of an operation. This trait was most apparent in the defeat of the Kolchak troops and the Vrangeli' army. For example, by the spring of 1919, an extremely difficult situation had come into being on the Eastern Front. The Kolchak forces, having suddenly gone over to the offensive, were approaching the Volga. Mikhail Vasil'yevich who at that time commanded the Southern Group of Forces, after a careful and thorough assessment of the situation, decided to first attack the strongest and most dangerous enemy grouping, the Western Army which was threatening Samara. The front's RVS [Revolutionary-Military Council] approved this

decision. As a result, the Western Army suffered a significant defeat and this created a possibility for its complete defeat in subsequent operations.

Characteristic of M. V. Frunze was a careful study of the area of forthcoming military operations and the probable enemy. Thus, in preparing the Perekop-Chongar Operation at the beginning of November 1920, he repeatedly traveled to the Perekop Isthmus and Sivash in order to study the approaches to the enemy defenses in the field, as well as the nature of its engineer works. Mikhail Vasil'yevich had a good knowledge of the tactics of the White Guards and he carefully studied the experience of the operations and battles conducted by them not only against his own but also other fronts. V. I. Lenin knew this particular feature of Frunze. With good reason Lenin, in proposing to appoint him commander of the Southern Front for organizing the defeat of Vrangel', wrote: "Frunze says that he has studied Vrangel''s front, he has prepared for this front and knows (from Urals Oblast) the methods of fighting against the Cos-sacks."⁴

The ability to anticipate the most probable lines of development of military events was aided by his exceptional natural intelligence, by his great store of diverse knowledge, by mastering the dialectical method of thinking and by the ability to analytically study the war's experience and its practical perception and to fathom the enemy's plans. This trait was particularly apparent in the spring of 1919 during the period of preparing for the counteroffensive of the Eastern Front. Here of important significance was the correct choice of the moment for going over to the counteroffensive. It must be said that here he showed inspired foresight.

A careful and thorough analysis of the situation permitted him to conclude that a crisis had arisen in the enemy offensive and a favorable moment had arisen for going over to the counteroffensive. In actuality, at the end of April, the Kolchak troops were involved in heavy fighting, they had used up all their reserves and were encountering ever-growing resistance from the Soviet troops as well as intensifying attacks by the partisans in the rear. As a result, the enemy's offensive capabilities had been exhausted and its fighting morale had begun to drop. The command of the Eastern Front made use of these circumstances, having commenced a counteroffensive on 28 April with the forces of the Southern Group of Forces under the command of M. V. Frunze.

M. V. Frunze, as an outstanding military leader, had an inherent ability to choose the sector of the main thrust and mass the men and weapons on it. As a rule, the main thrust was made on that sector which led to the flank and rear of the main enemy grouping. Frunze concentrated a predominant portion of the men and weapons on the main sector by weakening the other sectors which were to go over to the defensive. All of this predetermined the successful outcome of the operation.

One of the characteristic traits in the generalship art of Mikhail Vasil'yevich Frunze was a creative, innovative approach to adopting a plan for an operation.

During the period of preparing for the counteroffensive of the Eastern Front, Mikhail Vasil'yevich, as commander of the Southern Group of Forces, formulated and reported to the front's RVS the basic ideas of his plan to thwart the

offensive of the Kolchak armies. These consisted in the following: under the conditions of the ongoing enemy offensive, the plan was to go over to a counter-offensive with the decisive aim of defeating the main enemy assault grouping; the problem of organizing a sufficiently strong attack group from the available forces was creatively resolved by their regrouping, without waiting for the reserves to be brought up, considering such important situational elements as the combat capability and grouping of the enemy troops, the amount of time to prepare the operation, the geographic and climatic conditions. At the same time, there were to be full mobilization and maximum use of the local human reserves and material resources. Great attention was given to increasing the political-moral state of the troops.

In subsequently recalling that difficult time, Frunze said: "...It took not only colossal will power but also a clear conviction that only the going over to an offensive would alter the situation in order to actually begin such."⁵

M. V. Frunze was against dogmatism and routine. Thus, in preparing for the operation in Northern Tauria in the autumn of 1920, he planned by a pincer attack to encircle and destroy the main Vrangeli forces in order to prevent their retreat to the Crimea. Mikhail Vasil'yevich, in planning the operation, knew that the execution of the bold maneuver conceived of by him involved enormous difficulties, as the troops were poorly clothed, poorly armed and the necessary supplies were lacking for normal supply.

Along with this, M. V. Frunze took into account that the troops of the Southern Front had a high combat zeal, they were burning with a desire as soon as possible to destroy the enemy and were capable of enduring any hardships for carrying out the set missions. On the other hand, he knew that the Vrangeli army, while well armed and having a large number of officers, at the same time had no possibility of receiving fresh reserves and that the peasants which had been mobilized by force by the enemy did not represent a reliable and battleworthy force. Considering all of this, Mikhail Vasil'yevich felt that it would take merely one powerful and correctly aimed blow combined with the outflanking operations against the enemy flanks to defeat it to the north of the Crimean Isthmus and prevent it from retreating into the Crimea.

Characteristic of M. V. Frunze was a constant desire to exploit the achieved success and bring it to the complete defeat of the enemy. He gave great attention to organizing reconnaissance, security, combat training and supply of the troops as well as to ensuring concealment and surprise of actions. The prominent party and state Soviet figure A. S. Bubnov correctly pointed out that M. V. Frunze "had fully mastered the ability to combine a boldness of an operational decision with painstaking preparation for carrying it out."⁶

M. V. Frunze excelled in the ability to firmly control the troops, he had great capacity for work, courage and personal bravery. In profoundly realizing the class nature of the Civil War and the Red Army, he gave great importance to indoctrinating high moral-combat qualities in the soldiers and commanders and to ensuring the moral-political superiority over the enemy. Frunze viewed political indoctrination as a new weapon which to the greatest degree strengthened the combat might of the Soviet Armed Forces.

The Communist Party and the Soviet government had high praise for the contribution of M. V. Frunze to the defeat of the interventionists and White Guards. He was awarded two orders of the Red Banner and a presentation revolutionary weapon.

Relying on a strong foundation of Marxism-Leninism and the achievements of Soviet military science and profoundly understanding the development patterns of military affairs, Frunze proved to be not only an outstanding field leader but also a prominent military figure. After the end of the Civil War he held a number of responsible posts in the army: representative of the Republic RVS in the Ukraine, the commander of the Ukrainian and Crimean Armed Forces, the deputy chairman of the USSR RVS and deputy people's commissar for military and naval affairs, the chief of the RKKA [Worker-Peasant Red Army] Staff, chief of the Military Academy, chairman of the USSR RVS and people's commissar for military and naval affairs.

In occupying such important positions, M. V. Frunze made a major contribution to strengthening the nation's defense capability and to the organizational development of the Soviet Armed Forces, considering a rise in their combat might to be a concern of the entire party and all the people. In his activities he proceeded from the Leninist thesis that the underlying foundation of the organizational development of the Soviet Armed Forces was leadership by the Communist Party. In a speech on the occasion of the 6th anniversary of the Red Army Military Academy, M. V. Frunze pointed out: "In no way can anyone establish and carry out a policy both in the nation and in the army in addition to the party and without it. As long as the party is strong and united, the Union of Soviet Republics is undefeatable."⁷

Mikhail Vasil'yevich worked constantly to increase the work of all the state and local bodies to prepare the nation for defense. "This preparation," he emphasized, "should be aimed, in the first place, at continuously supplying the front with everything necessary to conduct combat operations; secondly, provide the rear itself with everything needed to maintain its working energy and moral strength on the proper level."⁸

In considering the economic situation in the country, the size of the Red Army in converting it from a wartime to peacetime footing was reduced from 5.5 million men to a little more than a half million men. It was a question of seeking out those methods for the organizational development of the Armed Forces in peacetime so that, on the one hand, they would have the necessary combat readiness and, on the other, reserves would be trained for fielding a large army in the event of war.

The party Central Committee and the Soviet government assigned M. V. Frunze the job of reorganizing and strengthening the USSR Armed Forces. With his active involvement and later under his direct leadership, in the period of 1924-1925, a military reform was carried out which played a major role in further strengthening the combat capability of the Red Army and Navy and improving the nation's defense capability.

A resolution of the Plenum of the USSR RVS held in November-December 1924, stated: "The reorganization was carried out promptly and has proven itself in

the experience of the first month of work. Regardless of the difficult conditions of a curtailed budget, all the measures were carried out with full consideration of increasing the combat capability and mobilizational readiness of the Red Army and Navy."⁹ In January 1925, M. V. Frunze reported to the party Central Committee that its decisions had been carried out. The RKP(b) [Russian Communist Party (Bolshevik)] Central Committee approved the military reform and confirmed M. V. Frunze as the chairman of the USSR RVS and people's commissar for military and naval affairs.

The questions of Soviet military organizational development have received a theoretical grounding in the works of Mikhail Vasil'yevich Frunze. He established the necessity of switching to the organizational development of the army on a basis of combining regular and territorial formations. The presence of a small group of permanent commanders in the territorial units and formations made it possible, in the event of necessity, to quickly provide them with a changing personnel which underwent military training without a significant stay away from the job. For those times this was a correct solution to the question. For the army was homogeneous.

M. V. Frunze devoted significant attention to the technical equipping of the Red Army. He believed that only on the basis of the nation's industrialization was it possible in a short period of time to eliminate the lag of our army behind the armies of the developed capitalist states. In his article "Results and Prospects of Military Organizational Development," Mikhail Vasil'yevich brought out the ever-increasing importance of the development of aviation, artillery, armored forces, air defense and chemical warfare. Here he gave the decisive role in a war to man who had mastered the weapons and equipment. M. V. Frunze emphasized that with the growth of equipment and the number of troops, increased demands would be placed upon the moral-combat qualities of the personnel and that the Red Army had enormous moral and political superiority over the probable enemy.

M. V. Frunze devoted unflagging attention to the moral and political indoctrination of the Soviet military and to party political work. In his articles "The Military-Political Indoctrination of the Red Army," "Greetings to the RVS Political Directorate," and others he brought out the sources and ways to ensure the high morale of the Red Army. In his opinion, the entire system of training and indoctrination should help "to turn each Red Armyman into an aware citizen who knows his place in the Soviet republic and his tasks in relation to the world of enemies surrounding us...and to achieving maximum military skill of the soldiers."¹⁰

Marxist-Leninist theory and enormous experience in leading the operational-strategic field forces during the years of the Civil War created the basic prerequisites for the military-theoretical activities of Frunze. A profound knowledge of the works of K. Marx, F. Engels and V. I. Lenin as well as Marxist-Leninist methodology allowed him a more scientific approach to investigating the most complex problems of Soviet military science.

One of the most important problems which had to be solved at the beginning of the 1920's was the problem of determining the nature of a future war. M. V. Frunze in his works showed that a future war, by its nature, would be protracted and

highly fluid and would require the efforts of mass armies and an enormous straining of the economic, political and spiritual forces of the people and state. "The war will assume the nature of a protracted and fierce contest," pointed out M. V. Frunze, "which will test all the economic and political underpinnings of the belligerents."¹¹ Here "the basic and predominant nature of our future operations will be maneuvering"¹² and the participants of the war will be "entire peoples down to a man" and it will draw into its vortex and subordinate to itself "decisively all aspects of social life" and will touch upon "all state and social interests without exception."¹³

M. V. Frunze proceeded precisely from such a future war in working out a unified military doctrine. He emphasized that "one of the main conditions for ensuring the maximum might of the Red Army is to turn it into a unified organism welded together from top to bottom not only by a common political ideology but also by a unity of views on the nature of the military task confronting the Republic, the methods of carrying them out and the procedures for troop combat training."¹⁴

M. V. Frunze for the first time provided the fullest scientific Marxist-Leninist definition of the concept of the Soviet state's military doctrine. He wrote: "...A unified military doctrine is the teachings adopted in the army of the given state and establishing the nature of the organizational development of the nation's armed forces, the methods of troop combat training, their leadership on the basis of the views prevailing in the state on the nature of the military task confronting them and the ways of resolving them; these stem from the class essence of the state and are determined by the development level of the nation's productive forces."¹⁵ Frunze isolated two aspects in military doctrine: political and military-technical. The political part of military doctrine was an expression of the state's military policy which in our country is determined by the Program and policy of the Communist Party. The military-technical part of the doctrine concerns the organizational principles of the Red Army and Navy, the nature of combat training for the troops and the methods of carrying out combat missions.

A profoundly scientific approach and a unity of views on resolving the entire range of questions of military doctrine gave purposefulness and effectiveness in preparing the state and its army for a future war. This preparation, in the opinion of M. V. Frunze, like all questions of national defense, should be organized "in the first place, on a clear and accurate notion of the nature of a future war; secondly, on a correct and precise consideration of those forces and means which our possible enemies will possess; thirdly, on the same consideration of our own resources."¹⁶

Each class and each state works out its own attitude toward one or another type of war, its own conception of preparations for it as well as methods and forms of waging it. The Soviet socialist state emerged on the international arena under the banner of the Leninist Peace Decree and has decisively acted and does act against any unjust wars. At the same time, it has proclaimed the immutability of revolutionary victories and has stated in its military doctrine the necessity of their armed defense.

In examining the problems related to this, M. V. Frunze wrote: "Should we be content with the idea of the nation's passive defense without posing or pursuing any active goals or should we not have in mind these latter? Depending upon one or another solution to this question of military policy, the entire nature of the organizational development of our armed forces, the nature and system for training the individual men and large troop formations, military political propaganda and generally the entire system of the nation's indoctrination are determined."¹⁷ The ideas and recommendations of Mikhail Vasil'yevich on the preparations for war which can be imposed now on our state are also timely.

At present, Soviet military doctrine proceeds from the view that a new world war, if the imperialists succeed in unleashing it in spite of the will of the peoples, will be the determining war between the two opposing social systems, capitalist and socialist. It will be a global clash of millions of coalition armed forces of unprecedented scope and fierceness and will be waged without compromise and with the most decisive political and strategic goals. In the course of it all the military, economic and spiritual might of the belligerent states, coalitions and social systems will be fully engaged.

All the organizational and political activities of the Communist Party and the Soviet state are concentrated in two interrelated areas: communist creativity and ensuring a lasting, stable peace in the world. In consistently carrying out a policy of maintaining peace, the CPSU Central Committee and the USSR Council of Ministers have taken measures to strengthen the security of the Soviet Union, its friends and allies and to raise the combat readiness of our Armed Forces capable of dealing a crushing blow to any aggressor.

M. V. Frunze devoted great attention to the training and indoctrination of command personnel and to improving the work of military institutions of learning. A special work "Voprosy vysshego voyennogo obrazovaniya" [Questions of Higher Military Education] is devoted to these problems. In heading the RKKA Military Academy (now named after him), M. V. Frunze carried out important work to organize military-scientific activities and establish military-scientific societies in the aim of involving the instructors and students in scientific research. Upon his instructions a manual "Vyssheye komandovaniye" [Higher Command] was worked out and this provided a definition of principles for preparing and conducting front and army operations. Mikhail Vasil'yevich repeatedly pointed out that Soviet military art should be permeated with the idea of great activity and highly fluid and bold offensive actions. At the same time he urged that the questions of defense not be forgotten and that defensive actions be employed when the situation requires this. M. V. Frunze gave great importance to the role of the rear services in a war. Upon his instructions, a special course on the questions of organizing the rear and troop supply was incorporated in the curriculum of the RKKA Military Academy.

As a theoretician and practitioner of military affairs, M. V. Frunze was decisively against any routine in the training of troops, particularly command personnel. He pointed out that "the art of a military leader should be apparent in the ability out of a multiplicity of diverse methods and means to choose the most appropriate one in each given instance. Military theory cannot give him any ready-made pat solution; it can only serve as a guiding, directing principle."¹⁸

The ideas and views of M. V. Frunze advanced by him and elaborated on the basis of Marxist-Leninist theory and the Leninist teachings about the defense of the socialist fatherland have played an important role in the organizational development of the USSR Armed Forces and have been reflected in the regulations, manuals and orders. These ideas and views have withstood the test of time and have been confirmed on the battlefields of the Great Patriotic War.

A study and generalization of the experience of the armed defense of the socialist fatherland during the period of the Civil and Great Patriotic Wars, the seeking out of new ways for increasing the combat readiness of the Army and Navy in the aim of repelling any aggression considering the developing international situation are an important component part in the tasks of Soviet military science.

The generalship and military-theoretical activities of M. V. Frunze are marked by unusual breadth and diversity. He did a great deal to strengthen the defense might of our nation, to organize its defense and to develop military theory. The ideas and views of M. V. Frunze have not lost their importance under present-day conditions. In a situation of a growing danger of the start of a new world war by international imperialism, the creative utilization of our rich historical experience will help in correctly resolving the urgent questions of the organizational development of the Soviet Armed Forces and in developing Soviet military theory and practice.

FOOTNOTES

- ¹ See: K. Ye. Voroshilov, "Stat'i i rechi" [Articles and Speeches], Moscow, Partizdat TsK VKP(b), 1937, p 82.
- ² M. V. Frunze, "Izbrannyye proizvedeniya" [Selected Works], Moscow, Voenizdat, 1984, p 7.
- ³ Ibid., p 305.
- ⁴ V. I. Lenin, PSS [Complete Collected Works], Vol 51, p 276.
- ⁵ M. V. Frunze, op. cit., p 67.
- ⁶ A. S. Bubnov, "O Krasnoy Armii" [On the Red Army], Moscow, Voenizdat, 1958, p 76.
- ⁷ M. V. Frunze, op. cit., p 237.
- ⁸ Ibid., p 184.
- ⁹ Quoted in: VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL, No 6, 1966, p 67.
- ¹⁰ M. V. Frunze, op. cit., p 82.
- ¹¹ Ibid., p 183.

¹² Ibid., p 66.

¹³ Ibid., p 33.

¹⁴ Ibid., p 29.

¹⁵ Ibid., pp 34-35.

¹⁶ Ibid., p 456.

¹⁷ Ibid., p 34.

¹⁸ Ibid., p 82.

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10272

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THE MILITARY POLITICAL ACTIVITIES OF M. V. FRUNZE

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 3, Mar 85 [signed to press 22 Feb 85) pp 21-28

[Article by Army Gen A. A. Yepishev, chief of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy]

[Text] In the history of the revolutionary struggle of our people and the Communist Party, the glorious name of Mikhail Vasil'yevich Frunze is inscribed in gold letters as one of the closest associates of V. I. Lenin, as a prominent party, state and military figure, an outstanding military leader of the Leninist school and an active organizer of the Soviet Armed Forces.

He dedicated all his strength, all his vivid, heroic life and all himself without reserve to the cause of the revolution and its armed defense.

The vivid gifts of Frunze were particularly apparent in the military-political area. V. I. Lenin and the Communist Party found in him a talented executor of their plans and conceptions. He organically combined the qualities of a major military figure and a political Bolshevik leader.

Precisely in this area, his wholehearted dedication to the revolution, to the working class and to the Communist Party, his outstanding qualities as an organizer and indoctrinator of the masses, his unbending will, the depth and scope of political thinking, his indefatigable energy, personal courage and charm were most apparent.

For 7 short years he was to work in responsible military positions, moving over this time from the commissar of a military district to the chairman of the USSR Revolutionary Military Council [RVS] and USSR people's commissar for military and naval affairs. Such an ascent was natural. It was prepared for by all the previous revolutionary struggle which for M. V. Frunze had become the most important university of life.

The proletarian revolution, V. I. Lenin pointed out, for the first time gave to the previous individuals and heroes of the revolutionary struggle a true ground, a real base, a real situation, a real audience and a real proletarian army where they could fully manifest themselves.

In speaking about the military-political activities of Frunze, one must endeavor first of all to reassess that contribution which he made to working out and actually realizing our party's military policy during the years of the Civil War and postwar construction. The fundamental bases of this policy were thoroughly worked out by V. I. Lenin in the fierce struggle against the anti-party elements and was most fully embodied in the historic decisions of the 8th RKP(b) [Russian Communist Party (Bolshevik)] Congress on military questions.

In accord with the spirit and sense of these decisions and the Leninist theses Frunze viewed party policy in the military area as a subordinate part of its overall policy aimed at building a new society. He saw in the profound scientific elaboration and consistent observance of the Leninist principles of military policy the truest guarantee for the secure defense of the people's revolutionary victories and the world's first socialist fatherland.

One of the most characteristic traits in the military policy of the Communist Party and Soviet government was considered by Frunze to be its defensive focus and peaceful nature. He saw in this the fundamental distinction in the socialist type military policy from the aggressive militaristic policy of the imperialist states. Even now there is a timely ring to Frunze's words voiced in 1925 in a report at a meeting of secretaries from the RKP(b) cells under the PUR [RVS Political Directorate]: "One of the reasons for our strength and our moral greatness in the eyes of hundreds of millions of workers and peasants abroad is precisely that they have profound confidence in the peaceful nature of our military policy."¹ Our military policy under present-day conditions remains precisely this in its very social nature.

In a speech at a session of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee on 15 November 1985, the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, Comrade K. U. Chernenko, stated: "...Our nation does not intend to attack anyone. This is clear to any normal-thinking individual. But we will strengthen our defense capability, protecting the peaceful labor of the Soviet people and defending the cause of peace throughout the world."

In his articles and speeches, Frunze never ceased emphasizing the full degree of the military danger for the young Soviet state from the capitalist encirclement. Perfectly mastering the Marxist-Leninist method of scientific analysis he prophetically judged the development of the military-political situation and foresaw the inevitability of a new military attack on our country. Under these conditions he saw the main task of the party's military policy in ensuring the highest military readiness of the nation and combat readiness of its Armed Forces. At present, in line with the significant exacerbation in the international military-political situation caused by the U.S. reactionary circles, the demands on the nation's military might and the combat readiness of the Soviet Armed Forces have immeasurably risen. Peacefulness and a readiness to decisively rebuff the aggressor have been forged together in the party's military policy and they comprise the foundation of this policy and the military doctrine of the Soviet state.

In analyzing the military-political activities of M. V. Frunze, one can isolate in them two basic interrelated directions: in the first place, activities aimed

at strengthening the military might of the nation as a whole; secondly, activities direct link to the organizational development of the Red Army and to the strengthening of all the components of its military might.

Proceeding from a profound understanding of the democratic nature of a war in the defense of socialism, Frunze established and constantly carried out the idea of complete preparation of the nation for defense. In his works "On the Reorganization of the Military Apparatus," he emphasized that "not only at the moment of war itself but also before a war it is essential to give some thought to having all the state bodies and all the masses of people involved in preparing the nation for defense."³ Frunze viewed the idea of the all-round and nation-wide preparation of the country for defense as a most important demand of Soviet military doctrine and in working this out he played a special role. In establishing the objective necessity to have such a doctrine, he wrote that a state should determine ahead of time the nature of its general and particularly military policy, it should set the possible objectives of its military aspirations in accord with this and work out and establish a definite plan of state-wide activities which would take into account the future clashes and ensure ahead of time their success by utilizing the energy of the people.

In taking a direct part in the work of the superior party and Soviet bodies and in heading the central military apparatus, Frunze carried out diverse organizational activities to improve the material-technical base of defense, as well as to strengthen the sociopolitical bases of the nation's military might and the military-political unity of the Soviet republic. He did a great deal to increase the attention of the party and Soviet bodies at the center and on the spot in the questions of military organizational development, the extensive dissemination of military knowledge among the population and military-patriotic indoctrination of the Soviet people.

Such an integrated broad-scale approach to the questions of national defense ensured the necessary material, sociopolitical and spiritual prerequisites for successfully carrying out the tasks of developing a new socialist army.

All of Frunze's military-political activities were devoted to realizing the party's leading role in military organizational development. "The party," he wrote with inspiration, "has played and will play the leading role in all our military policy. Outside of such party work we cannot conceive of the strengthening of our nation's military might, the strengthening of might, inner cohesion, solidarity and discipline of our Red Army."⁴

The activities of M. V. Frunze in the area of party influence on the questions of military organizational development were diverse and vast. First of all, he was an ardent supporter of V. I. Lenin on the questions of party unity and showed constant concern for strengthening this. "As long as our party is strong and united," Frunze pointed out, "the Union of Soviet Republics is unshakable."⁵

In carrying out Lenin's instructions, M. V. Frunze devoted unflagging attention to establishing and strengthening the army party organizations. He linked troop morale and their ability to carry out the set combat missions with the presence of party cells in the units and their active work in the masses of Red Armymen.

Frunze had high regard for the force of party influence and the example set by the communists in a combat situation. Where the most difficult situation had arisen on the front, where people were needed dedicated to the cause of revolution and capable of carrying out an order at a price of their life, here, as a rule, he would send communists.

M. V. Frunze showed unabating concern for carrying out party political work in the socialist state's army. Relying on the well-known thesis of V. I. Lenin on the enormous importance of party political work and on his own personal experience of organizing it, he felt that political work was and always would be the basis of Soviet military organizational development and was implacable against any attempts to underestimate it. He emphasized that political work in the army was the main and most important guarantee for all its might and a special type of weapons which to a certain degree would be of decisive importance.

It is truly hard to overestimate the contribution made by M. V. Frunze to working out the theory and practice of party political work. In the first place, he was largely responsible for establishing the objective necessity of carrying it out in the new type army. Relying on the Leninist method of class analysis of social phenomena and the Leninist understanding of the socioclass nature and revolutionary character of wars in the defense of socialism, he pointed out that "political work as a whole maintains its place and importance. As before, it will be a new, additional type of weapon terrifying for any of our enemies."⁶ Secondly, he had exceptionally high regard for the role of the army and navy political bodies in organizing and carrying out party political work. "Their achievements in the past are immeasurable...", he wrote in 1924. "Being the bodies of the Communist Party in the army, the political bodies were the direct guides of those attitudes, energy and enthusiasm with which the party abounded as well as that confidence in victory which the working class carried."⁷

The activities of the political bodies, in Frunze's mind, gave the Red Army enormous advantages over any bourgeois army.

He was decisively against the fears voiced at one time that a switch to one-man leadership would involve a playing down of the role of the political bodies in the army and constantly explained that in any future clash of the Soviet Union with any bourgeois state, the activities of the political bodies would be of most enormous and, in many instances, decisive significance. Life fully confirmed the correctness of these views.

Thirdly, M. V. Frunze steadily fostered the idea that the main task of party political work and its crown was to ensure high combat readiness of the troops and a constant readiness of each Soviet soldier, upon the motherland's first appeal, to come to its defense. He demanded that they see to it that each commander and soldier be profoundly aware that under certain conditions "the interests of the Soviet fatherland demanded from him the readiness to sacrifice everything, up to his very life, for the independence and victory of the worker-peasant state."⁸

Frunze constantly emphasized that in political and military terms it was essential to prepare the troops to fight against a strong and technically equipped enemy.

Fourthly, M. V. Frunze taught the commanders and political workers to correctly and profoundly understand the essence of the effectiveness criteria for party political work. The successes of our work, he pointed out, are not determined by the number of reports and talks which you give, but rather by the number of people to whom you give a clarity of goal and strength of orientation. If in your unit there is even one man who relies on habit, on drift and only instinct, this means that the political work is not sufficiently good.

Frunze constantly linked a high effective influence on the awareness, feelings and conduct of the men with the fact that party political work reflected as fully as possible the tasks confronting the troops, that the efforts of the command and political personnel, the political bodies and party organizations were organically intertwined in it and that each soldier was in the field of their vision.

All the heroic life of M. V. Frunze clearly shows that he brilliantly met the most complicated and responsible tasks which were set for him by V. I. Lenin and the party Central Committee. In possessing rare military talent, Frunze was able to brilliantly apply Lenin's principles of political strategy and tactics in his military activities. In recognizing the dependence of military strategy upon political, he demanded that the commanders and political workers possess a requisite and profound knowledge of Lenin's political strategy and pointed out that precisely "here, in this area, we will find the key to many questions of a purely military sort.... For this reason...it is important for us to be familiar with the essence of Leninism, this strategy and tactics of proletarian struggle, down to the very base, down to the very depth."⁹

M. V. Frunze was an unswerving defender of the purity of Marxism-Leninism and was an ardent and consistent supporter of its application to examining the problems of military theory and practice. At the 11th Party Congress, he decisively condemned the splitting position of the Trotskyites from the military question, their attacks on party military policy and on the combat experience of the Red Army as well as their demagogic statements on the inapplicability of Marxism to military affairs.

In actuality, Frunze organically combined high military professionalism with a profound understanding of political and social factors. This was clearly confirmed in the optimum use of military strength and methods of sociopolitical action on the various strata of the Urals Cossackry who had taken the side of the counterrevolution during Frunze's activities on the Eastern Front.

His mission in Turkestan was also complicated and crucial. Here the questions of defeating the counterrevolution were most closely linked with carrying out the party's Leninist nationality policy. (It had been impossible to put an end to the Basmacks, emirs and shahs just with the force of arms.) It was essential first of all to win over the broad masses of the population, and to free them from the ideological influence of the feudal lords and reactionary clergy. The difficult, Frunze pointed out, was not in the military overcoming of the enemy, as this was not very difficult, the difficulty was to make the peaceful, working Moslem millions aware that the Basmacks were their enemy and that the struggle against them was a sacred task and support for the working people. In actively utilizing social and ideological methods for influencing the population,

Frunze at the same time initiated decisive measures to establish and strengthen the armed forces of Soviet Turkestan using the indigenous nationalities.

Historical experience has confirmed the truth that the struggle against the revolution's enemies should have a comprehensive nature. It presupposes the greatest possible broadening of the ideological and political influence of the ruling revolutionary party in the masses, its struggle for the masses and the winning of them over. Only under this condition would military methods produce the desired results.

In subsequent years, in working in the Ukraine, Frunze devoted enormous attention to strengthening the friendship and solidarity of the Russian and Ukrainian peoples. The situation then had developed in such a manner that it was essential to overcome great power tendencies, to fight against nationalism and political banditry and to root out the vestiges of the former hostility and mistrust in the relations between the workers of different nationalities. For this reason in one of the first places in his military activities he put the questions of indoctrinating the Ukrainian population, the soldiers and commanders in a spirit of proletarian internationalism and eradicating the hostile activities of the bourgeois nationalistic organizations.

An important guarantee for success and the permanent importance of the historical example of the military-political activities of Frunze for the present generations of commanders and political workers is that he was constantly guided by a Leninist style in work and actively introduced it.

All the military-political activities of M. V. Frunze were marked by a scientific approach on the basis of a high educational level and a profound knowledge of the assigned job. Not only Frunze's contemporaries but we ourselves do not cease being amazed at that profound knowledge in the area of economic sciences, philosophy, history, Marxism-Leninism as a whole which he fully mastered. Like any creative worker, he constantly experienced dissatisfaction with the achieved level and had a desire to master new heights of knowledge.

His credo in life was: "Initially study and then act decisively." He never shot from the hip, he did not take hurried or ill-considered decisions and was a convinced opponent of the slightest manifestations of voluntarism. No matter how complex and difficult the situation was, he first of all endeavored to understand it, to take into account the entire aggregate of factors determining its state and development and only then took a decision and firmly carried it out.

Strict scientificness in the work of M. V. Frunze was organically combined with a clear class, proletarian approach to solving any political, military, economic or ideological problem. He never tired of repeating that "for everything there must be...an approach from a class assessment, and everything must be weighed from the viewpoint of the interests of the proletarian revolutionary movement. This is the highest criterion.... This is the first demand which excludes any dogmatism and scholasticism."¹⁰

A thorough analysis of the political and class forces within the nation and on the international scene after the Civil War, made it possible for M. V. Frunze,

along with the other prominent military leaders, to successfully elaborate the ways for solving the national defense problems under the conditions of rebuilding the national economy and initiating the construction of socialism. One of these was the military reform carried out in accord with the decree of the party Central Committee under the direct leadership of M. V. Frunze.

The military and political activities of Frunze are a clear example of the unity of word and deed. In demanding hard work from others, he literally was consumed by his work and inspired others with his ardor. His entire life was a model of the unswerving fulfillment of party decisions, steadfastness in surmounting difficulties, humility and simplicity in dealings with others. He dealt strictly with any manifestations of a lack of discipline and disorganization and himself was an example of strict observance of discipline and order combined with firmness in defending party positions in front of anyone. He was responsible for applying Lenin's thesis on the three conditions for ensuring discipline in a revolutionary proletarian party to carrying out the task of strengthening discipline in the Red Army. "The command and political personnel of the Red Army, in introducing discipline in its ranks," he said in the report "Lenin and the Red Army," "must always remember these three conditions given by Comrade Lenin and which are the sole guarantee for strong and conscientious discipline. The first condition is the wholeheartedness and steadfastness of the command and political personnel; the second condition is the maintaining of the vital organic link of this command personnel with the Red Army masses and the third one is that this Red Army mass see the correctness of our leadership in practice and in deeds.... Only by following this Leninist task can we obtain true, strong, iron discipline in the Red Army ranks."¹

These ideas of the proletarian military leader are pertinent also today. In actuality, if a commander and a political worker truly want to achieve strong discipline in a subunit, unit or on a ship, then they should start from their personal example, they should thoroughly know the mood of the men, actively influence them, and show constant concern for organizing military and political training, for maintaining firm prescribed order and satisfying the needs and requests of subordinates.

The activities of M. V. Frunze in the area of troop leadership were characterized by an unbroken organic link with the masses of men and with the workers of the rear. To communicate with the commanders, political workers, the rank-and-file and workers was a natural need for him. Indicatively, with all his busyness, he never missed an opportunity to speak before the men on urgent questions of national life or the combat activities of the troops. From this contact he derived a profound understanding of their moods and motives and drew conclusions for organizing political indoctrination and cultural educational work. A study of troop morale directly in the thick of the men and commanders provided him with an opportunity to determine the realisticness and feasibility of the combat missions and operational plans.

M. V. Frunze excelled in a special ability to strike up close, joint work and to find, promote, indoctrinate and support command and political personnel. Under his leadership an entire galaxy of subsequently legendary commanders and military leaders fought and matured, including, V. K. Blyukher, S. M. Budennyi,

S. S. Vostretsov, D. M. Karbyshev, A. I. Kork, M. N. Tukhachevskiy, V. I. Chapayev and others. These names have become a symbol of wholehearted service to the October Revolution and unstinting zeal in the organizational development of the young Red Army.

M. V. Frunze made a very significant contribution to actually realizing one-man leadership in the Soviet Armed Forces. Here he placed particular emphasis on ensuring the political preparation of the commanders and demanded from them personal involvement in the political indoctrination of subordinates.

On the fronts of the Civil War, M. V. Frunze worked fruitfully with many prominent political workers, including: P. I. Baranov, K. Ye. Voroshilov, S. I. Gusev, S. M. Kirov, V. V. Kuybyshev, Bela Kun and others. The strengthening of the troops with party workers and a rise in their role were always one of his daily concerns.

Mikhail Vasil'yevich Frunze was a man who fully evidenced the traits organically inherent to the old guard of Leninist communists. He was a true Leninist not only in terms of the Leninist ideas which he accepted fully and in his wholehearted struggle to realize them, but also in terms of his way of life and in terms of the content of his abundant activities.

Time has not diminished that heritage which M. V. Frunze has left the present and future generations of military personnel. The task is, we feel, to further study the content of his life and his revolutionary, military and sociopolitical activities. Of particular importance for us is a profound knowledge and practical realization of the military theoretical views of M. V. Frunze in the tasks of training and indoctrinating the personnel, in strengthening military discipline and order and in increasing the combat readiness of the Soviet Armed Forces.

FOOTNOTES

¹ M. V. Frunze, "Sobr. Soch." [Collected Works], Moscow-Leningrad, Gosizdat, 1927, p 137.

² PRAVDA, 16 November 1984.

³ M. V. Frunze, "Izbrannyye proizvedeniya" [Selected Works], Moscow, Voenizdat, 1984, p 153.

⁴ Ibid., pp 257-258.

⁵ Ibid., p 237.

⁶ Ibid., p 148.

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Ibid., p 514.

⁹ Ibid., p 291.

¹⁰ Ibid., p 306.

¹¹ Ibid., p 310.

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10272

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M. V. FRUNZE--A REVOLUTIONARY OF THE LENINIST SCHOOL

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 3, Mar 85 [signed to press 22 Feb 85) pp 29-31

[Article by Academician A. G. Yegorov; published as a scientific paper from the conference with insignificant cuts]

[Text] During all the stages of its history, our party has promoted and does promote from its ranks prominent figures whose ideas and deeds most fully and profoundly express the urgent needs of the times and the trends of social progress.

Mikhail Vasil'yevich Frunze is precisely among such party, state and military leaders and revolutionaries of the Leninist school. He viewed Leninism as a theory and practice of Marxism in our age, emphasizing here that Leninism is the strategy and tactics of the working class and that it plays an enormous role in the indoctrination of the masses.

Characteristically, Frunze chose the difficult path of an underground Bolshevik and professional revolutionary consciously and once and for all. This happened in November 1904, on the eve of the first Russian revolution. In 1904, he wrote to his brother: "To profoundly know the laws which govern the course of history, to plunge headlong into reality, to merge oneself with the most progressive class of modern society, the working class, to live by its thoughts and hopes, by its struggle and to fundamentally re-do everything--this is the goal of my life...."¹

This letter is very instructive. In the first place, in the fact that Frunze here is defending the necessity of scientific socialism for the success of the working class struggle, rejecting all and every doctrine of "khvostism" [follow-in in the tail of political events] which at that time was known as "economism." Secondly, in the sense that even then Frunze clearly realized the necessity of strengthening the ties of scientific socialism with the revolutionary struggle of the working class.

In the course of the first Russian revolution, the working class of our country by a heroic struggle against the autocracy, the landowners and capitalists, demonstrated its ability to be the leader of a people's revolution and play a vanguard role in the international revolutionary movement. Its leaders--Lenin and his associates--covered themselves with undying glory as the column leaders

of historical progress. Mikhail Vasil'yevich Frunze was also among these leaders of the Leninist school. In 1905, the party assigned him to revolutionary work in Ivanovo-Voznesensk Kray. This was one of the major industrial regions of the nation and a center of acute class struggle, as the contrast of rich and poor, the contradiction between labor and capital here had been brought to an extreme.

The Ivanovo-Voznesensk party organization and its leading bodies had almost an exclusively worker membership. Here they had actually realized the demand of V. I. Lenin who had constantly proposed at the Third Party Congress that workers be included in the committees. There was good reason for this fact. The entire 1905 revolution had a proletarian nature both in terms of the methods of struggle and the leading role of the working class.

On 12 May 1905, M. V. Frunze led a strike of the Ivanovo-Voznesensk workers. It lasted 72 days. The workers elected their representative deputies, a total of 141 persons. This Ivanovo-Voznesensk Soviet of delegates was one of the first soviets of worker deputies in Russia. In terms of its party composition it was Bolshevik. From the very first days of its existence the soviet became a powerful force which the local authorities of Tsarist power and the manufacturers were forced to consider.

Mikhail Vasil'yevich Frunze was the soul of all the party's political, organizational and propaganda activities in Ivanovo-Voznesensk. The well-known leader of the Russian revolutionary movement, Ol'ga Afanas'yevna Varentsova, in recalling her work with Frunze, has written that, regardless of his youth, he was striking in his organizational capability, affirmativism and professionalism in discussing the questions of party life. The Ivanovo-Voznesensk and Shuya textile workers loved and valued Frunze, and trusted him unconditionally.

As soon as the news of the December Revolt in Moscow reached Ivanovo-Voznesensk, Frunze proposed that a detachment of worker militia be sent to help the Muscovites and he himself led it. For 9 days, side by side with the Moscow workers, they drove off the attacks of the government troops. And when the revolt was suppressed, they broke out of the encirclement and returned to Ivanovo-Voznesensk. The experience which Frunze gained during the period of the first Russian revolution, in being a dress rehearsal for Great October, was of enormous significance for his further revolutionary activities.

In April 1906, Mikhail Frunze, also known as Arsenius (this was the name given to their leader by the Ivanovo-Voznesensk Bolsheviks), was elected as a delegate to the 4th (United) Party Congress. Here at the congress in Stockholm, Mikhail Vasil'yevich for the first time met V. I. Lenin. Lenin listened with great attention to Frunze's stories about the Ivanovo workers and asked about the "worker university" at Talka. This meeting made an indelible impression on Frunze. In 1907, M. V. Frunze was elected a delegate also to the 5th (London) RSDRP [Russian Social Democratic Workers Party] Congress. However, he was unable to make the congress as his arrest prevented this.

Starting from 1904 up to the February Revolution, Frunze was repeatedly arrested for his revolutionary activities, he was twice sentenced to death and spent 7 years in prison, forced labor and exile. But no hardships could break the iron character of this ardent Bolshevik.

In 1916, Frunze escaped from exile and under the name of Mikhaylov was sent by the party for revolutionary work in the army. He served on the committee of the All-Russian Zemstvo [Prerevolutionary Administrative Council] Union on the Western Front and headed the Bolshevik underground in Minsk with departments in the 3d and 10th Armies. With the outbreak of the February Revolution, he became one of the leaders of the revolutionary movement in Minsk, in Belorussia and on the Western Front.

After the 6th Party Congress, Frunze and the Minsk Bolsheviks initiated extensive revolutionary propaganda of the congress decisions and carried out energetic preparations for an armed insurrection. In the aim of uniting efforts, a decision was taken to set up a single Bolshevik center of Belorussia and the Western Front.

Upon the request of the Ivanovo-Voznesensk District Committee of the RSDRP(b) [Russian Social Democratic Workers Party (Bolshevik)], the Central Committee of the Bolshevik party in August 1917 sent Frunze to Ivanovo-Voznesensk. Mikhail Vasil'yevich began to work in Shuya. The decisive role in sending Frunze to Shuya was played by the fact that the leadership in the town дума [an elective body], the district council and the soviet of peasant deputies had been seized by the Mensheviks and SR's. The task was to neutralize their influence. In addition, Shuya was a rather important military center as the soldiers had to be turned into dependable allies of the workers in the coming revolution. Frunze brilliantly carried out these tasks. When the news arrived of the victory of the armed revolt in Petrograd, a complete transfer of power to the hands of the proletariat was carried out in Shuya without a single shot being fired.

However, from Moscow came the alarming news of the intense engagements against the troops of the Provisional Government. Frunze, using his power as the chairman of the Revolutionary Committee, issued instructions to the chief of the garrison that an armed detachment of Shuya and Ivanovo workers some 2,000-strong should be organized and dispatched to Moscow. He himself left for there earlier to have a look at the situation. In Moscow, Frunze took an active part in the street battles, in the storming of the Kremlin and in capturing the Metropol Hotel, one of the last refuges of the counterrevolution. The farsightedness and efficiency and the ability to correctly assess a complicated situation as evidenced by Frunze on the barricades of the 1905 revolution, during the October days of 1917, in organizing the suppression of the Kornilov troops and the Yaroslavl revolt shown and demonstrated his extraordinary military abilities.

In 1918, the party switched Frunze to military work where his generalship and military-theoretical talents were given free reign. Mikhail Vasil'yevich made a substantial contribution to strengthening our nation's defenses, to the organizational development of the Soviet Armed Forces and to working out a military doctrine of a socialist state and the forms and methods of conducting military operations from the standpoint of Marxism-Leninism.

A loyal student of V. I. Lenin, M. V. Frunze made a valuable contribution to the treasurehouse of scientific socialism on other important problems, too. In basing himself on Lenin's theoretical ideas on the nationality question, the decrees of the 8th and 10th Party Congresses and the decisions of the October

(1921) Plenum of the RKP(b) [Russian Communist Party (Bolshevik)] Central Committee, Mikhail Vasil'yevich did a great deal to carry out party policy aimed at uniting the Soviet republics and strengthening their union. Mikhail Vasil'yevich in a number of his works disclosed the objective factors which necessitated a close unity of the Soviet people and the Leninist principles of founding a multinational Soviet state, and he showed the inseparable link of the nationality question with the main political, economic, military and cultural measures of the Soviet government.

The ideas and deeds of Mikhail Vasil'yevich Frunze are not merely a monument of history. No, these are vital factors in contemporary life. With creative assimilation in accord with the needs of our times, they show ever-new facets and glow with ever-new luster. This is why we must study and assimilate ever-more profoundly and soundly the very rich heritage of Mikhail Vasil'yevich Frunze and indoctrinate new generations in his example, raising ever higher the title and importance of a member of the Leninist party.

FOOTNOTE

- ¹ "M. V. Frunze. Zhizn' i deyatel'nost'" [M. V. Frunze. Life and Activities], Moscow, Gospolitizdat, 1962, p 12.

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10272

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THE CONTRIBUTION OF M. V. FRUNZE TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF STRATEGY AND OPERATIONAL ART

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 3, Mar 85 [signed to press 22 Feb 85) pp 31-34

[Article by Prof, Army Gen M. M. Kozlov]

[Text] In the history of the Soviet state and in its military chronicle, M. V. Frunze has gone as a major political and military figure and as a talented proletarian general of the Leninist school.

In commanding the Southern Group of Forces of the Eastern Front and later the Eastern, Turkestan and Southern Fronts, M. V. Frunze successfully conducted nine major offensive operations which were unique in their concept and execution. They all ended with the complete defeat of the enemy and were all marked by a creative approach to selecting the sector of the main thrust and the time of making it, by a bold concentrating of men and weapons on the crucial sector, by high troop maneuverability, and by an unabating desire to attack the enemy flank and rear in the aim of encircling and defeating it.

M. V. Frunze made a significant contribution to the development of strategy and operational art in working out and conducting the counteroffensive by the Southern Group of the Eastern Front against the main Kolchak forces in May-June 1919. This counteroffensive was comprised of three offensive operations that were successive in depth, the Buguruslan, Belebey and Ufa and united by a single strategic concept. In the Civil War, this was the first instructive experience which played a major role in the development of Soviet military art.

In the counteroffensive of the Southern Group, M. V. Frunze was the first in the Civil War to shift from the practice of the even distribution of forces along the front to establishing assault operational groupings on the crucial sectors. For example, in the Buguruslan Operation, with an overall equality in the balance of forces, M. V. Frunze concentrated two-thirds of the Southern Group troops in a 220-km-wide area on the sector of the main thrust, thereby creating a double superiority over the enemy. He left only one-third of the forces for defending the remaining 720-km sector of the front and this was one-half the number of the enemy, taking the risk, undoubtedly, for the sake of the main, operational-strategic result. The constant desire to establish a strong assault grouping on the main sector with the aim of dealing a decisive defeat to the enemy can be traced in all the operations carried out by Frunze.

The experience of the deep, large-scale flanking attack made by the Southern Group in the aim of defeating the main enemy grouping was also a contribution to the development of military art. For Frunze this became one of the decisive forms of an operational maneuver in his subsequent offensive operations.

Soon after the counteroffensive carried out by the Southern Group, M. V. Frunze was appointed commander of the Eastern Front. In following the instructions of V. I. Lenin of not to weaken the offensive and before winter to complete the liberation of the Urals with its numerous working class and plants, in July-August Frunze successfully conducted operations under the difficult conditions of a wooded mountain terrain and interlacustrine defiles.

In the course of the Chelyabinsk Operation which was marked by great dynamicness and meeting encounters, Frunze sought a decisive success by a deep outflanking of the enemy grouping which was making a counterstrike. He prepared for the capture of Chelyabinsk and coordinated his actions with the rebel workers of the city while the liberation of Troitsk involved partisan actions and this was a new phenomenon in military art. The decisive attack against Troitsk and the capture of the town led to a situation where the White Guard front was split into two parts and these were deprived of effective contact. The basic forces of the Kolchak troops began a hurried retreat deep into Siberia while their Southern Army began to pull back into Orenburg and Urals Oblast.

In mid-August 1919, the Turkestan Front was established. It included the 1st, 4th and 11th Armies as well as the troops of the Turkestan Republic. M. V. Frunze was appointed the commander of this front.

Proceeding from an analysis of the existing military-political situation, and the balance of forces, the missions confronting the front were carried out in the course of two offensive operations that were successive in terms of front and time: the Aktyubinsk and Ural-Guryev.

From the viewpoint of the development of military art, the Aktyubinsk Operation was very instructive; it was carried out in August-September. This was the first example of the successful encirclement and rapid and complete rout of a large enemy grouping some 60,000 strong by forces that were half the size, and under the conditions of steppe terrain, where combat operations were conducted not along a solid front but by individual sectors. Such decisive aims were achieved as a result of the surprise, pre-emptive strike by the advancing groupings, the outflanking of both flanks of the White Guard Southern Army, the splitting of it into two parts and the rapid encirclement by a deep cavalry raid into the enemy rear for cutting its escape routes.

The Ural-Guryev Operation conducted from 2 November 1919 through 10 January 1920, enriched Soviet military art with experience in fighting on the steppe expanses under conditions of harsh winter and a lack of roads.

Also instructive was the organization of armed combat by M. V. Frunze against the Basmacks in Central Asia. In the mountainous regions of Fergana, where there was no solid front, surprise raids were organized as a counter to the more decisive form of actions, that is, encirclement and destruction of the Basmack bands during their attacks on Soviet garrisons. For this so-called flying

detachments (mounted operational groups) were organized and these cooperated closely with the garrisons.

The high generalship art of M. V. Frunze was also apparent in the Bukhara Operation, the instructiveness of which is primarily in the fact that the 40,000-strong arm of the Bukhara emir was defeated by forces a quarter of the strength in just 5 days.

Soon after the Bukhara Operation, M. V. Frunze, upon the proposal of V. I. Lenin, was appointed commander of the newly organized Southern Front.

Having stabilized the front in Northern Tauria and on the Dnieper in mid-October 1920, the Soviet troops with a large semicircle enveloped the enemy army and thus created conditions for its encirclement and defeat.

The strategic offensive operation conducted from 28 October through 17 November against Vrangeli was formed from two frontal operations which were successive in depth and unified by a common plan: the counteroffensive in Northern Tauria which took a week and the Perekop-Chongar Operation which lasted 11 days after a 3-day lull.

The Perekop-Chongar Operation provided: in the first place, the only example in the Civil War of a breakthrough, and in a short period of time (in 3-4 days) of a strongly reinforced, deeply echeloned positional enemy defense; secondly, the experience of a deep operational configuration of the front's troops; thirdly, the experience of employing two cavalry armies as mobile groups and this made it possible to successfully carry out the problem of an operational breakthrough; finally, new experience in crossing the Sivash and at night, in the aim of the Soviet troops emerging in the rear of the main enemy grouping defending Perekop. This was also employed in the Great Patriotic War.

The diverse combat experience generalized by Frunze after the war and enriched by Marxist-Leninist methodology served as a subsequent foundation for working out the theory of an operation in depth. This experience was tested out and successfully employed on the battlefields of the Great Patriotic War. Under present-day conditions it has also largely maintained its timeliness.

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10272

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M. V. FRUNZE ON THE TRAINING AND INDOCTRINATION OF SOVIET MILITARY PERSONNEL

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 3, Mar 85 [signed to press 22 Feb 85) pp 34-37

[Article by Army Gen I. N. Shkadov]

[Text] M. V. Frunze left a rich military-theoretical heritage on all areas of the organizational development of the Armed Forces and on the sectors of military science, including on the questions of training, indoctrination and an entire complex of problems related to work with the military personnel. These questions were worked out with particular profundity and completeness in such works as "Lenin and the Red Army," "A Unified Military Doctrine and the Red Army," "On the Reorganization of the Military Apparatus," "On the Academy and Academies," "The Questions of Higher Military Education," "The Red Army and One-Man Command," "The Next Tasks of the Political Workers," and others.

M. V. Frunze passionately propagandized, defended and introduced Lenin's underlying principles of work with the personnel and primarily the principle of the selection and placement of them in terms of political and professional qualities. It must be emphasized that he, like many outstanding military leaders, was a remarkable military pedagogue, he had a good knowledge of human psychology, he was a great expert on political and military indoctrination and training, and gave closest attention to the questions of the training, placement and indoctrination of military personnel. Many of his views and the conclusions formulated by him have kept their importance under present-day conditions.

M. V. Frunze noted with great satisfaction the fact that our party and state, regardless of the exceptionally difficult conditions under which the Red Army had been founded, had succeeded in training and indoctrinating their own military personnel from the workers and peasants. M. V. Frunze explained the successes in the training of the Red Army military personnel chiefly by the attention shown to this problem from the party.

M. V. Frunze constantly recalled that the nature of a possible future war placed particularly high demands on the command and political personnel. For precisely this reason he showed great concern for improving the ideological conditioning and professional training of the military personnel, considering this a most important condition for successfully carrying out all tasks in the area of the organizational development and training of the Armed Forces.

Proceeding from the instructions of the party Central Committee on personnel questions, Mikhail Vasil'yevich Frunze demanded that the VUZes and troops train a commander who possessed the following qualities: 1) An ardent and revolutionary spirit and passion for carrying out the ideas of communism and the ability to instill this spirit in subordinates; 2) the ability to quickly understand the phenomena of life occurring around him; 3) to possess a total of definite knowledge on a military specialty; 4) to be able to pass on his knowledge and skills to subordinates, that is, to possess pedagogical abilities; 5) to have the skills of instructing his subordinates, proceeding from the simple to the more complex; 6) be an example of a soldier in whom a subordinate would see a model worthy of imitation; 7) the commander should be irreproachable in moral terms.

With the development of the Red Army, considering the nature of a future war, the demands on the training of the command and political personnel increased even more. Considering this, Frunze constantly reminded the commanders and political workers of the need to keep track of everything occurring in our Armed Forces as well as in the armies of other countries and that steady, systematic work on one's own education was essential. "...This is a duty for all commanders without exception," he emphasized. "The person who does not do this very soon will be far behind and in this case could only blame himself."¹ Frunze emphasized that in order to best serve the interests of the workers and peasants, it was not enough to merely belong to the proletariat or to the peasantry or even have the most wholehearted dedication to the interests of the workers. Significantly more was required from the Red commander. In order that a Red Army commander stand at the proper height as a commander of the socialist revolution's army, he should have a perfect mastery of the method of Marxism-Leninism. This, in turn, can be achieved only in the instance that all the work of the higher school and all the training of the command and political personnel in the army and navy be permeated with a spirit of Marxism-Leninism, if all military disciplines are given a Marxist-Leninist interpretation and if the study of Leninism is always on the proper height. These demands are also pertinent today.

M. V. Frunze acutely posed the question of the creative mastery of the principles of military science and military art and a profound rethinking of the experience of the past and a creative approach to it considering the nature of future wars and the development of military art. Frunze constantly emphasized that "the commander who rests on his laurels, who relies solely on his old accomplishments and on this basis does not move forward in his education and improvement, this commander will not encounter support from us."²

M. V. Frunze on this question set an example of exactingness and a self-critical attitude toward himself. "I can say frankly and honestly about myself," he said, "that for a whole series of questions I constantly feel my great backwardness. One feels how much one has to do in order to truly become worthy of those posts which the Soviet government has placed us in."³

At present, our party has done a great deal to improve the training of personnel. More than 70 percent of the officers have a higher, higher military or higher special military education. This is a great, tangible accomplishment.

At the same time, it must be pointed out that this has given rise in a certain group of leaders to complacency and has dulled exactingness on oneself and subordinates in the area of the need to constantly improve theoretical and practical knowledge.

M. V. Frunze warned the commanders that military science and military affairs were moving forward rapidly. An idea if it does not reinforce itself and if it does not keep up on all achievements in military affairs becomes impotent and sterile. Hence the conclusion: "Only those of us," he said, "who feel a constant dissatisfaction with themselves, a dissatisfaction and incompleteness with one's scientific knowledge...only this person will endeavor to broaden his viewpoint, to add to his theoretical and practical knowledge. This person will not fall behind in military affairs, he will be ahead and, possibly, lead tens and hundreds of others."⁴ M. V. Frunze was impatient and sharply critical of dilettantism, and he condemned those who self-confidently and uncontestedly took it upon themselves to judge various problems of theory and practice.

One of the conditions for a serious and sound preparation of the commanders and political workers was considered by M. V. Frunze to be their continuous study of major questions using original sources. Only with the direct study and investigation of facts, documents and works are convictions honed and profound thoughts born.

M. V. Frunze proceeded from Lenin's demands on promoting to leadership profoundly competent people, for no conscientiousness, no party authoritativeness, V. I. Lenin, pointed out, could replace what is the main thing in the given instance, a knowledge of the question. Mikhail Vasil'yevich considered as a major evil for military service the military-theoretical backwardness of a senior leader who because of insufficient competence not only was unable to effectively head the job assigned, see all its aspects and skillfully direct subordinates but was unable to profoundly analyze what had been reported to him.

Competence, the ability to think and act under conditions of an extremely rigid time limit and enormous moral-psychological and physical stresses, a heightened feeling for the new, the ability to assume responsibility for solving complex questions, to promptly spot and support initiative, to mobilize the will and energy of the personnel--these are the main demands upon an officer of our times.

M. V. Frunze pointed to the necessity of a close link of theoretical studies with the working out of practical skills for effectively carrying out tasks in the troops and warned that a young commander who showed uncertainty in carrying out practical tasks would fall into a difficult situation in the troops. For this reason Mikhail Vasil'yevich constantly drew attention to the fact that in the training process in the military schools, in commander training in the troops there should be an optimum combination of theoretical training and practical skills and good practical training.

The faculty of the VUZes were urged by M. V. Frunze to avoid formalism in training and indoctrinational work, to judge the assimilation of the training material by the students not only from their replies but also how they employed this knowledge in practice, to develop in the students the ability to precisely and

clearly formulate their decisions, to give missions to subordinates and practically organize their fulfillment. In inculcating in the trainees standard norms and work rules obligatory for all, he demanded that leveling, the suppressing of their individuality and uniqueness not be allowed. Mikhail Vasil'yevich recommended that more concern be shown for the developing of operational-tactical thinking, a firm commander's nature and other organizational and volitional qualities. In the process of instruction in the VUZes and commander training in the troops, he saw to it that chief attention was given to the operational-tactical training of the commanders. Frunze considered the elimination of "operational-tactical impotence" to be the main task both of the VUZes and the troops. It must be reemphasized that this demand of M. V. Frunze's is also pertinent today. Without high operational-tactical and military-technical training, a modern commander is simply inconceivable.

Frunze showed a particularly demanding attitude toward increasing the personal responsibility of the instructors, students and officer candidates and was extremely disapproving of overstating grades by certain instructors. He said directly that the duty of each student was to justify those large material outlays which the state had made on his instruction. "The time spent...in the walls of the Military Academy...must be used 100 percent in order to prepare oneself as well as possible for the coming responsible work. Study and assimilating the subject should be in the forefront."⁵ Echoing these ideas and practical recommendations of the proletarian military leader are the measures presently being undertaken to strengthen the VUZes and to bring the training and indoctrinational process closer to the needs of the troops.

Over the years of their existence, the Soviet Armed Forces have been fundamentally transformed. The military-technical revolution of recent years has brought about fundamental qualitative changes in their organization, technical equipping and in all areas of military affairs. Over the years which have passed since the founding of the Red Army, we have developed a remarkable officer corps. In terms of its ideological level, education, culture and professional military skill it is the best in the world. The modern achievements of military science and military art have incorporated all preceding military experience and primarily the experience of the Soviet Armed Forces and they have been its continuation and the development of the ideas of the Soviet military theoreticians and military chiefs.

Mikhail Vasil'yevich Frunze was one of these. His military theoretical ideas, and in particular the concept concerning the preparation and training of military personnel, their selection and placement, that is, the entire range of problems concerning personnel work, are employed today and are utilized in the practical activities of the command and political personnel of the Soviet Army and Navy.

FOOTNOTES

¹ M. V. Frunze, "Sobr. Soch." [Collected Works], Moscow-Leningrad, Gosizdat, Vol 2, 1926, p 172.

² Ibid., p 171.

³ Ibid., p 37.

⁴ Ibid., p 80.

⁵ Ibid., p 19.

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10272

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M. V. FRUNZE AND SOVIET MILITARY SCIENCE

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 3, Mar 85 [signed to press 22 Feb 85) pp 37-40

[Article by Prof, Mar Armored Trps O. A. Losik]

[Text] Relying on Lenin's ideas on military questions and creatively applying the Marxist dialectical method, M. V. Frunze made an enormous contribution to the establishing and development of Soviet military science during the years of the Civil War and the interwar period.

In his scientific works, Frunze established the nature of a future war and the methods of waging it and he worked out the theoretical principles of military doctrine. The opponents of M. V. Frunze accused him that he supposedly, by his military-theoretical problems, "distracted" the command and all the army from practical questions and the studying of regulations. M. V. Frunze acted decisively against the Trotskyites who denied military science as he was persuaded that without a solution to general theoretical problems it was impossible to create scientifically sound manuals. We cannot, he said, help but move our military theoretical thoughts farther and instill this thought in our command personnel as this would threaten us with stagnation and military theoretical backwardness which would be reflected in all our practical activities.

Of great theoretical and practical significance was the establishing by M. V. Frunze of the basic ways for developing Soviet military science. He gave special attention to a profound study by the command and political personnel of the works of K. Marx, F. Engels and V. I. Lenin as well as Marxist-Leninist methodology in the aim of ensuring the creative application of the Marxist dialectical method in military science. M. V. Frunze considered as the basis of military scientific work a critical analysis and generalization of the experience of the imperialist and Civil wars, the operational and combat training of the units, formations and field forces of the Red Army as well as the establishing and maintaining of close contact with the nation's scientific centers and scientists and the use of their achievements in the interests of increasing the combat might of the army and navy.

Upon the instructions of M. V. Frunze, military scientific societies were established in the Red Army Military Academy as well as in the formations and field forces for conducting scientific research.

The great talent of a researcher and the enormous experience gained by M. V. Frunze in the course of the Civil War and in the postwar years in high government positions contributed to the fruitfulness of his military theoretical work. Of important significance were his active party undertakings and participation in the discussion of military questions at party congresses and in working out a series of party program documents.

In the area of the theory of military art, one of the most important questions worked out by M. V. Frunze was the question of the nature of a future war. M. V. Frunze considered the just, revolutionary nature of a war to be its main feature if the Soviet Union was to wage it. It would be marked by uncompromisingness, by a decisiveness of aims and by a fierceness of combat operations. Hence, M. V. Frunze drew the practical conclusion that it was essential "to introduce more strongly into the awareness of all the population of our Union a notion that modern wars are waged not by the army alone but by the entire nation as a whole...that the war would be a fatal war, a war not for life but to the death and that for this reason thorough, careful preparations for it are essential even in peacetime."¹

The decisive nature of the future war, M. V. Frunze was profoundly persuaded, required the indoctrination of the command personnel and all the personnel in a spirit of the greatest activity and an organic combination of offensive and defensive. He wrote: "The troops in peacetime should be organized and indoctrinated in such a manner as to be able to carry out both defensive and offensive tasks. But they should be prepared first of all for the tasks of an active offensive nature, for this is the most responsible, important and psychologically most difficult part of the combat missions generally."² But Frunze recognized not formal offensiveness but rather mobility, initiative and activity which ensured the successful outcome of an offensive operation. He also profoundly studied positional (defensive) forms of combat, their role and place in operations. Under certain conditions, as Frunze felt, their use was completely justified.

In the works of M. V. Frunze a significant place is devoted to examining the most important principle of military art, the principle of firm and uninterrupted troop command and control. He emphasized that only highly ideological and spiritually strong military leaders, persons with unbending will, decisive, bold and enterprising persons could hold troop command in their hands and win a victory over the enemies.

Upon instructions from Frunze, the manual "Vyssheye komandovaniye" [Higher Command] was worked out. This stated the bases for the preparation and conduct of front and army operations. This, in essence, marked the beginning to a clear division of Soviet military art into strategy, operational art and tactics.

In the area of the theory of military organizational development, M. V. Frunze proceeded from the Leninist thesis that the fundamental basis of organizational development in the Soviet Army is leadership by the Communist Party. He made a significant contribution to establishing such principles of Soviet military organizational development as centralism, one-man command and strict military discipline. From the very essence of the military organization, its goals and purpose, he concluded that "the strength of the army lies in discipline, in the

determination to accurately and unquestionably fulfill the orders of the corresponding levels of command."³

In his works Frunze pointed out that success in a war to a significant degree will depend upon the technical equipping of the army and navy. A correct assessment of the development rates and purpose of the new types of weapons and equipment such as tanks, aircraft, radio and combat chemicals made it possible for him to conclude that: "A future war to a significant degree, if not completely, will be a war of machines."⁴

In giving important significance to equipment, M. V. Frunze at the same time did not absolutize it. A dialectical-materialistic assessment of the role of equipment and man in a war led him to the following fundamental conclusion that in a war man would play the decisive role and without him equipment was dead.

M. V. Frunze also left a rich military theoretical heritage in the area of the theory of troop training and indoctrination. He gave great importance to achieving a unity of political and military indoctrination. "On the question of the military-political indoctrination of the Red Army," M. V. Frunze wrote, "we should pay attention to the necessity of merging the two lines: the purely military and the political lines."⁵

M. V. Frunze solidly established the notion of bringing combat training as close as possible to wartime conditions. He demanded that combat training be carried out with an eye to the future, creatively, with the maximum introduction of the latest military scientific achievements.

M. V. Frunze made a great contribution to the theory of military economics and the rear. He defined the place and role of the rear in the system of the socialist state's military might and disclosed the importance of logistical support for the troops and the military economic education of command personnel.

M. V. Frunze clearly saw the inseparable link between the level and quality of the economy, on the one hand, and the army's combat might on the other. The maturity of a nation's economic development, he said, tells favorably on the quality of the "human material" from which the army is formed, it contributes to the technical equipping of the troops, provides for their maneuvering in the theater of military operations and so forth.

M. V. Frunze proposed that with time and space available, there is the possibility, on the basis of reserves, to restore the battleworthiness of an army and successfully continue further combat. This conclusion put in the hands of military theory a key for resolving the most important strategic problems of planning a war and economically preparing the nation to convert to satisfying military economic needs. The early preparation of the rear, the reorganization of the national economy considering the needs of a future war, that is, the increased military-economic potential, was considered to be by M. V. Frunze a task of exceptional importance for the fate of the socialist state. "It is essential to draw up," he emphasized, "an operational plan for the deployment of the national economy during the war just as we do for the troops. This plan should precisely consider all our needs and all our resources."⁶

The military theoretical views of M. V. Frunze played a major role in preparing the country for the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945 and for the achieving of the Soviet people's victory in it. The theoretical views worked out by him on military doctrine and on the basic areas of Soviet military science have fully maintained their importance under present-day conditions.

Thus, M. V. Frunze left a great military-theoretical heritage the value of which is that it was founded on the basis of Marxism-Leninism and permeated with a party spirit. It generalized the experience of the organizational development for the Armed Forces of the world's first socialist state and provided a forecast for the future.

FOOTNOTES

¹ M. V. Frunze, "Sobr. Soch." [Collected Works], Moscow-Leningrad, Gosizdat, Vol III, 1927, p 253.

² Ibid., Vol II, p 273.

³ Ibid., Vol III, p 86.

⁴ Ibid., pp 251-252.

⁵ M. V. Frunze, "Izbrannyye proizvedeniya" [Selected Works], Moscow, Voenizdat, 1984, p 71.

⁶ Ibid., p 168.

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10272

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M. V. FRUNZE ON THE MORAL FACTOR IN MODERN WAR

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 3, Mar 85 [signed to press 22 Feb 85) pp 40-43

[Article by Doctor of Philosophical Sciences, Prof, Lt Gen D. A. Volkogonov]

[Text] The brief, like a vivid flash, life of the proletarian military leader has been marked not only by a worthy place in the memory of the people but also by his numerous military scientific works which continue to live and their timeliness at the end of the 20th Century is very high. One of the reasons for the long life of the ideas advanced by M. V. Frunze has been that he, in all his works, has relied on the classics of Marxism and on the works of the genial V. I. Lenin. In the broad spectrum of his interests, a leading place was held by the problem of the moral factor in terms of modern war.

What new and original did M. V. Frunze introduce into the Marxist-Leninist interpretation of the moral factor? What is the importance of this in our days? Let us endeavor to briefly answer these questions. As is known, the military thinkers and generals of the past had long noticed the dependence of victories and defeats upon the state of morale of the fighting masses. Interesting surmises can be found in Clausewitz, Jomini, Dragomirov, Suvorov and Mikhnevich.... But only the founders of Marxism-Leninism showed that the moral factor of a society, a people and an army is nothing more than a specific manifestation of social awareness expressing their spiritual ability (and determination!) to endure the harshest testings of the war and not lose the will to fight and for victory. Why then is this spiritual capacity called a moral factor? The entire question is that in the process of carrying out major missions in a war, such forms of social awareness as political and moral come to the forefront. The attitude of people toward a war, their assessment of its events and the readiness to carry out the corresponding tasks in it are expressed in such moral categories as military duty, heroism, courage, honor, self-sacrifice and so forth.

M. V. Frunze, in proceeding from the Leninist methodology of interpreting the essence of the moral factor, enriched its understanding of important theses contained in a number of his works and speeches, for example, the "Privet PURu" [Greetings to the RVS Political Directorate], in the speech at the RKKA Military Academy on 20 December 1924 and in a speech at the Bolshoy Theater on 16 February 1925 devoted to the international situation and military tasks, in

the speech at the graduation of the military political academy courses on 17 August 1925, in the report "The Red Army and the Defense of the Soviet Union" at the Third Congress of Soviets and so forth. We would point out that his major works, a significant portion of them probably, were written by him in 1925, in the last year of his life. These theses which broaden and deepen our understanding of the essence and content of the moral factor can be grouped in the following manner.

The first thesis. The central point of high morale is the awareness of the military masses. In following Lenin's instructions that "the development of the awareness of the masses remains, as always, the base and main content of all our work,"¹ M. V. Frunze devoted a significant portion of his speeches and articles to the questions of improving political work in the army, the ways to increase the moral strength of the personnel and achieve a clear understanding of the class goals in a world-wide struggle. He saw in the high proletarian awareness of the Red Armymen one of our decisive advantages over the imperialist enemies. At present, when developed socialism (and this is its enormous, outstanding achievement) has achieved a strategic balance with the potential enemy, we have objective opportunities now and in the future to have an indisputable spiritual advantage over the enemy founded on awareness, a justness of goals and the greatness of communist ideals which, in using the words of Frunze, "inspire the new army." The strengthening and increasing of this spiritual superiority, wrote Frunze, is possible only on the basis of political work in the masses of soldiers whom Mikhail Vasil'yevich remarkably termed a new, additional branch of arms. A real strengthening of this work, as is required by the CPSU Central Committee and the instructions of the minister of defense and the chief of the main political directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy, to a significant degree depend upon shifting its center of gravity directly into the troop collectives, broadening the influence of all levels of commanders and superiors on the process of indoctrination and inculcating in its creativity a desire to achieve high, ultimate goals.

The second thesis developed by M. V. Frunze concerns the elaboration of the social role of the moral factor in a war, expressed, in using the language of today, in its functions. The proletarian military leader and thinker, in noting the enormous impact of the spiritual abilities of the fighting masses in achieving victory, pointed out that due to the party's work, these [the spiritual abilities] ensure the ideological and moral-political orientation of the people and the army in the war, the uniting of the people and army around the nation's political leadership as well as the function of a direct incentive, a motive of action and conduct in the combat of the soldiers, subunits and units.

In other words, the moral factor, as M. V. Frunze pointed out, makes it possible to create the spiritual prerequisites for realizing the plans in a combat situation, for carrying out combat missions and for achieving definite goals. These ideas which found brilliant confirmation in the Great Patriotic War are exceptionally pertinent now, when the combat might of the Soviet Armed Forces is comprised of an organic unity of the material, spiritual and organizational components.

The third thesis, which can be considered a substantial contribution by the proletarian thinker to the theoretic elaboration of Marxist-Leninist teachings,

is his ideas on the relationship of man and equipment in a war. In his report "On Military Organizational Development and the Tasks of the Military Scientific Society" in May 1925, he emphasized that in a war "the decisive role will belong not to equipment, for behind the equipment is always a living man and without whom the equipment is dead."² The importance of this conclusion is hard to overestimate, particularly at present when the crest of the wave of scientific-technical progress has risen unprecedentedly high and the technical innovations stun human imagination. Under conditions when computers, automatic systems and very complicated systems have invaded our lives, for us methodologically it is important to see that these devices are created by people, controlled by people, used and modernized by them. Of importance are the political responsibility of these persons, their creative heights, professional competence and wholehearted determination to carry out any, let me emphasize, any order of the fatherland for employing these technical systems. It is not hard to imagine that in the future, when possibly the machine will already perform many heuristic functions, human reason will still be at the sources of the creative, thinking process. Reason, as the source of thought, will find in the machine, apparatus or mechanism, only the means of its embodiment and the strengthening of creative power.

As is known the structure of the moral factor to a significant degree reflects the structure of social awareness and consists of two groups of elements: ideological and sociopsychological. M. V. Frunze, without examining specifically the structural spheres of the moral factor, however, did draw special attention not only to its ideological aspect (political tempering, ideological principles, class maturity) but also to the importance of shaping the sociopolitical elements of patriotic feelings, revolutionary moods, a combat upsurge and so forth. By this he pointed out that the moral-political state of the personnel is a spiritual value which depends upon the entire spectrum of effects, the social milieu, the existing system of education and indoctrination, traditions, the skill of the commanders and political workers. The importance of such an approach is also apparent today.

In speaking about the moral factor, it could be added that the man whose centennial birthday this conference is devoted to, enriched the theory and practice of this question by other ideas as well. In analyzing the role of the moral factor in a modern war, he particularly emphasized the importance of preserving its revolutionary nature in social terms, constant concern for increasing the spiritual superiority over the enemy, as well as working out the methods and forms of morally suppressing the enemy's will to resist. The timeliness of these ideas is as though they were voiced today.

We feel that the reflections of M. V. Frunze on the role of the moral factor in modern war are very important on a level of those high tasks which the CPSU has posed for the Armed Forces, namely: to securely ensure favorable external conditions for the building of socialism and communism in our nation and the fraternal socialist countries. All of this could be expressed in a terse formula: the higher our readiness and our political, moral determination to thwart any aggressive intrigues by imperialism, the less the probability that the potential aggressor will decide upon a nuclear adventure. Such is the dialectics of our times.

FOOTNOTES

¹ V. I. Lenin, PSS, Vol 13, p 376.

² M. V. Frunze, "Sobr. soch.," Vol 3, p 255.

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10272

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THE MILITARY PEDAGOGICAL VIEWS OF M. V. FRUNZE

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 3, Mar 85 [signed to press 22 Feb 85) pp 43-45

[Article by Army Gen G. I. Obaturov]

[Text] The shaping of the military pedagogical views of M. V. Frunze and the start of his pedagogical activities go back to the period of the Civil War. Even as the commissar of the Yaroslavl Military District, he worked out and implemented an entire system of measures evidencing a fundamentally new approach to the questions of troop training and indoctrination. Upon his initiative and with his direct involvement, training plans and programs were worked out for the district schools and courses for training command personnel of the junior and middle levels and these were all based upon the idea of a unity of political, military and general education.

M. V. Frunze evidenced his military pedagogical gifts fully during the interwar years. Having headed the armed forces of the Ukraine and the Crimea, he initiated intense activities to establish here a full network of military schools. Due to this, in just 3 years (1921-1923), 80 percent of the higher and senior commanders received a special military education. The valuable experience gained in the Ukraine was widely employed throughout the Red Army.

With his appointment to higher military and state positions, a new stage commenced in the military pedagogical activities of M. V. Frunze. These were particularly fruitful during the period from April 1924 through January 1925, when Mikhail Vasil'yevich, as a second appointment, also headed the RKKA Military Academy. Dating precisely to this time were his intense activities to reform the military school in accord and within the framework of the military reform which was being carried out in the nation with his active involvement. At this same time, he created the basic military pedagogical works which in a most mature and complete form set out the system of his views on all the basic questions of the content and organization of the educational and indoctrinational process in the Soviet military school and in the troops.

The exceptionally fruitful military pedagogical activities of M. V. Frunze were based on a solid foundation of Marxist-Leninist methodology. In mastering this perfectly, he theoretically analyzed and profoundly generalized the progressive military pedagogical experience of the past and the first years of Soviet military organizational development. Mikhail Vasil'yevich made a major contribution

to working out the problems of Soviet military pedagogics. He advanced and established both the most general principles of Soviet instruction and indoctrination of the troops and troop collectives as well as recommendations on the use of didactic principles in the educational and indoctrinational process.

In giving great importance to the use of the Leninist principle of the unity of instruction and indoctrination in the army, M. V. Frunze pointed out that theoretical knowledge should be reinforced by practical studies and practice and training should be in first place. From this he drew the conclusion that the troops must be taught what is essential in a war and this requires great procedural art.

M. V. Frunze enriched the ideas on the effective use of such principles of military didactics as visibility of instruction, awareness and activity on the part of the trainees, strict successiveness in gradually moving from the simple to the more complex, planning and programming of construction and the organizing role of the solely-responsible leader, that is, in teaching, not only to provide knowledge but also indoctrination and an individual approach.

M. V. Frunze actually carried out his views and ideas in military pedagogical activities in the following main area.

The first area which M. V. Frunze himself considered to be the main and determining one, was linked to increasing the ideological and political level of troop training and instruction for the students. He endeavored to establish a system of instruction and indoctrination for the military personnel which would function under the unchallenged leadership of the party.

Heading the RKKA Military Academy, Frunze confronted its personnel with the main task of training commanders capable not only of commanding the troops but also of skillfully indoctrinating them politically, that is, to be solely-responsible leaders and this in those years was the course set out on by our party. Upon his instructions, the program of the socioeconomic cycle was enlarged and in 1924 a seminar was introduced on Leninism; soon thereafter the first chair of political work was established in the system of military schools.

The second area of military pedagogical activities of M. V. Frunze was related to improving the professional preparation of the military personnel.

Frunze considered operational-tactical preparation to be the main thing in shaping the military-professional qualities of the students. And in operational-tactical training he valued not only broad erudition and a knowledge of general ideas but also high professionalism in specific skills and abilities and the mastery of field service techniques. "In terms of general ideas, broad plans and generalizations," Frunze commented not without irony, "our things are going brilliantly. But when it comes to the embodiment of these ideas in details, in a drawing, report, order, briefing and so forth, then a different picture emerges."¹

The third area was related to improving the organization and methods of the training and indoctrinational process. In the troops this was expressed in an intensification of military and political training and in the search for and

introduction of effective teaching methods. In the academy, under Frunze's leadership, in a short period of time a reorganization of the faculties was carried out, an ordered and scientifically sound system was worked out for taking the curriculum by years, excessive subjects were eliminated by removing disciplines not specific to the academy's command and staff profile, and the role of the chairs was increased in training-indoctrinational and military scientific work.

In the organization and methods of the teaching process, M. V. Frunze consistently and steadily followed a policy of bringing it close to the conditions of a combat situation and of giving maximum consideration to the needs of troop practice. Without in any way understating the role of purely theoretical forms of exercises (lectures, seminars), M. V. Frunze when he arrived at the RKKA Military Academy, increased the proportional amount of practice exercises in the field, military games and tours of duty in the troops. He showed particular attention to such an effective form of developing practical skills and moral-psychological tempering of the students as field trips.

The military pedagogical activities of M. V. Frunze during the period of the military reform certainly cannot be reduced to merely the work in the academy. In holding the post of the RKKA chief of staff and deputy chairman of the USSR RVS [Revolutionary Military Council], he had a direct effect on improving the entire system of military education in the nation and in the army. This effect became particularly noticeable with the appointing of M. V. Frunze to the post of people's commissar of military and naval affairs and chairman of the USSR RVS. He focused his basic efforts on giving military education an ordered system permeated by a single idea, the idea of successiveness and the gradual ascent from basic military knowledge to its heights.

Even such a brief listing of the military pedagogical views of Mikhail Vasil'yevich Frunze makes it possible to conclude that in him we have an outstanding military pedagogue and one of the most prominent organizers of the Soviet military school during the first, most difficult stage of its establishment and development.

The views, ideas and deeds of Frunze in the area of military instruction and indoctrination have not aged and have essentially maintained their importance now. They incite thinking and contribute to the creative search for more effective ways, methods and means for improving the entire question of the training and indoctrination of Soviet military personnel and troops.

FOOTNOTE

¹ M. V. Frunze, "Sobr. soch.," Vol 2, p 38.

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10272

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M. V. FRUNZE ON THE NATIONAL NATURE OF DEFENDING THE SOCIALIST FATHERLAND

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 3, Mar 85 [signed to press 22 Feb 85) pp 45-46

[Article by Flt Adm G. M. Yegorov]

[Text] In heading the People's Commissariat for Military and Naval Affairs and the USSR RVS [Revolutionary Military Council] by party assignment, M. V. Frunze worked tirelessly on developing Lenin's ideas on the national [lit. all-the-people] nature of defending the socialist fatherland and on a creative search for those organizational forms which would make it possible to actually turn national defense into a cause of all the people. Proceeding from the Marxist-Leninist thesis on the decisive role of the masses of people in a future war in the defense of socialism, M. V. Frunze profoundly established the role of social organizations in preparing the Soviet people for it.

One of the first social organizations which helped in strengthening national defense was the Military Scientific Society (VNO) at the beginning of the 1920's and which was organized and led by M. V. Frunze, K. Ye. Voroshilov and S. M. Budenny. As the VNO moved from working out military theoretical questions to the broad propagandizing of military knowledge directly at enterprises, schools and institutions, it was renamed the Defense Assistance Society and subsequently was combined with Aviakhim [Society for Assisting Aviation and Chemical Construction in the USSR] as the single all-Union society, Osoaviakhim [Society for Assisting Defense, Aviation and Chemical Construction in the USSR].

In the notion of M. V. Frunze, the defense organizations should develop in the civilian population a correct understanding of the nature of a future war and establish broad public opinion around the defense question. In this context, the defense society was given the mission of broadly propagandizing the party directives on defense questions, military and military-technical knowledge, the experience of the Civil War as well as the military patriotic indoctrination of the workers in the combat traditions of the army and navy.

Under Frunze's leadership, during the period of the military reform, extensive work was done to introduce the experience of Lenin's Vsevobuch [Universal Military Training] in the territorial-militia system for the organizational development of the Red Army.

The defense society established upon the initiative of M. V. Frunze, in the situation of the threat of Nazi aggression, completely focused its attention on the military preparation of the population, on increasing the skills of the reserve command personnel and on developing aviation and shooting sports. With the start of the treacherous attack by Nazi Germany on the Soviet Union, more than 7 million members of Osoaviakhim who had received military training were taken into the operational army, the people's militia and partisan detachments. As a total during the years of the Great Patriotic War, around 18 million persons underwent military training in the Osoaviakhim organizations.

DOSA AF, at the sources of which stood M. V. Frunze, under the leadership of the Communist Party has become a mass patriotic defense organization of the workers which presently brings together 100 million persons and this is up to 77 percent of the nation's adult population.

In being guided by the demands of the Decree of the CPSU Central Committee and the USSR Council of Ministers of 7 May 1966 and the tasks set out in the orders of the USSR minister of defense, the DOSAAF organizations have focused their chief attention on organically combining military patriotic indoctrination with military technical instruction and the moral-psychological and physical tempering of the DOSAAF members, particularly the induction youth.

In DOSAAF there is a network of training organizations in which one out of every three inductees receives one of the military technical specialties. These train drivers of transports, drivers of armored personnel carriers and tracked tractors, communications and radar specialists, electricians, radio operators, the pilots of jet aircraft and helicopters, junior aviation specialists, naval gunners, helmsmen and divers as well as parachutists.

We consider our important mission to be constant work in carrying out the instructions of the USSR Minister of Defense, MSU, Comrade L. S. Sokolov as set out in his speech at the Ninth All-Union DOSAAF Congress. DOSAAF should be not only a school of courage and patriotism but also a school of technical mastery.

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10272

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M. V. FRUNZE ON THE IMPORTANCE OF MILITARY EXPERIENCE FOR THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF THE ORGANIZATIONAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE SOVIET ARMED FORCES

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 3, Mar 85 [signed to press 22 Feb 85) pp 47-48

[Article by Corresponding Member of the USSR Academy of Sciences, Lt Gen P. A. Zhilin]

[Text] M. V. Frunze, developed as a political and military leader at the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th centuries, at the turning point of two eras, when the foundations of capitalism were collapsing and major revolutionary events had matured. This was a time full of wars, class clashes and social disturbances.

The professional military development of Frunze began in the fire of barricade battles during the years of the first Russian revolution of 1905-1907. Even then he understood well the need to master military knowledge and firmly follow the instructions of V. I. Lenin. He constantly studied the works of Marx, Engels and Lenin concerning war and the army and armed insurrection, and he re-read a mass of books on military theory and history. While in the Vladimir Prison and later the Nikolayev Central, one of the gloomiest prisons of Tsarist Russia, he not only himself industriously studied military affairs but also involved other prisoners in this.

A knowledge of military experience and its creative application in a specific situation are the professional duty of any rank of serviceman. M. V. Frunze, in holding the high positions of an army and front commander, during the years of the Civil War and in working out and implementing the overall concepts and plans for operations, repeatedly turned to military experience and took this into account. Thus, in preparing the counteroffensive by the Southern Group of Forces of the Eastern Front, he carefully studied not only the experience of the previous fight against Kolchak, but also the experience of the maneuvering operations of World War I of 1914-1918. In the period of fighting the Vrangeli army, Frunze profoundly studied the history of the Crimean wars. He was particularly interested in the maneuver carried out by the Russian Army in 1737 to outflank Perekop over the Arabat Spit, when the Russian troops, under the command of Field Mar Petr Petrovich Lassi, "having deceived the Crimean Khan who stood at Perekop with his main forces, advanced along the Arabat Spit, and having crossed to the peninsula at the mouth of the Salgir, came out in the rear of the Khan's troops and quickly captured the Crimea."¹

M. V. Frunze intended to employ an analogous maneuver in the course of the Red Army offensive in November 1920 in the aim of liberating the Crimea. He considered this the best method of carrying out the given mission and only as a consequence of the fact that the Azov Naval Flotilla could not promptly support the operation from the Azov Sea, was Frunze forced, in his words, "with the greatest regret," to abandon his plan to utilize the Arabat Spit for making the main thrust.

The attitude of M. V. Frunze to the practical value of military experience and his personal example are worthy of the broadest popularization and imitation. Certainly all that is valuable which has been achieved by the elder generations, by their mind and energy, and all the heroic linked with the defense of our motherland will never lose its practical scientific and indoctrinational importance. Particularly in our times. In the first place, because the Soviet Armed Forces have gained the richest experience in all areas of military art, experience in the defense of the Soviet state by military means and, secondly, because now, 40 years after the end of the Great Patriotic War, the Army and Navy officer personnel are basically persons of the postwar period who have not undergone the severe school of armed combat and they must have a good knowledge of this experience.

Our party has always given and presently does give great importance to indoctrinating the youth in the revolutionary and military traditions and in acquainting it with the priceless heritage of the older generations. "In order to correctly assess today," said Comrade K. U. Chernenko, "the youth should have a good knowledge of the past. Certainly it is not a question of learning historical dates and names by heart. The duty of memory is a moral duty."³

In the military area, these instructions should be reflected in the preserving and adding to of military experience, combat traditions and their practical utilization for the more effective military-professional and military-patriotic indoctrination of the Army and Navy personnel. M. V. Frunze endeavored to thus employ combat experience and this was precisely how he saw its importance.

Certainly a systematic study and generalization of military experience are inconceivable without introducing it into military practice and without creating the corresponding organizational forms, centralization and coordination of military scientific research. M. V. Frunze did a good deal in establishing and organizing military scientific work in the Soviet Armed Forces. In the troops which he commanded, great attention was always given to military scientific work. M. V. Frunze was convinced that this should be a component part of the overall operational-tactical and strategic training for the Army and Navy command and political personnel. Upon the personal instructions of Frunze, a special military scientific directorate was established on the staff of the Turkestan Front. Upon his initiative a permanent conference was organized in Kharkov on military scientific work. The first results of its work were generalized at a meeting of the command and political personnel of the Ukrainian and Crimean troops in March 1922. This was devoted to generalizing the experience of the Civil War and World War I and using it in training command personnel. The conference was attended by the Commander-in-Chief of the Republic Armed Forces, S. S. Kamenev. M. V. Frunze who chaired the conference, in opening it, said: "The present conference which is attended by the flower of the armed

forces of the Ukraine and the Crimea has as its task a review and analysis of the combat and tactical experience gained by the Red Army and which could strengthen the Red Army for future wars."⁴

Upon the initiative of M. V. Frunze, an extensive network of military scientific circles and societies was established in the Army and Navy. "It is essential to develop the work of these societies and connect them...", said Frunze, "and thus establish conditions for the broad development of our military theoretical thought."⁵ In his speeches he repeatedly emphasized that the military scientific societies should help to raise the military educational level of the Red Army command personnel.

M. V. Frunze played an exceptionally great role in establishing the leadership bodies of military scientific work in the Army and Navy. He devoted enormous attention to this question, holding the positions of RKKA Chief of Staff and later the people's commissar for military and naval affairs. Upon his instructions, in 1924, a military history department was founded on the RKKA Staff, and in February 1925, a directorate for the study and utilization of the experience of wars was established. This directorate was a military scientific institution of the central apparatus of the People's Commissariat for Military and Naval Affairs and was under the RKKA chief of staff. It brought together the military scientific, military history and regulations work in the army.

The Directorate for the Study and Utilization of the Experience of Wars made it possible to centralize, coordinate and direct the scientific research, to elaborate a unity of views on the main questions of military theory and closely coordinate it with the demands of practice. This proven form underwent further development. Thus, during the Great Patriotic War a directorate for the utilization of the war's experience was formed under the General Staff and this did great work in generalizing the experience of combat operations and rapidly bringing it to the attention of the troops (the directorate prepared and published 33 collections, 25 collections of tactical examples and 43 collections of combat documents).

The vivid life and activities of M. V. Frunze have gained broad recognition in the people and the army. The capital of Kirghizia where he was born bears his name as do the senior military academy, the Central Soviet Army Club, many streets, plants and factories, kolkhozes and sovkhozes.

Each year the USSR Ministry of Defense awards the Prize imeni M. V. Frunze to the authors of the best military scientific works.

The extensive measures being carried out in the nation, the Army and Navy on the occasion of the centennial birthday of M. V. Frunze, including the current military scientific conference, are vivid proof of recognition for the outstanding services of the ardent revolutionary, talented military leader and theoretician which Mikhail Vasil'yevich Frunze was and remains for us.

FOOTNOTES

¹ M. V. Frunze, "Izbrannyye proizvedeniya," Vol 2, p 111.

² [Not in text]

³ K. U. Chernenko, "Izbrannyye rechi i stat'i" [Selected Speeches and Articles], Moscow, Politizdat, 1984, p 550.

⁴ VOYENNNYY VESTNIK, No 5-6, 1922, p 62.

⁵ M. V. Frunze, op. cit., p 71.

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10272

CSO: 1801/195

CONCLUDING SPEECH

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 3, Mar 85 [signed to press 22 Feb 85) pp 50-55

[Closing speech at the conference on M. V. Frunze by MSU V. G. Kulikov, USSR first deputy minister of defense and commander-in-chief of the Joint Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact States]

[Text] Respected comrades! The military scientific conference devoted to the centennial birthday of M. V. Frunze is concluding its work. I feel that you all will agree with me that the conference has been beneficial and useful.

We have heard informative reports by MSU S. K. Kurkotkin and Army Gen A. A. Yepishev as well as interesting papers by Academician A. G. Yegorov, Comrades I. N. Shkadov, M. M. Kozlov, G. I. Obaturov, O. A. Losik, G. M. Yegorov, D. A. Vokogonov and P. A. Zhilin. These reports and papers clearly showed the diverse revolutionary, party, state and military activities of M. V. Frunze, the loyal student and associate of V. I. Lenin.

The conference fully brought out the generalship of M. V. Frunze and his contribution to the development of Soviet military science and military art. The theoretical and practical heritage of Mikhail Vasil'yevich Frunze represents a great value not only for the history of the Soviet state and its Armed Forces but also as a remarkable example of unstinting service to the motherland, the party and the Soviet people.

He farsightedly and skillfully carried out Lenin's ideas on the defense of the socialist fatherland and the decisions of the Communist Party on military organizational development.

Decades have passed since M. V. Frunze was concerned with the organizational development of the Red Army and Navy. Over this time the Soviet Armed Forces have repelled more than one imperialist aggression, together with all the Soviet people they sustained a world historical victory in the Great Patriotic War and have moved far ahead in their development during the postwar years.

The leadership of the Communist Party is the most important source of strength and invincibility for the new type army, a socialist army to which the Leninist Bolshevik M. V. Frunze made an inestimable contribution. The historical path of

the organizational development of the Armed Forces shows that the role of this leadership has been constantly growing.

There has not been a single major measure to strengthen the nation's defense capability or to raise the combat might of the Army and Navy which was not carried out upon the instructions of the CPSU Central Committee and without its active and fruitful influence. In our practical work, we constantly feel the guiding hand and a profound understanding of the needs of the Armed Forces and a paternal concern for the men on the part of the party's combat staff, the Leninist Central Committee and personally the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, the Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet and Chairman of the USSR Defense Council, Comrade K. U. Chernenko. Profoundly pertinent at present are the words of M. V. Frunze that in the form of the party the Red Army has known and knows only this leader.

The Bolshevik Party and V. I. Lenin long before the revolution gave exceptionally great importance to the selection and indoctrination of personnel dedicated to the cause of the revolution and particularly military personnel. Mikhail Vasil'yevich Frunze was one such pupil of the party's, one of the firm and consistent proponents of its policy.

He ardently accepted the challenge of V. I. Lenin: "Study military affairs effectively."¹ For him this challenge became not merely a slogan but a cause for his entire life. He steadily studied military affairs in the course of revolutionary clashes against the autocracy, in prison and forced labor and worked on it on the Civil War fronts.

The life and activities of M. V. Frunze and all his accomplishments are a vivid example of wholehearted dedication to the cause of the Communist Party and an unstinting struggle for the triumph of its ideals. Mikhail Vasil'yevich Frunze lived just 40 years, a large portion of which was spent in unceasing, ebullient activity. He participated in three Russian revolutions and in the Civil War and was an active organizer of the Red Army and Red Navy during the years of peacetime construction. As V. I. Lenin pointed out, "Each month of such work and such experience is worth 10 if not 20 years of our history."²

During the years of the Civil War the generalship talent of M. V. Frunze became vividly apparent. A good deal has been said about this at our conference. But I would like to emphasize that a number of his leadership qualities are of permanent significance for today's military personnel. This is the ability to quickly assess the situation, to think widely, to decisively focus efforts on the main thing, to work steadily to achieve the planned goals, to constantly seek out the new and apply this new in the fight against the enemy.

All the operations conducted by the Red Army under the leadership of M. V. Frunze were marked by originality of conception, by a drive and surprise of troop operations and by the complete achieving of the planned goals.

The leadership art of M. V. Frunze brought together a profound military knowledge and the ability to creatively apply this in practice. This quality should also be inherent to the military leaders of our days.

The experience of all the wars and daily life show that each commander, each superior, in addition to the ability to creatively apply knowledge under specific conditions, must also have great organizational capacities and volitional qualities, as well as strong skills in organizing combat operations and controlling the troops. These qualities are also essential under present-day conditions. These are developed in the officers during study in the VUZes, in the course of military and operational training in the troops and fleets and in all exercises and training.

The generation of commanders and political workers who went through the flames of the Civil War and who skillfully combined theoretical knowledge with practice became the backbone of our officer corps and the basis for the genesis of a galaxy of Soviet military leaders during the years of the Great Patriotic War.

G. K. Zhukov and A. M. Vasilevskiy, I. S. Konev and K. K. Rokossovskiy as well as many, many others, along with such famous representatives of the Revolutionary Guard as K. Ye. Voroshilov, courageous heroes of the Civil War such as S. M. Budenny, embodied the inseparable link of military and combat generations. They brought together a profound ideological conviction and dedication to our cause and a desire to devote all themselves, without exception, to serving the motherland. With great professionalism they creatively carried out the most difficult tasks of military organizational development and correlated routine problems with profound reflections on the development prospects of military affairs. Inherent to them was a desire to master the art of troop command and an ability to find and implement the most difficult decisions in a situation which was seemingly hopeless.

At present, in our Armed Forces, more than 70 percent of the officer personnel has a higher and special military education. No matter how high the educational level of the modern military personnel, it cannot remain unchanged.

Military knowledge must be constantly increased, improved and added to. The way to do this is by constant work with oneself and by developing in oneself those qualities which are essential to a military chief, a leader and organizer of military collectives.

And here the example of the revolutionaries and military leaders who were fostered by the party under the immediate leadership of V. I. Lenin remains and should remain the model.

In this context I would like to voice several requests. We are carrying out jubilee measures devoted to the memory of the outstanding people of our party and Soviet state, as well as measures related to the 40th anniversary of the victory in the Great Patriotic War and so forth. We must see to it that these have not only a solemn holiday nature but also be full of useful content and contain specific experience, vivid convincing examples which would serve in indoctrinating the Army and Navy personnel and all the Soviet youth.

Military theoretical works, artistic literature, films on military patriotic themes, as well as articles in newspapers and magazines all contribute to the all-round indoctrination, education and training of our military personnel. They should provide in a lively, apt and a profoundly party manner in aggregate

all so that our commander, soldier and young person grows up to be a truly worthy successor to the great cause for which the Leninist Bolsheviks fought, the cause to which Mikhail Vasil'yevich Frunze dedicated his brief but eventful life.

At our conference a great deal has been said about M. V. Frunze as a major military theoretician who left a rich military theoretical heritage. This heritage has generalized the experience of the organizational development and training of the army and navy in the world's first socialist state.

In actuality, the theoretical heritage of M. V. Frunze is diverse and the range of his interests and scientific research is unusually broad. Their value is determined primarily by the fact that they were carried out on the basis of Marxism-Leninism, they are permeated with a party spirit, they rest on the rich experience of the past but at the same time are future directed. Precisely in this M. V. Frunze is for us both a political and military strategist as well as a military theoretician of the Leninist type.

M. V. Frunze saw in Marxist-Leninist theory a powerful ideological weapon and an important source of strength for the socialist state's army. From it he gained a truly scientific method for solving urgent problems of military organizational development. M. V. Frunze was a passionate propagandist of the military theoretical heritage of K. Marx, F. Engels and V. I. Lenin. At the same time he demanded that our leading military cadres be "fully armed not only with military knowledge but also political and economic, for now all of this is intertwined into a single whole and without a knowledge of these aspects it is impossible to lead an army successfully."³ These words are surprisingly in accord with today's conditions.

M. V. Frunze began his military theoretical activities by working out fundamental, general theoretical questions related primarily to disclosing the principles of Soviet military science and a unified military doctrine, for without this it was impossible to resolve the specific problems of the organizational development of the Red Army and the development of Soviet military art. Life has repeatedly convinced us and does convince us how profoundly correct V. I. Lenin was when he said: "...The person who becomes involved with particular questions without first resolving the general ones will at each step unconsciously for himself 'collide' with these general questions."⁴

Today Marxism-Leninism serves as a dependable compass in resolving urgent problems of military theory and practice. At the June (1983) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, Comrade K. U. Chernenko emphasized that the most important thing in the area of social sciences is to be constantly guided by revolutionary theory and to be able to skillfully apply the tested Marxist-Leninist methodology of scientific search. Ideological clarity, he commented, and methodological discipline of thought are an indispensable condition for the successful development of social sciences. This also applies fully to our military science.

The core of the entire military theoretical heritage left to us by M. V. Frunze is his contribution to working out the principles of Soviet military doctrine. With the then existing diversity in opinions on the most important problems of

military affairs, he with great tenacity posed the question of the need to work out a unified military doctrine for the Red Army so as to achieve a unified understanding of the major questions involved in the organizational development, training and employment of the Armed Forces. The methodological approach of M. V. Frunze to working out Soviet military doctrine has also maintained its importance under today's conditions.

The nature of Soviet military doctrine stems from the peace-loving policy of the CPSU and the Soviet government. From the very first days of its creation this has had a strictly defensive focus the essence of which is that the Soviet Union is a peace-loving state. It has not attacked anyone and does not intend to do so. But in the event of aggression it will deal a decisive rebuff to any enemy.

As was pointed out by the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, Comrade K. U. Chernenko, the difficult international situation "forces us to give most serious attention to strengthening national defense. The Soviet people do not wish to increase weapons but rather reduce them on both sides. But we are obliged to be concerned for the sufficient security of our nation, its friends and allies. This is being done. Let everyone know that no fans of military adventures will catch us unaware and no potential aggressor can hope to avoid a crushing retaliatory strike."⁵

Also pertinent in our days are the words of M. V. Frunze on the ways to increase the technical equipping of the army and navy and that in this regard one cannot stop with what has been achieved but one must go farther and forward. The implementation of the Communist Party's economic policy by the Soviet people has made it possible to equip the Soviet Armed Forces with the most modern types of weapons and military equipment for successfully carrying out any missions on land, in the air and at sea. The economy, science and technology of the Soviet Union are capable of developing any types of weapons on which our enemies may wish to wager.

A great deal has been done by Soviet military science to strengthen national defense capability and to increase the combat readiness of the Armed Forces. However life constantly poses ever-new and more responsible tasks for it. The growing complexity of the processes occurring both in social development as a whole and in military affairs demands that military science go deeper and deeper into the nature and particular features of modern warfare and that it constantly and thoroughly analyze the patterns and trends in the development of the means and methods of waging war.

For a more profound understanding of the essence of the processes occurring in military affairs, it is important to thoroughly study the experience of previous wars. In his numerous speeches and articles, M. V. Frunze repeatedly turned to the experience of previous wars, particularly the Civil War. He pointed out that our experience will help the proletariats of other countries in correctly setting the tasks of the war and that it is vitally essential for those detachments of the proletarian army which are preparing to engage the class enemy. Such a conclusion on the importance of historical experience has maintained its pertinence today. This must be more profoundly studied and applied in training and indoctrinating the personnel of the Soviet Armed Forces.

Comrades!

Our conference is being held at the beginning of 1985. This year will be full of such major events as the 40th anniversary of the victory of the Soviet people in the Great Patriotic War and the 80th anniversary of the revolution of 1905-1907 in Russia. At present, active preparations have commenced for the next 27th CPSU Congress.

Undoubtedly, all of this gives a special political meaning to that great work which awaits us this year.

A great responsibility rests on us, the military. The Armed Forces are confronted with the mission of dependably ensuring the peaceful labor of the Soviet people, achieving higher indicators in combat training and properly celebrating the 26th CPSU Congress.

The military scientists and historians should direct their efforts to carrying out these tasks, in making maximum use of the theoretical and practical heritage of M. V. Frunze as well as the conclusions and recommendations of the current military scientific conference.

In conclusion, allow me to thank the speakers, the organizers and the participants of the conference and wish them good health and great success in future work.

FOOTNOTES

¹ V. I. Lenin, PSS, Vol 36, p 26.

² Ibid., p 499.

³ M. V. Frunze, "Sobr. soch.," Vol 2, pp 37-38.

⁴ V. I. Lenin, PSS, Vol 15, p 368.

⁵ PRAVDA, 3 March 1984.

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10272

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THE NATIONAL AIR DEFENSE FORCES IN THE GREAT PATRIOTIC WAR

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 3, Mar 85 [signed to press 22 Feb 85) pp 56-65

[Article by Ch Mar Avn A. I. Koldunov, commander-in-chief of the Air Defense Forces and USSR deputy minister of defense, twice Hero of the Soviet Union]

[Text] Four decades separate us from that day when the Great Patriotic War ended victoriously. The National Air Defense Forces also made a significant contribution to the historic victory of the Soviet people and their Armed Forces over Nazi Germany. Together with the fighter aviation and antiaircraft artillery of the fronts (fleets) these troops protected against destruction from the air major administrative-political and industrial centers, including Moscow and Leningrad, many cities, population points, transport routes, troop groupings and their lines of communications. All of this to a significant degree ensured the normal operation of industry and transport and contributed to the preparation and successful execution of the offensive and defensive operations as well as to maintaining the morale of the troops and population.

The National Air Defense Forces [NAD] honorably carried out their international duty, having created an effective air defense for various installations on the liberated territory of Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Czechoslovakia, Austria and Yugoslavia.

As a total, during the years of the Great Patriotic War, the NADE destroyed more than 7,300 enemy aircraft.

For combat feats more than 80,000 men received orders and medals and 92 of them were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union including the pilot A. Karpov who was awarded this title twice. Some 29 formations and units received the title of guards and 11 received honorific designators.¹

The Nazi Command gave great importance to the air forces, considering them one of the main means for waging a "blitzkrieg" against the Soviet Union. Even before the attack on the USSR, 4 out of the 5 air fleets existing in the Luftwaffe as well as Finnish, Romanian and Hungarian aviation totaling 4,980 combat aircraft were concentrated at airfields in the eastern regions of Germany, in Poland and partially in Finland, Romania and Hungary.² These were, for those times, completely modern bombers, fighters and reconnaissance planes. The

aircraft crews, as a rule, had great combat experience gained in the course of combat operations in Western Europe.

During the very first hours of the war, Nazi aviation undertook a series of massed raids against the airfields of the border districts, the ground forces groupings, the rail junctions and other installations. The combat operations of the NADF to repel its raids assumed an unprecedented scope and fierceness. These developed along the entire western frontier from the Baltic to the Black Sea to a depth of up to 400 km.

In repelling the enemy air raids, the NADF caused the enemy heavy losses. For example, the air defense fighter and antiaircraft artillery units covering Kiev and installations in its area during the first 5 days of the war destroyed 93 aircraft. Over this same period, units of the 4th Air Defense Division which were defending Lvov downed 25 bombers.³ The NADF fought unstintingly against the air and often the ground enemy on the other sectors and installations, weakening the enemy forces by their attacks and showing heroism, steadfastness and high military skill. During the first day of the war, the 123d Fighter Air Regiment of the 10th Composite Air Division under the command of Maj B. Surin fought fierce air battles against superior enemy forces in the region of Brest. The fighter pilot Lt P. Ryabtsev when he was out of ammunition rammed an enemy bomber and himself bailed out successfully. This was one of the first ramblings in the Great Patriotic War. As a total for the day the regiment's pilots downed 30 enemy aircraft.⁴

During the first days of the war, unprecedented valor was shown by the fighter pilots over the distant approaches to Leningrad. Jr Lts P. Kharitonov and S. Zdorovtsev rammed enemy bombers and Jr Lt M. Zhukov in a dive "drove" an enemy aircraft into Lake Pskov. On 8 July 1941, the first Ukase during the Great Patriotic War was published by the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet awarding the title of Hero of the Soviet Union to Soviet soldiers, including to the valorous pilots M. Zhukov, S. Zdorovtsev, and P. Kharitonov.

During the initial period of the war, the NADF withstood the powerful blow by enemy aviation, they maintained their battleworthiness, and in fighting simultaneously against enemy tanks and infantry, protected a larger portion of the installations covered by them against air attack. Particularly important was that they did not permit serious disruption in the work of the front lines of communications which functioned without extended interruptions until our troops pulled out of the defended areas. The enemy aviation did not succeed in destroying the strategically important bridges across the Berezina and other major rivers. The enemy also suffered substantial losses: just during the period from 22 June through 3 July 1941, the units of the border air defense zones destroyed around 150 aircraft.⁵

The NADF played an enormous role in the defense of Moscow, Leningrad, Odessa, Sevastopol, Stalingrad and other major industrial and strategic centers.

During the very first days of the war the air defenses of Moscow were significantly strengthened. By the start of the massed air raids on Moscow, the NADF directly covering the capital had 602 fighters, 1,044 medium- and small-caliber antiaircraft guns, 336 antiaircraft machine guns, 618 searchlight stations, 124

barrage balloon posts, 8 radar stations and 612 VNOS [air raid warning] posts.⁶ The radius of the fighter basing was increased from 120 to 200 km. This made it possible to increase the dependable cover of not only Moscow but the entire Moscow-Tula Industrial Region. Such a defense was a classic example of defending a major center and industrial region of the nation against air attack. It was all-round, deeply echeloned and reinforced on the most dangerous sectors. Close cooperation was organized between all the branches of the NADF and unified, centralized command over them was provided.

During the defensive period of the Battle of Moscow, the Moscow air defense forces, in cooperation with the front air forces and troop air defenses, thwarted the plan worked out by the Nazi Command to destroy our capital from the air and ensured a normal life for Moscow which at that time was a frontline city. From July through December 1941, Nazi aviation undertook 122 raids against our capital involving 7,146 aircraft (only 299, that is, a little more than 3 percent broke through to the city).⁷

In the course of the intense struggle against the air enemy, the Moscow air defense forces showed heroism and high military skill. The intrepid air fighter V. Talalikhin during the night of 7 August 1941 rammed a target without searchlight illumination. Two days later the pilot, Communist A. Katrich, glorified himself by a ram made at an altitude of 8,000 m. On 12 September 1942, on the approaches to the capital A. Katrich by a second ramming downed an enemy bomber and his aircraft did not sustain serious damage.

The antiaircraft gunners also successfully defeated the enemy. During the defense of Moscow, the men of the Soviet Army's senior 193d Antiaircraft Artillery Regiment (commander, Lt Col M. G. Kiknadze) distinguished themselves as they covered various installations on the most crucial western sector. During July-December 1941, the regiment almost daily fought Nazi aviation. Over this period its batteries downed 38 enemy aircraft. By an order of the People's Commissar of Defense of 7 November 1942, the regiment became a guards unit.⁸

As a total during the war, the air defense forces who defended Moscow and installations on the approaches to the city destroyed 1,305 aircraft.⁹

The air defense of the Soviet capital was insurmountable for the Nazi aviation. Moscow was one of the capitals which during the years of World War II did not sustain substantial damage from enemy air raids and this was the most important and most convincing indicator of the effectiveness of its air defenses.

The air defense of Leningrad was carried out under exceptionally difficult and unique conditions. Being unable to take the city, the Nazis in the autumn of 1941 began a barbarian bombing of it. Particularly severe were the first months of the blockade, when enemy aircraft methodically, day after day, bombed Leningrad either with large forces or small aircraft groups.

As a total during the war years the NADF, in cooperation with the air forces and air defense units of the Leningrad Front as well as the Red Banner Baltic Fleet, drove off more than 270 air raids by Nazi aviation, having destroyed 1,561 aircraft in the air and on the ground.¹⁰ Having successfully repelled a larger share of the enemy air raids, the air defense forces protected the most

important installations of Leningrad, they defended the ships of the Baltic Fleet against air attack and ensured the uninterrupted operation of the Lifeline linking blockaded Leningrad with the country.

The NADF were also on the forward edge of the struggle against the Nazi invaders in the Battle of Stalingrad. Together with the fighter aviation and antiaircraft artillery of the fronts, under conditions of air supremacy of the Nazi aviation and direct contact with the ground enemy, they were able to drive off the numerous enemy air raids, they helped our troops defend the city and later crush the enemy on the Stalingrad sector. The fierceness of combat operations can be seen from the repelling of a massed Nazi air raid on 23 August 1942. This raid was one of the strongest and involved several hundred enemy aircraft, that is, virtually all the forces of the enemy 4th Air Fleet. Until darkness set in, enemy aviation made around 2,000 aircraft overflights. The Nazis wanted to drown Stalingrad in blood, to spread panic among the population and disorganize troop command. But the steadfastness of its defenders, including the air defense troops, thwarted the enemy's plans. In driving off the raid, fighters from the 102d Fighter Air Defense Division and fire from the antiaircraft artillery of the Stalingrad Corps Air Defense Region in addition to fighter aviation from the 8th Air Army and the troop air defenses downed 120 Nazi aircraft.¹¹ As a total from July through December 1942, the units of the Stalingrad Corps Air Defense Area and the 102d Fighter Division destroyed 699 aircraft.¹²

Air defense of the transport routes was one of the primary tasks of the NADF. In covering the frontlines of communications, the air defense forces conducted intense combat operations. Characteristic in this regard were the engagements in the area of the Kursk Salient. Just in May and June 1943, the enemy air forces made up to 4,300 aircraft overflights in the aim of bombing the main rail lines over which the troops of the Central and Voronezh Fronts were supplied. Thus, over 800 enemy aircraft (543 aircraft in the day and up to 300 bombers at night) took part in the raids against the Kursk Rail Junction (2 June and the night of 3 July).¹³

The repelling of the daylight raid involved around 390 fighters from the 101st Fighter Air Defense Division from the 16th and 2d Air Armies of the fronts, the antiaircraft artillery and machine guns from the Kursk Operational Group of the Voronezh-Borisoglebsk Air Defense Region, in addition to the air defense forces of the Central and Voronezh Fronts. The enemy lost 145 planes.¹⁴ The enemy did not succeed in disrupting the operational regroupings and supply of the troops of our fronts by air attack or in having any significant impact on a change in the operational-strategic situation in its favor.

After the Kursk Battle, in the course of the general strategic offensive by the Soviet Army, the NADF, in carrying out the missions of defending installations in the deep rear against air strikes, strengthened the cover of the troop groupings and installations of the front rear, they increased the air defense resources in the theater of war, they defended areas liberated from the enemy, they covered the lines of communications and supply bases of the operational army and participated in the air blockade of surrounded enemy groupings. The table provides a visual depiction of the nature of the missions carried out and the allocation of the NADF forces.

Table

**Distribution of Resources of National Air Defense Forces
in European USSR and Outside the Nation on 1 October 1944
(Depending Upon Missions Being Fulfilled)**

Mission Being Fulfilled	Fighter Aviation (crews)	Medium-Caliber AA Artillery	Small-Caliber AA Artillery	Large-Caliber AA Machine Guns	AA Searchlights
Defense of major centers	1,521	4,331	1,748	2,107	2,776
Defense of industrial regions and installations	249	898	828	759	183
Defense of front transport routes and crossings	1,020	2,628	3,565	2,733	1,127
Other missions	163	380	371	280	214
Total	2,953	8,237	6,512	5,879	4,300

Party political work was a powerful weapon in the fight against the enemy and the most important means of strengthening the morale and combat capability of the air defense troops. This work was organized on the basis of the decisions of the party Central Committee considering the missions pending and the specific features of the combat activities of the NADF. The work helped to indoctrinate profound ideological conviction, total dedication to the party and people, love for the motherland, and unbounded confidence in the rightness of the great Leninist cause and our victory over Naziism.

During the war years, the NADF gained very rich combat experience, they grew quantitatively and qualitatively, and were turned, in essence, into a new independent Armed Service capable of carrying out operational-strategic missions. In military art a new area appeared related to the preparation and conduct of combat operations by the air defense field forces, namely, the operational art of the NADF.

Of decisive influence on the development of the operational art of the NADF were such factors as the nature and methods of enemy air operations, the tasks and specific purpose of the NADF, the quantitative and qualitative growth of the weapons, the increase in the number of personnel, the better air defense system as a whole and the gaining of combat experience.

In the course of the war there was a search for an optimum version for the organizational structure of the NADF and their control. Even in the summer-autumn campaign of 1941 it was convincingly shown that our army and nation needed a strong air defense.

Since the combating of enemy aviation had assumed an operational-strategic nature and required a unified, centralized leadership, the State Defense Committee [GKO] on 9 November 1941 introduced the position of NADF commander and established the necessary headquarters bodies. All the air defense formations and units defending various installations in the nation were taken away from the military districts and fronts and put under the new commander. The fighter aviation assigned from the air forces for air defense purposes in operational terms was put under the NADF commander and on the spot under the commanders of the corps and divisional air defense regions. The placing of the fighter aviation assigned to cover major rear installations under the NADF Command in January 1942 was the logical conclusion to this reorganization.

The formation of the unified NADF Command made it possible to utilize their resources most effectively on a state-wide scale and in accord with the requirements of the specific operational-strategic situation. Better conditions were established for further improving the organizational structure of the units and formations and for developing the command system; an opportunity appeared for the broad maneuvering of the air defense forces to threatened sectors.

Due to the constant concern of the Communist Party and the government, to the unstinting labor of the Soviet people and to the accomplishments of the defense industry, starting in the first half of 1942, the NADF began receiving ever-increasing amounts of new weapons and combat equipment. This made it possible not only to replenish the combat losses but also organize new formations and units. In line with the numerical growth of the NADF, in 1942, the first operational field forces were established: the Moscow Front, the Leningrad and Baku Air Defense Armies. With the going over of the Soviet Army to a strategic offensive, the number of air defense regions was increased and their missions were broadened. For ensuring more effective control and continuous cooperation with the all-arms field forces, two air defense fronts, the Western and Eastern, were established in mid-1943 in breaking up the command of the NADF.¹⁵ Subsequently, in the course of the war, in the aim of improving leadership over the men and weapons, the number of the air defense fronts as well as the demarkation lines between them were altered. These changes were carried out proceeding from the conditions of the general strategic situation, the importance and number of covered installations and sectors as well as the grouping and probable nature of enemy air operations.

By the end of the war the NADF had four air defense fronts: Western, South-western, Central and Transbaykal (commanders, Col Gens Art A. D. Zhuravlev and G. S. Zashikhin, Col Gen M. S. Gromadin and Lt Gen Art P. Ye. Gudymenko).

In terms of their purpose and place in the overall structure of the USSR Armed Forces, the air defense fronts were operational-strategic field forces. This was caused, in the first place, by the fact that they usually carried out the missions of defending key strategic installations such as major administrative-political centers, important industrial and economic areas and national lines of communications. Secondly, the air defense fronts covered installations on one or several strategic sectors and their combat operations had significant spatial scope. Thirdly, each of these, in carrying out its missions, cooperated with several field forces of the other Armed Services. The establishing of air defense fronts became a natural stage in the development of the organizational

structure of the NADF and the system of their command and control during the years of the Great Patriotic War.

One of the most characteristic traits in the operational art of the NADF was the transition from installation to a zonal air defense system and the basic principles for this were formulated by Soviet military science on the eve of the Great Patriotic War. The zonal air defense system became possible as a result of introducing radar into the troops, improving the tactical performance of the fighters, increasing the air defense resources as well as the gaining of combat experience.

The transition to a zonal air defense system made it possible to solve more effectively the questions of alerting the troops about the air enemy, to promptly bring them to full combat readiness, to quickly maneuver the fighter aviation and regroup the antiaircraft artillery to the threatened sectors and as a result to more successfully repel air strikes.

As was pointed out above, the first zonal air defense was organized during the defense of Moscow, when the air defense units and formations were used in a single grouping for covering all the major installations within the Moscow-Tula Industrial Area.


Subsequently, on the main sectors of our troop operations, air defense had a clearly expressed zonal nature. This was the case, for example, in defending the installations, lines of communications and groupings of the fronts on the Kursk sector in the spring and summer of 1943, in the liberation of Belorussia in the summer of 1944 and in the Vistula-Oder, East Prussian and other operations of 1945.

In organizing air defense during the years of the Great Patriotic War wide use was made of the principle of the massing of air defense resources in defending major administrative-political and industrial centers against air strikes as well as on the main sectors of ground troop operations.

The NADF in the course of the strategic offensive by the Soviet Army were to promptly increase the air defense resources in the theater of war in order in carrying out the operations to prevent a gap forming between the troop air defense formations and the national air defense ones. This was a new and very complicated problem which had not been worked out even theoretically prior to the war.

Initially, for organizing air defense for areas and important installations on territory liberated by our troops, free reserves were employed which had been moved up ahead of time to the front area to sectors of the most active front operations. However, as the scope of the strategic offensive by the Soviet Army increased, there was an obvious shortage of such reserves.

The Soviet Command began to boldly maneuver the NADF by removing a portion of their men and weapons from covering installations in the interior of the nation and which had become unreachable for the air enemy. Such regroupings were carried out upon a decision of Headquarters, Supreme High Command [Hq SHC]. For example, for defending the liberated areas and strengthening the defense of



Boundaries of Air Defense Fronts by Beginning of 1945

previously covered installations in the front area, the Command of the Western Air Defense Front regrouped several formations and a large number of units and individual subunits from the interior.¹⁶ Along with this a regrouping along the front was carried out both within the air defense formations and within the air defense fronts for strengthening the defense of individual installations which had been subjected to most intense enemy air operations.

The NADF formations cooperated closely with the fronts. Here the principle of joint operations in one area was one of the main ones. During the period of the strategic offensive by the Soviet Army, when enemy aviation was forced to shift predominantly to operations against troop groupings, their lines of communications and installations in the front rear, a larger portion of the troop air defenses was concentrated in the tactical depth in the aim of providing a dependable cover for the first echelon troops. The basic air defense missions in the operational depth of the fronts were carried out by NADF formations. Cooperation between them consisted in assigning combat missions in the course of covering the main groupings, the lines of communications and installations in the front rear, in establishing a unified air reconnaissance, observation and enemy alert system, the coordinated employment of fighter aviation as well as organizing antiaircraft artillery fire.

The cooperation of the NADF field forces with the field forces of the other Armed Services was organized under instructions from Hq SHC or the General Staff. The staffs of the field forces of the Ground Forces, Air Forces, Navy and air defense fronts were the immediate organizers and executors of this. Operations groups consisting of staff officers from the cooperating field forces were organized for more flexible command and control.

A new form of the operational employment of the NADF formations during the war years was the air blockade of surrounded enemy groupings. The forces of the Bologoye Brigade Air Defense Region in 1942 took part in blockading the 16th German Army from the air in the region of Demyansk. Forces from the Stalingrad Corps Air Defense Region at the start of 1943 participated in an air blockade imposed on the large Nazi troop grouping surrounded in the area of Stalingrad. Forces from the Kiev Corps Air Defense Region in February 1944 were involved in an air blockade of the Korsun-Shevchenkivskiy enemy grouping. In 1945, formations of the Western and Southwestern Air Defense Fronts participated in an air blockade of the surrounded enemy groupings in the areas of Budapest, Breslau, Poznan, Konigsberg and Berlin.

In the course of the Great Patriotic War high and constant readiness of the air defense forces was a major factor in the development of operational art of the NADF. This encompassed all aspects of troop life and activities and held a central place in the work of the commanders, the political bodies, staffs, party organizations and all the personnel. The standing of alert duty was the core of troop combat readiness.

The basic content of operational art for the NADF during the years of the Great Patriotic War was the theory and practice of preparing and conducting combat operations by the air defense formations and field forces both independently and in cooperation with the formations and field forces of the other Armed Services to thwart enemy air operations, to defeat its attacking aviation and

to provide a dependable cover against air strikes for the troop groupings and defended front and rear installations. The combat operations of the NADF in terms of their scope, goals and achieved results in a number of instances assumed the characteristic traits of antiaircraft or air defense operations. The beginning to air defense operations was made by the successful combat operations of the air defense troops in checking the air offensive by Nazi aviation against Moscow in 1941. The combat operations of the NADF to thwart the air operations of the Nazi Air Forces in the Leningrad area, to repel enemy bombing raids against the ships of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet in the spring of 1942, in the defense of Stalingrad and in the Kursk Battle in the summer of 1943 also had the nature of air defense operations.

In the second and third periods of the war, the traits of the operational employment of the NADF were defined more clearly. Here one must include: premature planning of combat operations for the air defense fronts and armies following a single plan with the setting of operational-strategic missions for them; the massing of resources to carry out the main missions; an active type of combat operations to defeat the air enemy; great spatial scope, high intensity and speed of the engagements and battles against the air enemy; extensive operational maneuvering of the men and weapons within the field forces and between them in the aim of concentrating efforts on the crucial sectors; a transition to the broad, maneuvering use of air defense fighter aviation for covering areas, installations and troops; the organization and implementation of operational cooperation between the air defense field forces as well as between the fighter aviation and antiaircraft artillery of the fronts; centralized command and control of the air defense groupings of the different Armed Services for their joint carrying out of a combat mission in one area.

The theory of the operational employment of the Air Defense Forces had been continuously developing and as before the creative employment of the combat experience gained during the years of the Great Patriotic War is of important significance for its further improvement.

At present, due to the constant concern of the Communist Party, the Air Defense Forces have been qualitatively modernized. In terms of combat capabilities they greatly surpass the NADF of the period of the Great Patriotic War. Their personnel, in approaching the 40th anniversary of the victory over Nazi Germany, are constantly increasing combat readiness and are securely defending the air frontiers of our socialist fatherland.

FOOTNOTES

- 1 "Sovetskaya Voyennaya Entsiklopediya" [Soviet Military Encyclopedia], Moscow, Voenizdat, Vol 2, 1976, p 320; "Geroi Sovetskogo Soyuza. Istoriko-statisticheskii ocherk" [Heroes of the Soviet Union. An Historical-Statistical Essay], Moscow, Voenizdat, 1984, p 190.
- 2 "Istoriya vtoroy mirovoy voyny 1939-1945" [The History of World War II of 1939-1945], Moscow, Voenizdat, Vol 4, 1975, p 21.

- ³ "Voyska protivovozdushnoy oborony strany. Istoricheskiy ocherk" [The National Air Defense Forces. An Historical Essay], Moscow, Voenizdat, 1968, pp 75, 82.
- ⁴ Ibid., p 70.
- ⁵ TsAMO SSSR [Central Archives of the USSR Ministry of Defense], folio 72, inv. 11174, file 2, sheets 234-250.
- ⁶ "Sovetskaya Voyennaya Entsiklopediya," Vol 6, 1978, p 583.
- ⁷ "Istoriya vtoroy mirovoy...", Vol 4, p 108.
- ⁸ "Voyska protivovozdushnoy oborony...", pp 117, 118.
- ⁹ Ibid., p 125.
- ¹⁰ "Sovetskaya Voyennaya Entsiklopediya," Vol 6, p 583.
- ¹¹ "Istoriya vtoroy mirovoy...", Vol 5, p 174.
- ¹² "Sovetskaya Voyennaya Entsiklopediya," Vol 7, p 522.
- ¹³ "Voyska PVO strany v Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyne 1941-1945. Kratkaya khronika" [The National Air Defense Forces During the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945. Brief Chronology], Moscow, Voenizdat, 1981, p 216.
- ¹⁴ Ibid.
- ¹⁵ The Moscow Air Defense Front was reorganized as the Separate Moscow Air Defense Army which was part of the Western Air Defense Front.
- ¹⁶ TsAMO, folio 72, inv. 12278, file 585, sheet 80.

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10272

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MILITARY TRANSPORT DURING THE YEARS OF THE GREAT PATRIOTIC WAR

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[Article by Col Gen A. S. Klemin, chief of the Central Military Transport Directorate]

[Text] Military transport involves the land, water and sea lines of communications used for moving troops and carrying out all types of military shipments in peacetime and wartime. For cooperating with the transport institutions on the questions of preparing and utilizing the transport routes in the interests of the Armed Forces, the military transport bodies have been set up and these in organizational terms include the central, district (fleet) and line headquarters bodies. During the war years, the central bodies including the Military Transport Directorate (UPVOSO) of the Soviet Army (director chief, Lt Gen N. I. Trubetskoy, from July 1941, Mil Engr 1st Rank I. V. Kovalev, from December 1944, Maj Gen Tech Trps V. I. Dmitriyev) were responsible for utilizing all types of transport in the interests of the Armed Forces as well as the planning, organizing and control of troop movements and leadership of the railroad troops (at the start of the war).

From the first days of the Great Patriotic War, troop shipments had to be carried out under exceptionally difficult conditions of the operational and transport situation brought about by the surprise attack by Nazi Germany on the Soviet Union. The following example shows the intensity of the work of the VOSO [military transport] bodies during that period. With the outbreak of war the UPVOSO had on record simultaneously up to 1,500-1,700 operational trains and up to 10,000-12,000 transports. Simultaneously with the troop movements there was a large counterflow of evacuation shipments which were also under the control of the VOSO bodies. The volume of these alone during the first months of the war was around 1.5 million cars.¹ This caused difficulties in the control of troop movements.

In benefiting from the temporary air supremacy, enemy aviation constantly made bombing attacks against the rail lines, disrupting their operation. Nazi flyers bombed and strafed not only railroad junctions, stations, sections and bridges but also the trains. During individual months of 1941, in the sphere of enemy air operations were simultaneously up to 22 railroads, including such rear ones as the Gorkiy, Penza and Kuybyshev. In the plan of transport MPVO [local air

defense] worked out by the NKPS [People's Commissariat of the Railroads] on the eve of the war, chief attention was to be given to covering the border main-lines. The plan did not extend to the more distant railroads. This gap had to be eliminated in the course of the war.

In line with the difficulties arising in handling the mass troop movements, the State Defense Committee [GKO] assigned the member of the politburo of the VKP(b) [All-Union Communist Party (Bolshevik)] Central Committee A. A. Andreyev, together with the UPVOSO of the General Staff, to find ways for improving rail transport operations and institute proper control over the delivery of troops and supplies.

The excluding of the VOSO bodies from the control of troop movements at the outset of the war told on troop supply. The commission headed by A. A. Andreyev at the end of June and the beginning of July 1941 checked the needs of the fronts and the requests of the directorates supplying weapons, equipment, ammunition and other supplies to the troops. It established that cars with weapons, ammunition and other military freight were being dispatched by suppliers to the front in small groups (of 3-5 cars) without notifying the UPVOSO and without assigning them troop transport numbers. The line VOSO bodies were virtually eliminated from the supervising of their movements. The NKPS also did not possess precise data on the location of this freight. Supply of the fronts was threatening to break down. The personnel of the UPVOSO and NKPS had to quickly rectify the difficult situation which had developed with the delivery of military freight.

On 13 July 1941, a census of transports on the move carrying ammunition, weapons and other supplies of the NKO [People's Commissariat of Defense] was made on 13 railroads of the West, Southwest, Center, Northwest and Urals. As a result it was ascertained that on these roads alone there were around 47,000 cars with military freight extremely essential for the front, including 13,197 cars with ammunition, 692 with weapons, 8,551 with materiel, 2,355 with food and 8,950 tank cars with fuel. It was also established that more than 3,000 cars lacked documents indicating the ultimate destinations while 1,629 cars had destinations at stations already occupied by the enemy.² After the census all the cars were given appropriate numbers and taken over by the VOSO bodies. A new numbering was instituted for the cars and for express delivery of particularly important cargo the VOSO bodies introduced special number series for cars and travel-warrant trains.

The new numbering system for the cars made it possible for the VOSO bodies to know at any moment the location of each car on the railroad network as well as the address and the destination on what front, what measures should be taken for accelerating the movement of the operational trains and so forth. Summaries on the movement of military trains were forwarded by the railroads to the UPVOSO every 6 hours.

A procedure was also instituted for escorting military freight. Security and escort patrols were assigned and responsibility for providing these under way was entrusted to the VOSO bodies. Measures were taken to institute order in the planning and carrying out of military shipments. All military shipments were transferred exclusively to the UPVOSO. The UPVOSO set up system maps on which

officer operators plotted data separately for the operational and supply movements. On such diagrams one could see the daily movement of the troops and freight and, when necessary, upon instructions from the command, change their direction. The data obtained daily were reported on operational movements to the General Staff and on supply ones to the chief of the Soviet Army Rear. Such a procedure of accounting and controlling the movements was maintained until the war's end and proved fully effective.

The Secretary of the VKP(b) Central Committee A. A. Andreyev helped the UPVOSO organize close cooperation with the transport departments and governmental bodies. As a result, supply for the fronts improved noticeably.

Simultaneously with the reorganization of transport operations to a wartime footing, the GKO adopted a decision to put the UPVOSO (from 1 August 1941) under the chief of the Soviet Army Rear.

The measures taken to improve transport operations were aimed at helping the railroad workers and VOSO bodies handle the increasing flow of military freight. Regardless of the fierce enemy air raids, the operation of the railroad junctions and stations did not cease due to the unstinting labor of the railroad workers, the personnel of the railroad troops and the VOSO bodies. The average duration of interruptions in train traffic after enemy air raids was around 6 hours and only in individual instances did the interruption exceed 24 hours.³

In October-December 1941, rail transport moved an enormous amount of troops and military equipment into the regions adjacent to Moscow from the Far East, Urals, from Siberia and Central Asia and operational trains moved over the railroads of the Far East and Siberia at a speed of up to 800 km a day. Mass military movements during the period of the decisive Battle of Moscow, in being carried out under an exceptionally difficult situation both from the deep rear as well as within the fronts, for the VOSO bodies, for the railroads and railroad troops were not only a testing of their capabilities but also a source for gaining combat experience and acquiring practical skills. Just how great was the volume of rail transport operations to handle the military shipments can be judged from the fact that for the deployment and concentration of the Armed Forces in the theaters of war during the summer and autumn of 1941, 291 rifle divisions, 94 rifle brigades and over 2 million new recruits were delivered chiefly by rail from the interior military districts.⁴

The experience of handling the military shipments during the winter campaign of 1941-1942 disclosed a series of major shortcomings in transport operations and these were caused not only by the poor throughput, shipping and unloading capacity of the front railroad sections but also by the not completely coordinated operation of other types of transport. On 14 February 1942, at a joint session of the GKO and the Politburo of the VKP(b) Central Committee, it was decided to set up under the GKO a Transport Committee which would coordinate the operation of the basic types of transport and ensure clearer planning and control of the troop and national economic shipments. The membership of the Transport Committee included: I. V. Stalin (chairman), A. A. Andreyev (deputy chairman), A. I. Mikoyan (deputy chairman of the SNK [Council of People's Commissars]), L. M. Kaganovich (people's commissar of the railroads), A. V. Khrulev (deputy people's commissar of defense and chief of the Soviet Army Rear),

I. V. Kovalev (chief of the UPVOSO), P. P. Shirshov (people's commissar of the navy), Z. A. Shashkov (people's commissar of the river fleet), G. V. Kovalev (deputy people's commissar of the railroads), A. G. Karponosov (deputy chief of the operations directorate of the General Staff). The establishing of the Transport Committee helped mobilize all the resources of the transport system, to impose order in the use of all types of transport, to eliminate the administrative lack of coordination in shipments and strengthen the ties of the UPVOSO with the General Staff.

With the founding of the Transport Committee the functions of the UPVOSO changed fundamentally. It became not only a body for planning military shipments and controlling their implementation but also an actually working body as the staff of the GKO Transport Committee which drew up decisions on organizing and carrying out military shipments, for developing the lines of transport and for other measures required for all the transport people's commissariats and departments. The UPVOSO chief could, as a representative of the GKO, more effectively settle the questions of organizing military shipments.

The frequent changes in the operational-rear and transport situation, the rapidly increased volume of shipments as well as the urgency of carrying them out demanded a sharp reduction in the time for planning and carrying out the shipments. Under these conditions the personnel of the VOSO bodies and the rail transport workers introduced much that was new into the organization of military shipments and this made it possible to increase the throughput and carrying capacity of the lines of communications as well as systematize train traffic.

Thus, instead of rigid planning of military shipments, a more flexible operational planning method was introduced with an administrative procedure for carrying out the shipments. Shipment routing was widely employed and this meant the dispatching of the basic types of materiel (ammunition, fuels, lubricants, food and so forth) in full trains from the originating station to the fronts' regulating stations. For accelerating the delivery of fuels and lubricants to the fronts, front "shuttles" were established and these were assigned special numbers and attached to the fronts.

An increase in the throughput capacity of the railroads was aided by the extensive use of an uneven (one-way) train traffic schedule, by dispatching the consists one after another with shortened intervals, the introduction of the packet schedule of train traffic and much else. These innovations were confirmed by the Transport Committee and were a law for the transport workers, the troops and military suppliers. Security for the movement of trains traveling a short distance apart was ensured by a live [human] blocking system. Duty signalmen placed within visual contact of one another replaced the technical signaling equipment. This was an extreme but essential measure.

Considering that the enemy aviation usually made raids at night, the procedure was altered for the operation of the main rail junctions. All the work of reforming the trains was carried out at prejunction stations and the trains passed through the junctions predominantly without stopping. After bombing of the junction and marshaling stations, the railroad workers quickly repaired two or three of the least damaged tracks and re-opened through train traffic.

Upon the assignment of the Soviet government and the command of the fronts, the railroad troops and construction organizations of the NKPS in 1941-1942, in the front areas built new railroad lines and connecting spurs (sections) as well as bypasses of railroad junctions. This increased the throughput capacity of the roads and also contributed to the development and reconstruction of the rail junctions and stations which limited the throughput capacity of the routes. Thus using a high-speed method, railroad lines which were important in defense terms were built between Kabozha--Chagoda and Nebolchi--Lyubytino (Zarubino), which developed the railroad network in the Leningrad sector, Kizlyar--Astrakhan, Saratov--Ilovlya and Sviyazhsk--Saratov which expanded the railroad network near Stalingrad. Great railroad construction was also carried out in other regions of the nation. The measures taken helped to increase the throughput capacity of the railroad sections and this made it possible to significantly accelerate the concentration of troops in their destinations as well as deliver materiel.

The organizational structure of the VOSO bodies in the course of the war was constantly improved. Thus, on 19 August 1941, the UPVOSO established specialized departments for planning and directing operational and supply shipments according to types of materiel and in September, a medical evacuation department. Divisions for the management of supply freight were introduced on the TOE of the VOSO line bodies. By a directive of Hq SHC of 31 January 1943, the Soviet Army's UPVOSO was transformed into the Central Military Transport Directorate (TsUPVOSO); it was removed from the Main Directorate of the Rear Services and turned over to the General Staff. However, the attempts to establish a more effective structure for managing the military transport bodies did not fully succeed. For this reason, by an order of the people's commissar of defense of 7 March 1943, the military transport bodies were taken away from the General Staff and the all-arms staffs and turned over as follows: the TsUPVOSO to the chief of the Soviet Army Rear and the military transport departments of the field forces to the chiefs of the rear of the fronts (districts) and armies.⁶ Here the TOE of the TsUPVOSO was somewhat broadened. It now included: a general planning department, an operational shipments department, departments for material shipments (shipments of ammunition, weapons and equipment; fuels and lubricants; quartermaster property and food), a medical evacuation department and others.⁷

By that time the following procedure had been instituted for organizing military shipments. In accord with the plans of the General Staff and the Soviet Army Rear, the TsUPVOSO worked out and presented to the NKPS plans for all types of military shipments and organized their prompt fulfillment. With delays in military shipments, proposals were submitted to the GKO Transport Committee for eliminating them. The established planning procedure for military shipments withstood the testing of the war and proved fully effective.

The GKO and the people's commissar of defense, having entrusted the VOSO bodies with the important task of planning and controlling military shipments, constantly supervised their work and provided practical help. Thus the GKO obliged the leading transport workers to immediately and unconditionally carry out all the demands of the VOSO bodies relating to troop shipments. The chiefs of the front railroads were prohibited from interfering into controlling the dispatch sequence of the military trains. The Soviet Army TsUPVOSO was obliged to

establish control over the precise and unfailing fulfillment by the railroads of the plans and quotas relating to operational and supply shipments.⁸

The Soviet Armed Forces during the years of the Great Patriotic War conducted more than 50 offensive and defensive strategic operations. During the period of preparing and conducting each of these major movements were carried out to concentrate and regroup the troops, to deliver military equipment, weapons, ammunition, fuel and other types of logistical support to the fronts. This required intense work by all types of transport and the VOSO bodies. Thus, during the period of the defensive engagements at Moscow and the preparations for the counteroffensive, the Western, Kalinin and Southwestern Fronts received by rail 333,500 cars with troops and military freight, and for the three fronts--Stalingrad, Don and Southwestern participating in the Battle of Stalingrad--over 202,000 cars were delivered.⁹ The total volume of military shipments for the fronts participating in the Battle of Kursk was around 540,000 cars.

Rail transport carried out the most important troop regroupings and ensured continuous delivery of materiel to them. In short periods of time not only were formations and armies moved but even fronts. Thus, in February-May 1943, 894 trains were dispatched from the Stalingrad area with troops for the Don Front. The main mass of troops (662 trains) traveled toward Voronezh--Kursk to form the Central and Reserve (subsequently the Steppe) Fronts. At the end of 1943, 730 trains with troops were sent from other fronts to form the Second Baltic Front. In 1945, three all-arms armies, one tank army, mechanized corps, an artillery corps as well as a large number of individual units and formations--a total of about 1,700 trains--were transported to the Far East over a distance of approximately 11,000 miles.¹⁰

To provide help on the spot and primarily to the front railroads which were handling the shipments for major operations, operations groups were organized from representatives of the UPVOSO (TsUPVOSO) and the NKPS and they were responsible for organizing the shipments and carrying them out. The operations groups were headed usually by the chief of the UPVOSO (TsUPVOSO) or his deputies P. A. Bakulin, V. I. Dmitriyev, I. G. Kashcheyev-Semin, S. A. Stepanov, V. V. Stolyarov and others. The operations groups of the NKPS also traveled with them. They were headed by deputy people's commissars or other leaders from the NKPS. The joint work of the operations groups of the UPVOSO (TsUPVOSO) and the NKPS in the field significantly facilitated the task of organizing the military shipments.

During the war years important significance was given to the organizing of air defense for the trains and the most important installations on the rail lines. On the front and near-front railroads, the VOSO bodies had under them air defense units which escorted the military trains and the most important cars. Thus, at the beginning of 1944, under the TsUPVOSO there were 10 regiments (each with 40 antiaircraft machine gun and cannon platoons [ZPPV] in each) and 14 separate air defense battalions (each with 20 ZPPV). For directing the combat activities of the air defense units and air defense department was organized in the TsUPVOSO. The ZPPV were assigned considering the importance of the railroad sectors. Over the war years, the air defense subunits of the military trains repelled around 6,000 enemy air attacks, downing 132 enemy planes and damaging 29.¹¹

Providing the transported troops, new recruits and individually traveling servicemen with food and hot meals as well as medical services for them enroute were one of the important tasks for the VOSO bodies, the medical service, food and uniform supply of the Soviet Army. On the railroads, including foreign ones, military food stations (VPP) were set up at railroad stations approximately a day's run apart for a military train (500-600 km). For medical services of the transported troop contingents, isolation checkpoints and disinfection detachments were organized at the railroad stations close to the VPP. Moreover, mobile bath-laundry and bath-disinfection trains as well as medical stations were organized.

Motor transport during the war years was used chiefly as the connecting link in transporting materiel from the rail head to the troops as well as independently for transporting from the front and sometimes the central depots and dumps to the army and troop dumps.

Maritime transport assumed greatest significance in those instances when sea routes were the sole means of communication and coincided with the direction of troop operations. In the Northern Sea Basin, the route of Murmansk--Rybachiy Peninsula over the entire war was the basic route over which troops and military cargo were moved for the Northern Fleet and the Karelian Front. Sailors from the Black Sea Fleet under very difficult conditions supplied the heroic defenders of the hero cities of Odessa and Sevastopol, and then evacuated the troops, population and industrial equipment from these cities. In 1942-1943, the transport fleet of the Caspian Basin played a major role in handling operational shipments. Vessels of the Far Eastern Shipping Company delivered cargo from overseas over the sea lanes and transported troops and materiel to Sakhalin, to the Korean ports and other destinations. The VOSO bodies of the Navy were the organizing link in handling the military sea shipments and in utilizing the transport fleet. During the entire war Rear Adm N. K. Kechedzhi was the chief of the Naval Transport Department Under the Navy Main Staff.

The river fleet handled military shipments and was used for establishing bridge and ferry crossings. From the very first days of the war, the ships of the Dnieper Basin, along with handling the increased amounts of shipments, operated hundreds of crossings on the Dnieper, Yuzhnyy Bug, Berezhina, Pripyat and Sozh. River vessels on Lake Ladoga successfully ferried troops to the combat areas. The Mari Water System was extensively used for evacuating cargo. The Ladoga river workers during the difficult days of the Leningrad blockade provided the basic transport link with the unoccupied territory. Just in the 1942 navigation season, more than 1 million tons of cargo and around 900,000 servicemen and residents of the blockaded city were transported across Ladoga.¹² The river workers in 1942 on the Volga Basin carried out a large amount of shipments for the Don and Stalingrad Fronts.

Air transport during the war years carried out the missions of landing Soviet Army units and formations in the enemy rear, transporting troops, military equipment and materiel to besieged cities, to surrounded groupings and partisan formations and also evacuated sick and wounded. Air transport successfully handled the most immediate military shipments and was irreplaceable under those conditions where other types of transport could not be employed.

The contribution of each type of transport to moving troops and materiel during the years of the Great Patriotic War in terms of cargo turnover was: 68.5 percent for rail, 20.0 percent for motor, 9.3 percent for water (sea and river) and 0.2 percent for air.

There were also shortcomings in the organizing and carrying out of military shipments. Thus, in planning the shipments consideration was not always given to the actual capabilities of the railroads for loading, handling and unloading. Certain shipments were planned by the administrative method without considering the time needed by the railroads to prepare for their execution. There were instances of a hold-up in information on the arrival of trains (cars), on quotas for loading, unloading and letting through the trains as well as delayed providing of shipments with rolling stock and poor equipping of the troop loading and unloading points and areas.

The military transport system during the years of the Great Patriotic War was a complex and very important organism the functioning of which largely determined the combat might of the Soviet Armed Forces. The military transport officers were the immediate organizers and executors of military shipments. Under the difficult conditions of the frontline situation, they frequently directly organized military train traffic and here showed courage and heroism. During enemy air raids they moved the trains out from under attack, they rescued valuable military freight and personnel, they took emergency measures to eliminate destruction and completely carried out their military duty. For courage and heroism shown in the battles against the Nazi invaders, more than 7,000 military transport workers received orders and medals.

Soviet transport during the period of the Great Patriotic War successfully withstood major testing. By the common efforts of the transport and military transport bodies, continuous shipments were provided as well as maneuverability and viability of the transport system. Regardless of every effort, the enemy did not succeed in paralyzing railroad operations which were the basis for the deployment of the operational rear. Over the years of the war all types of transport handled a volume of military shipments never known before in history. Thus, for the railroads this was over 440,000 trains (around 20 million cars), including 55.2 percent operational and 44.8 percent supply. Over 4 million persons, more than 10,000 guns, 4,500 tanks and a large amount of materiel were transported by water. Motor transport delivered 625.2 million tons of various freight. Air shipments were over 2 million servicemen and a large amount of materiel.¹³

The railroad units and the repair-reconstruction organizations of the NKPS carried out a significant amount of work in building and rebuilding the railroads. During the war around 111,000 km of main and station tracks were repaired, 2,756 major bridges and many other installations were built and reconstructed.¹⁴

During the years of the Great Patriotic War the VOSO bodies gained enormous combat experience in employing all types of transport in the interest of carrying out military shipments. General principles were worked out and a procedure established for planning mass military shipments, a method was evolved for taking decisions, for working out quotas and determining the loading-unloading

areas, selecting the transport routes, determining the heaviness of the traffic and the rate of shipments and standardized documents were introduced. All of this helped to improve the quality of planning and management for military shipments.

The experience of the war confirmed the necessity of the coordinated development of all types of transport as well as the increased role and importance of the VOSO service in coordinating their work related to military shipments. The Soviet transport system, in being based on rail transport, successfully carried out the enormous volume of mass military shipments. The VOSO bodies were the connecting link between the military command and the transport administration. The procedure for working out the military shipment plans, submitting these to the transport bodies and supervision of their fulfillment showed that the organizational structure of the VOSO bodies during the period of the Great Patriotic War proved fully effective.

FOOTNOTES

- ¹ "Voyennyye soobshcheniya za 50 let" [Military Transport Over 50 Years], Moscow, Voenizdat, 1967, p 46.
- ² G. A. Kumanev, "Na sluzhbe fronta i tyla" [Serving the Front and the Rear], Moscow, Nauka, 1976, p 86.
- ³ "Ty1 Sovetskikh Vooruzhennykh Sil v Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyne 1941-1945 gg." [The Rear of the Soviet Armed Forces in the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945], Moscow, Voenizdat, 1977, p 227.
- ⁴ "Voyennyye soobshcheniya za 50 let," p 46.
- ⁵ TsAMO SSSR [Central Archives of the USSR Ministry of Defense], folio 16, inv. 132061, file 146, sheet 77.
- ⁶ "Ty1 Sovetskikh Vooruzhennykh...", pp 115-116.
- ⁷ I. V. Kovalev, "Transport v Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyne (1941-1945 gg.)" [Transport During the Great Patriotic War (1941-1945)], Moscow, Nauka, 1981, p 242.
- ⁸ GKO Decree of 28 March 1943.
- ⁹ "Ty1 Sovetskikh Vooruzhennykh...", pp 230, 232.
- ¹⁰ "Voyennyye soobshcheniya za 50 let," pp 48, 49.
- ¹¹ "Eshelon za eshelonom" [Train After Train], Moscow, Voenizdat, 1981, pp 224, 232.
- ¹² "Ty1 Sovetskikh Vooruzhennykh...", p 247.

¹³ "Sovetskaya Voyennaya Entsiklopediya" [Soviet Military Encyclopedia], Moscow, Voenizdat, Vol 2, 1976, p 265.

¹⁴ "Ukhodili na front eshelon" [The Trains Left for the Front], Moscow, Voenizdat, 1974, p 13.

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CERTAIN DOCUMENTS ON THE EASTERN POMERANIAN OPERATION

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 3, Mar 85 [signed to press 22 Feb 85) pp 75-80

[Archival documents prepared by Col I. Yaroshenko, Lt Col A. Bulan'ko and V. Sutulov]

[Text] The Eastern Pomeranian Offensive Operation was successfully conducted by the troops of the First and Second Belorussian Fronts with assistance from the Baltic Fleet forces during the period from 10 February through 4 April 1945.¹

The task of defeating the Eastern Pomeranian enemy grouping arose for the Soviet Command in the course of carrying out the Vistula-Oder and East Prussian Operations. Hq SHC entrusted this mission to the Second Belorussian Front, having freed it from further participation in the East Prussian Operation (see Documents 1 and 2).

Commencing on 10 February, the offensive by the troops of the Second Belorussian Front developed slowly. Over 10 days of fighting, they advanced up to 70 km on individual sectors. By the end of 19 February, enemy resistance had strengthened significantly and the offensive had virtually halted. It was apparent that the forces of just the Second Belorussian Front were not sufficient to defeat the Eastern Pomeranian enemy grouping. By that time, Hq SHC had received from the commands of the First and Second Belorussian Fronts proposals on further operations in Eastern Pomerania (see Documents 3 and 4). On 17 February, Headquarters approved these decisions and gave the fronts the mission of attacking by adjacent flanks in the aim of splitting the enemy grouping into two isolated parts and emerging on the Baltic Sea Coast.

Proceeding from the set tasks, the commanders of the First and Second Belorussian Fronts adopted plans to conduct the operation (only the operational directive of the First Belorussian Front is given, see Document 5).

On 4-5 March 1945, the troops of the First and Second Belorussian Fronts reached the Baltic Sea Coast and split the Eastern Pomeranian enemy grouping into two parts (see Documents 6 and 7).

On 5 March, Hq SHC gave the fronts additional missions. The Second Belorussian Front received an order to develop the offensive to the east and northeast on the Danzig and Gdynia axes, to capture these cities and by no later than 20 March clear the enemy out of Eastern Pomerania (see Document 8).

As a result of the successful offensive of our troops in Eastern Pomerania, the enemy plans were thwarted to make a counterstrike in the flank and rear of the Soviet troops fighting on the Berlin sector. The Polish people received back all of Polish Pomorye.

Document 1

OPERATIONAL DIRECTIVE BY THE COMMANDER OF THE SECOND BELORUSSIAN FRONT OF 7 FEBRUARY 1945 FOR THE OFFENSIVE

The troops of the front with the left wing, from the morning of 10 February, are to continue the offensive with the immediate mission of capturing Dirschau, Hoch, Stublau, Czersk, Donitz, Schlohau and Preussisch Friedland.

My orders are:

1) The 70th Army with the VIII Mechanized Corps and I Guards Tank Corps reinforced by the 26th Artillery Division, the 167th Howitzer Brigade, the 41st Mechanized Brigade, the 19th and 7th Antitank Artillery Brigades, the 544th Mechanized Regiment, the 325th Guards Mechanized Regiment, the 43d Guards Mechanized Regiment and the 74th Antiaircraft Battalion, on the morning of 10 February 1945, to go over to an offensive with the mission of no later than 13 February reaching the line of Waltersdorf, Schlohau, Steinborn, Preussisch Friedland. The CXIV Rifle Corps with two reinforced rifle divisions (76th and 160th Rifle Divisions) from 7 February 1945 are temporarily to be turned over to the commander of the 65th Army.

Subsequently, the armies are to continue the offensive on the general axis of Tempelburg. The demarkation lines: on the left with the First Belorussian Front along the Vistula as before, then Vordon, Krone, Zempelburg, Flederbörn, Wirchow--everything inclusively for the Second Belorussian Front; to the right the 49th Army--Wilkaloaka, 15 km to the southeast of Kuhlensee, Kuhlensee Baersee, Topolno, Lowin, Trutnowo, Tucheli, Konitz, Steters--everything inclusively for the 70th Army. The army command post from the morning of 9 February 1945 should be in the area of Klarheim.

2) The 49th Army reinforced by the 2d Artillery Division, the 4th Guards Mortar [Rocket Launcher] Division (the 4th and 7th Mortar Brigades), the 2d Corps Artillery Brigade, the 15th Antitank Artillery Brigade, the 77th Guards Mortar Regiment and the 49th Antiaircraft Division, by the morning of 9 February 1945, is to take over from the 70th Army the combat area on the line Schirosław, Lianno, Trutnowo. From the morning of 10 February 1945, to go over to an offensive with the mission no later than 13 February 1945 of capturing the line Czersk, Konitz.

Subsequently to develop the offensive on the general axis of Baldenberg.

The demarcation line on the left with the 65th Army--Briesen, Schenau, Osche, Gross Schliwitz, Czersk--everything except Briesen, Czersk inclusively for the 65th Army. The army command post from the morning of 9 February 1945 is to be in the area of Gruchno.

3) The 65th Army reinforced by the 18th Artillery Division, the 85th and 49th Howitzer Artillery Regiments, the 1st Antitank Artillery Brigade, the 317th OM [abbreviation unknown] Battalion, the 5th and 31st Guards Mortar Brigades, the 62d and 18th Guards Mortar Regiments and the 12th Antiaircraft Division, during 8 February 1945, by attacking from the east and from the west is to eliminate the Schwetsk enemy center of resistance and reach the line of Neundorf, Eszewo.

The reinforced CXIV Rifle Corps (76th and 160th Rifle Divisions) on the occupied line is to be transferred for reinforcements temporarily from 7 February 1945 to the 65th Army. From the morning of 10 February 1945, the offensive is to be continued to the northwest with the mission no later than 14 February 1945 of reaching the line of Hochstublau, Czersk. Subsequently, to plan an offensive on the Butow axis. Demarcation line to the right of the 2d Attack Army to Sakra as before, then Neunburg, Skurz, Hochstublau--everything inclusively for the 65th Army.

The army command post from the morning of 9 February 1945 is to be in the area of Rudnik and subsequently Eszewo.

4) The III Guards Cavalry Corps reinforced by the 4th Antitank Artillery Brigade, the 313th Guards Mechanized Regiment, the 1359th Antiaircraft Artillery Regiment, the 36th and 104th opmb [abbreviation unknown], on 10 February 1945 is to reach the area of Waldau, Zempelburg and from the morning of 11 February 1945, attack on the Kammin, Schlohau axis with the mission, no later than the morning of 12 February 1945, capturing the area of Konitz, Schlohau. To plan subsequently to reach the area of Rummelsburg, Waldenberg.

5) The commander of the 2d Assault Army is to prepare an attack using the forces of at least two reinforced rifle corps from around the right flank of the 65th Army on the Pruessisch, Stargard axis with an immediate mission of capturing the line Dirschau, Hochstublau with the offensive to commence approximately on 11 February 1945 from the line of Neunburg.

Upon the arrival of the 91st, 153d and 161st UR [?fortified areas], the III Corps is to be committed to battle. Upon the taking of Elbing, at least one reinforced rifle division is to be left in the Elbing area.

6) The chief of the front's engineer troops is to supply the armies with crossings over the Vistula River in the area of Neunburg, Graudenz Wordon....

Rokossovskiy

Bogolyubov

Subbotin

(TsAMO SSSR [Central Archives of the USSR Ministry of Defense], folio 422, inv. 10504, file 97, sheets 65-67)

Document 2

FROM THE DIRECTIVE OF Hq SHC OF 8 FEBRUARY 1945
TO THE COMMANDER OF THE SECOND BELORUSSIAN FRONT

Hq SHC orders:

- 1) With the center and left wing of the front (the 2d Attack, the 65th, 49th and 70th Armies, the I Guards Tank Corps, the VIII Mechanized Corps, the III Guards Cavalry Corps and at least four breakthrough artillery divisions)² on 10 February are to go over to an offensive to the west of the Vistula River and no later than 20 February capture a line of the mouth of the Vistula River, Dirschau, Berent, Rummelsburg, Neustettin.
- 2) Subsequently, with the approach of the 19th Army, to develop the offensive on the general axis of Stettin, to capture the area of Danzig, Gdynia and clear the enemy out of the coast up to the Pomeranian Bay....

Hq SHC
I. Stalin,
Vasilevskiy

(TsAMO, folio 132a, inv. 2642, file 39, sheet 25)

Document 3

REPORT OF THE COMMANDER OF THE SECOND BELORUSSIAN FRONT
TO THE CHIEF OF THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE SOVIET ARMY OF 15 FEBRUARY 1945
ON THE PLAN FOR THE FURTHER OPERATIONS BY THE FRONT³

My report:

1. By the directive of Hq SHC No 11021 of 8 February 1945, the front was given the mission no later than 20 February 1945 of capturing the line of the mouth of the Vistula River, Dirschau, Berent, Rummelsburg, Neustettin. Subsequently, with the arrival of the 19th Army, to develop the offensive on the general axis of Stettin, to capture the region of Danzig, Gdynia and clear the enemy from the coast as far as the Pomeranian Bay.
2. Proceeding from the available means of the front, I propose that the 19th Army and the III Guards Tank Corps would be more effectively used on the left wing of the front with the mission, in deploying on the line Schlohau, Ratzeburg, to advance on the general axis of Baldenbuerg, Bublitz, Koslin with the aim of splitting the enemy Pomeranian grouping and coming out on the Baltic Sea Coast along the front of Jamundersee, Kolberg.

The elimination of the enemy to the east of the meridian of Konitz, Rugenwalze will be entrusted to the troops on the right wing of the front consisting of the 2d Attack, 65th, 49th and 70th Armies.

3. The committing to battle of the 19th Army and the III Guards Tank Corps is possible only from 22-23 February, since a 160-km march must be made to reach the deployment line. The start of the move up will be from 17 February 1945.

4. For carrying out the mission of Hq SHC to clear the enemy out of Pomerania and reach the Pomeranian Bay, it is essential:

- a) To strengthen the left wing of the front with two all-arms armies with two tank corps. This must be done with the reaching of the Neustettin area by the 19th Army and the III Guards Tank Corps, as with the advance of the given troops to the northwest, Koslin must be secured from the west;
- b) Due to the fact that the armies on the right wing of the front which have been engaged in intense offensive battles for a month have suffered high casualties and at present are under strength numbering an average of 3,000 in 26 rifle divisions and 4,000 in 8 rifle divisions to bring the size of these divisions at least up to 6,000 men and for this there must be centralized trained replacements of up to 80,000 men and for the replacements in the special branches of troops, up to 20,000 men.

Rokossovskiy

Bogolyubov

Subbotin

(TsAMO, folio 237, inv. 2430, file 75, sheets 1-4)

Document 4

REPORT OF THE COMMANDER OF THE FIRST BELORUSSIAN FRONT TO THE SUPREME COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF 16 FEBRUARY 1945 ON CONDUCTING THE OFFENSIVE OPERATION IN EASTERN POMERANIA

In carrying out your personal instructions, I report my views on conducting a partial offensive operation by the troops on the right wing of the front.

I. The aim of the operation is to throw the enemy back to the north and with the right wing of the front to reach the line of Lubow, Tempelburg, Falkenburg, Dramburg, Wangerin, Massow, Hollnow, Stettin, to cut the lines of communications of the Pomeranian enemy troop group to the west and aid the left wing of the Second Belorussian Front in more rapidly advancing into the Stettin region.

II. I can commence the operation from the morning of 19 February 1945. The time for conducting the operation is approximately 6-7 days.

III. I will make the main thrust with all the forces of the 61st Army, all the forces of the 2d Guards Tank Army, the VII Guards Cavalry Corps and the IX Tank Corps with the support of two artillery divisions from the line of Reetz, Brellentin, Piritz, Ban the Stargard to the northwest.

I have given this group of forces the mission of throwing the enemy back to the north and, coming out on the front of Blankenhagen (6 km to the southwest of Wangerin), Kannenberg (6 km to the northwest of Freienwalde), Massow, Hollnow, Stettin, to cut the lines of communications of the Pomeranian enemy troop group to the west.

An auxiliary thrust will be made by all the forces of the 1st Polish Army and by two rifle corps of the 3d Assault Army from the line Rederitz, Markisch Friedland, Kallis, Reetz.

The mission for this group of forces is: in directing the main effort to the front of Falkenburg, Dramburg and cooperating with the troops of the Second Belorussian Front, to throw the enemy back to the north and reach the line Lubow, Tempelburg, Falkenburg, Dramburg, Wangerin.

The XII Guards Rifle Corps of the 3d Assault Army and the II Guards Cavalry Corps are to continue to hold the occupied positions on the line of Battrow, Dobrin, Kolpin, Drumenfliess, Lumzow, Barenbusch, Gross Born and the eastern outskirts of Zaharin.

As the left wing of the Second Belorussian Front moves forward, the II Guards Cavalry Corps will successively from right to left go over from the offensive to the offensive to the west.

The XII Guards Rifle Corps is to be put into the second echelon of the 3d Assault Army....

Zhukov

Malinin

Telegin

(TsAMO, folio 233, inv. 2307, file 193, sheets 19-21)

Document 5

OPERATIONAL DIRECTIVE FROM THE COMMANDER OF THE FIRST BELORUSSIAN FRONT OF 22 FEBRUARY 1945

1. Units of the 5th Light Infantry Division, the 402d Reserve Infantry Division, the 281st Security Division, the 28th SS Light Infantry Division (Walgi), the 15th Tank Division, the 10th SS Frunsberg Tank Division, the 7th SS Holstein Tank Division, the Tank Brigade Fuhrer, the 11th SS Nordland Mechanized Division, the 4th SS Polizei Mechanized Division, the 503d Separate Heavy Tank Battalion, the 5th Reserve Antitank Battalion, the 911th Assault Gun Brigade and up to nine artillery battalions of the High Command Reserve are defending the line: Schonfeld (7 km to the northwest of Markisch Friedland), Marienhof, Giesen, fl. Pammin, Hutsdorf, Neu Hassendorf, Hassendorf, Kreuz, Nantikow, Buchholtz, Konraden, the southern edge of the forest (2 km to the west of Reetz), fl. Kolental, Schlagentin, Arnswalde, fl. Bonin, the southwest edge of the forest (1 km to the northeast of Petznik), Ballentin, Blumberg, Kollin, Stresen, Buslar, Werben, Gross Rizow, Piritz.

Reserves--a tank division and an infantry division in the Stargard area and one tank division in the Stettin area.

2. To the right the 1st Polish Army on the second day of the operation is to go over to the offensive with the mission, by the end of the third day of the operation, of reaching the front: Klein Sawiz, Guntershagen, the southwestern bank of Grosser Lubbeesee, Karwitz.

The demarcation line with it: Tutz, Alt Lowitz, Karwitz, Klein Mellen, Wangerin, Hoffelde, Dusterwek (9 km to the north of Naugard), all points, with the exception of Tutz and Alt Lowitz, inclusively for the 3d Attack Army.

To the left, the 47th Army is to advance on the general axis of Piritz, Altdamm.

Demarcation line with it: Dikow, Piritz, the southwest bank of Madusee, Kolbatz, Ezeritz, Hohenkrug, Altdamm, all points with the exception of Dikow and Madusee, exclusively for the 61st Army.

3. The 3d Assault Army with the IX Tank Corps, the 115th UR, the 6th Artillery Division of the RGK [High Command Reserve], the 8th Antitank Artillery Brigade, the 3d Guards Antitank Artillery Brigade, the 45th Antitank Artillery Brigade, the 2d Polish Artillery Division, the 5th Guards Mortar Division, the 316th, 37th and 94th Guards Mortar Regiments are to go over to the offensive with the mission of breaking through the enemy defenses on the sector: elev. 115.4 (2 km to the south of Glambek), Reetz and, in developing the thrust on the general axis of Jakobshagen, Freienwalde, Schonewalde, to capture the lines:

a) On the first day of the operation: the pltf [?whistle stop] (4 km to the west of Hutsdorf), Habweg, Gross Mellen, Butow, the southern bank of the Satzigersee;

b) On the third day of the operation: Karwitz, Welschenburg, Ginow, Wangerin, Winnigen, the southern shore of Botschwinsee, Marienhagen, Breitenfelde, Hermelsdorf, Massow.

On this line the troops are to dig in, planning on a subsequent offensive on the general axis of Paugard.

During the period of the artillery softening up, all the artillery of the 1st Guards Tank Army is to be employed.

With the start of the artillery softening up, the 567th Ground Attack Air Regiment (198th Ground Attack Air Division) and 278th Fighter Air Division (III Fighter Air Corps) are to be turned over to the commander of the 3d Assault Army.

Demarcation line to the left: Bernsee, Reetz, Satzig, Schenebek, Massow, Glewitz, all points, with the exception of Massow and Glewitz inclusively, for the 3d Assault Army.

4. The 61st Army with the VII Guards Cavalry Corps, the 119th UR, the 22d Artillery Division, the 6th Guards Antitank Artillery Brigade, the 33d and 39th Antitank Artillery Brigade, the 22d and 25th Guards Mechanized Brigades, the 41st and 75th Guards Mortar Regiments, the 11th Guards Tank Brigade, the 85th Tank Regiment, the 88th Guards Tank Regiment, the 1818th Self-Propelled Artillery Regiment, the 81st and 85th shisb [abbreviation unknown] (17th shisbr [abbreviation unknown]), the 2d and 3d Guards Motorized Engineer Battalions (1st Guards Motorized Engineer Brigade), the 70th Military Construction Section and the 33d Separate Chemical Warfare Battalion are to go over to the offensive with the mission of breaking through the enemy defenses on the sector: Reetz, Kolental and, developing the attack on the general axis of Rafenstein, Tornow, Massow, to capture the lines:

- a) On the first day of the operation: Satzlig, Gross Schlatikow, Zahan, Schlagentin;
- b) On the third day of the operation: Massow, Stargard, Hansfelde;
- c) On the fifth day of the operation: Massow, Primhauhen, Hornskrug, Altdamm.

On this line the troops are to dig in, planning a further offensive toward Hollnow.

For the period of artillery softening up all the artillery of the 2d Guards Tank Army is to be employed.

With the start of the artillery softening up, the 173d and 175th Ground Attack Air Regiments (the 11th Guards Ground Attack Air Division) and the 265th Fighter Division (III Fighter Corps) are to be put under the commander of the 61st Army.

5. The 1st Guards Tank Army, with the infantry's reaching of the line: Klein Spiegel, Gross Silber, Falkenwalde, is to enter the breakthrough on the sector: Klein Spiegel, Falkenwalde and, developing the attack on the general axis of Nerenberg, Wangerin, during the first day of commitment to the breach to capture the region: Grosssee, Ginow, Wangerin, Zeinik and hold it until the approach of the main forces of the 3d Assault Army. The forward detachments are to occupy Dramburg, Lawes, Rekkow.

Subsequently to plan for an offensive on Daber, Naugard.

The artillery and engineer support for the commitment of the 1st Guards Tank Army to the breakthrough is entrusted to the commander of the 3d Assault Army and air support to the commander of the 16th Air Army.

With the commitment to the breakthrough, the 567th Ground Attack Air Regiment (198th Ground Attack Air Division) and the 278th Fighter Air Division (III Fighter Corps) are to be switched to the commander of the 1st Guards Tank Army.

6. The 2d Guards Tank Army (without the I Mechanized Corps), with the infantry's reaching of the line: Falkenwalde, Rafenstein, Schlagentin, is to be committed to the breakthrough on the sector: Falkenwalde, the northern edge of the forest (3 km to the south of Guntersberg) and, developing the attack on the general axis of Tornow, Boche, Kannenberg, on the first day of the commitment to the breach is to capture the area: Freienwalde, Rossow, Schenebek, and hold it until the approach of the main forces of the 61st Army. The forward detachments are to capture Daber, Feuchshagen, Massow, while strong reconnaissance detachments are to be sent out to Roggow and Stargard.

Subsequently to plan an offensive against Massow, Hollnow.

The I Mechanized Corps is temporarily to be put under the command of the 47th Army. An additional order has been issued for transferring the corps.

The artillery and engineer support for the commitment of the 2d Guards Tank Army to the breakthrough is entrusted to the commander of the 61st Army while air support is for the commander of the 16th Air Army.

With the commitment to the breakthrough, the 173d and 175th Ground Attack Air Regiments (11th Guards Ground Attack Air Division) and the 265th Fighter Air Division (III Fighter Corps) are to be switched to the commander of the 2d Guards Tank Army.

7. Preparations for the offensive operation, the regrouping and the moving up of the troops to the jump-off position for the offensive are to be carried out covertly from the enemy observing all camouflage measures, endeavoring here to achieve without fail surprise in the army operation.

8. I hereby permit the chief of staff, the chief of the operations department of the army staff and the commander of the army artillery to be acquainted with this directive.

The remaining executors are to be given missions within the limits of the duties carried out by them.

Written instructions are not to be given to the regimental commanders and missions are to be given verbally 2 or 3 days beforehand.

General directives are not to be issued for the rear services, limiting one to verbal instructions.

9. It should be explained to all the personnel of the army that our mission is a stubborn defense for an extended time.

The junior command personnel and Red Army men are to be explained the mission for the offensive 2 hours before the attack.

10. The time for commencing the offensive is according to my personal instructions.

The procedure for carrying out the artillery softening up is according to the appended schedule.

11. The plan for the army offensive operation is to be submitted to me for approval by 1200 hours on 25 February 1945.

Receipt is to be confirmed.

Zhukov

Malinin

Telegin

(TsAMO, folio 233, inv. 2307, file 185, sheets 17-22)

Document 6

FROM THE COMBAT REPORT OF THE COMMANDER OF THE SECOND BELORUSSIAN FRONT
OF 4 MARCH 1945 TO THE SUPREME COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF
ON COMPLETING THE SURROUNDING OF THE DANZIG ENEMY GROUPING

Troops of the Second Belorussian Front on 4 March 1945 by an outflanking movement and storming captured the center of the governmental district, the city of

Koslin, a major center of communications linking Danzig--Berlin and a major industrial center of Pomerania.

In continuing the offensive, the troops of the front have reached the Baltic Sea Coast and have thereby completed the encirclement of the Danzig enemy troop grouping from the land.

Rokossovskiy

A. Bogolyubov

Subbotin

(TsAMO, folio 237, inv. 2394, file 1371, sheet 42)

Document 7

FROM THE COMBAT REPORT OF THE COMMANDER OF THE FIRST BELORUSSIAN FRONT OF 5 MARCH 1945 TO THE SUPREME COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF ON THE REACHING OF THE BALTIC SEA COAST BY THE FRONT'S TROOPS

...The troops of the front during 4 March 1945 with the main forces continued to develop the offensive on the right wing. Overcoming enemy resistance in strongpoints and its obstacles in forests and on roads, advancing up to 30 km ahead of the all-arms armies the tank formations reached the Baltic Sea Coast in the area of Kolberg. During the course of the day's offensive, the troops of the front captured the cities: Falkenburg, Dramburg, Regenwalde, Korlin, Freienwalde as well as important communications centers and strongpoints of enemy defenses in Pomerania....

G. Zhukov

Malinin

Telegin

(TsAMO, folio 233, inv. 2356, file 573, sheet 66)

Document 8

DIRECTIVE OF Hq SHC OF 5 MARCH 1945 TO THE COMMANDER OF THE SECOND BELORUSSIAN FRONT ON THE DEFEAT OF THE ENEMY IN THE REGION OF DANZIG, GDYNIA

Hq SHC orders:

1. The troops of the Second Belorussian Front to defeat the enemy grouping in the area of Danzig, Stolp, to capture the cities of Danzig, Gdynia and by no later than 20 March reach the Baltic Sea Coast in the area of the front.
2. For carrying out this mission, the troops of the front are to continue the offensive by the right wing along the western bank of the Vistula River to Danzig and with the left wing on the Lauenburg, Gdynia axis. The 1st Guards Tank Army and the tank brigade of the 1st Polish Army are to be employed for developing the attack on the left wing of the front.
3. As the coast is cleared, a strong defense is to be organized, using for this the III Guards Cavalry Corps, UR and certain other units.

4. Demarcation lines and responsibility for securing boundaries with adjacent fronts are as before.

Hq SHC
I. Stalin
Antonov

(TsAMO, folio 3, inv. 11556, file 18, sheet 49)

FOOTNOTES

- ¹ For more detail on the course and results of the operation, see: VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL, No 3, 1975; No 2, 1985.
- ² By the Directive of Headquarters No 11022 of 9 February 1945, the 50th, 3d, 48th and 5th Guards Tank Armies with all reinforcements and material supplies were transferred from the Second Belorussian Front from 2400 hours on 10 February 1945 to the Third Belorussian Front.
- ³ On 17 February 1945, the plan was approved by Hq SHC.

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10272

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REVIEW: SHAKHURIN ON AVIATION INDUSTRY DURING WAR YEARS

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 3, Mar 85 [signed to press 22 Feb 85) pp 87-89

[Review by Hero of the Soviet Union, Mar Avn S. I. Rudenko of the book "Kryl'ya pobedy" (Wings of Victory) by A. I. Shakhurin, Moscow, Politizdat, 1984, 240 pages]

[Text] In planning its treacherous attack on the USSR, German Naziism assigned a major role in achieving its aggressive goals to the air forces (Luftwaffe). The Nazi Command during the very first hours of the war planned to knock out the main part of Soviet aviation and thereby ensure air supremacy as this, as the experience of the previous campaigns in Europe showed, would open up the most direct path to ultimate success.

As is known, the enemy succeeded in carrying out the first part of this piratical plan: as a result of the surprise, massed attack against our airfields in the border military districts, we on the very first day of the war lost a large number of aircraft. The situation was exacerbated by the fact that these losses could not immediately be replaced, since the air industry enterprises located in the western regions of the nation had been forced to curtail production and be evacuated to the east. The first war year was a difficult one for our aviation. And although the Soviet pilots waged a wholehearted heroic struggle against the Nazi air pirates, the enemy's quantitative supremacy made itself felt....

On the front we endeavored to compensate for the shortage of aviation equipment and the enemy's numerical superiority by high skill, courage and valor of the pilots. Thus the wings of our victory grew stronger in the fierce air battles. But this was not enough to win air supremacy. It would take an ever-increasing influx of combat aircraft and new ones, of more advanced design.

How our nation carried out this task during the difficult war years is described in the recently published book of Aleksey Ivanovich Shakhurin who at that time was the USSR people's commissar of the aviation industry. It vividly shows the unstinting labor of the large detachment of Soviet aircraft builders during the years of the Great Patriotic War.

The book is autobiographical and written in the form of memoirs. But its chief content is not comprised of details of the author's life who in the past had been a young working man who grew in time into a major state leader and one of the leaders of our nation's defense industry. The basic theme in the memoirs of A. I. Shakhurin is a description of the development of aviation production in the USSR on the eve and during the war. The book describes how, due to the constant attention from the party and its Central Committee and as a result of enormous efforts by all the Soviet people, we had created a strong industrial base for aircraft building and engine building relying on the most advanced science and equipment and on the achievements of design thought. All of this arose, of course, not in a vacuum. Even in the 1920's, our nation had established the bases of aircraft and aircraft engine production, design bureaus appeared which developed an entire series of advanced types of combat aircraft for those times, and remarkable personnel of designers and engineers and test pilots developed. Aviation building in the Soviet Union developed on the sound foundation laid during the period of the first five-year plans. Its scope and scale made it possible during the difficult wartime to organize production of the required amount of combat aviation equipment.

A. I. Shakhurin was involved with aviation for a long time: he worked as a party organizer at a major aviation plant, he served in the Air Force Engineer Academy imeni N. Ye. Zhukovskiy and for many years headed the aviation industry. For this reason with his knowledge of the question, with profound penetration into the essence of the problems confronting us then in the area of building a powerful air fleet for the Soviet nation, he describes those who during the difficult years created the aviation equipment for the defense of the motherland. Even for us, persons of the older generation who participated in the war and have spent our entire lives in aviation, the book by A. I. Shakhurin provides at times little-known details from the history of the development of our Air Forces and from the expanding of production capacity in the aviation industry.

The value of the book by A. I. Shakhurin is that it shows the development of Soviet military aircraft building as a whole, with all its sectors and areas, from the scientific research facilities to the plant airfields, where the combat aircraft which emerged from the assembly shops were tested.

One recalls the terse and at the same time exhaustive descriptions by the author of the leading aircraft and aviation engine designers such as Yakovlev and Lavochkin, Tupolev and Petlyakov, Il'yushin and Polikarpov, Limov and Mikulin as well as a number of others. They make it possible to see the traits inherent to each area of design thought in the approach to developing the aircraft and these were responsible for the appearance in the course of the war of our fighters and ground attack planes, long-range and dive bombers which surpassed the performance of the corresponding classes of aircraft which the enemy had.

The indefatigable activities of the enterprise leaders, the engineers and technicians and entire labor collectives of the aviation plants who during those difficult times worked as if they were on the front have been described just as thoroughly in chapters of the book that are small in size but vast in content. One has merely to read those pages of the book which describe how the aviation enterprises were evacuated to the east and how in a deep frost on barren ground the plant buildings had to be put up, equipment installed and begin producing

the product, often when there was not even a roof over your head, in order to gain a sense of this.

And it also happened that the plant territory became a true arena of fierce fighting against Nazi aviation. For example, this was the case with the aviation plant in Saratov. Seemingly, as a result of the fire which broke out as a result of the bombing, the plant buildings burned to the ground. But the enterprise was rebuilt in the shortest time and continued to turn out aircraft for the front.

The book gives an interesting episode. When the director of the Saratov plant, I. S. Levin, was on a trip to one of the fronts, he happened to be present at the interrogation of a Nazi pilot who had been shot down and taken prisoner. It turned out that this pilot had participated in the raids against Saratov. He asserted that the aviation plant in Saratov no longer existed and had been completely wiped out. The Nazi stubbornly insisted on this, not believing that Saratov was already delivering aircraft to the front in ever-increasing amounts. But this was precisely the case.

It seems to me that one should have emphasized another aspect in the work of the aviation industry during the war days, namely: the fruitful contact of the aviation designers and builders with the aviation commanders and engineers, with the staffs of the aviation field forces and formations and directly with the pilots on the front. This contact reciprocally enriched us and made it possible to effectively consider the combat experience gained by us as well as the experience in operating the equipment under frontline conditions in the aim of improving the flight performance of the produced aircraft and developing even more remarkable models of combat aircraft.

The book "Kryl'ya pobedy," although classified as among memoirs, in essence represents a serious study of the questions of organizing and operating the Soviet aviation industry during the period of the Great Patriotic War. Full of rich factual material and vivid examples from the life of the Soviet aviation builders, it convincingly brings out the unbreakable unity between the frontline soldiers and the workers of the rear who during the war days, under the leadership of the Communist Party, forged the victory over the enemy. The Decree of the CPSU Central Committee "On the 40th Anniversary of the Victory of the Soviet People in the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945" states that "a great feat during the war years was carried out by the rear workers. Workers, kolkhoz members, scientists, engineers and designers by their unstinting labor won an unprecedented battle for metal and grain, fuel and raw materials, for creating powerful Soviet weapons."¹ These words apply completely and fully to the workers of our aviation industry about which Aleksey Ivanovich Shakhurin has written so warmly.

In conclusion I would like to mention that in 1976, Voenizdat published a book of my memoirs under the same title "Kryl'ya pobedy." I would not wish to accuse the author of copying, all the more as he was not able to complete the work on the book and its publishing was carried out after his death. It seems to me that there is profound meaning in this very coincidence: the wings of victory grew and strengthened both on the front and in the rear. Documentary in nature and at the same time coming from his soul and heart, the tale of A. I. Shakhurin

strongly convinces us that the wholehearted loyalty of the Soviet people to the Communist Party and to their socialist fatherland inspired them to unprecedented feats both in battle and in labor.

The book "Kryl'ya pobedy" by A. I. Shakhurin will be read with great interest by everyone who wishes to know about the glorious campaign record of our aviation and about those persons who by heroic labor forged the strength and might of its steel wings.

FOOTNOTE

¹ PRAVDA, 17 June, 1984.

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10272

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REVIEW: KARELIAN FRONT, 1941-1945

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 3, Mar 85 [signed to press 22 Feb 85) pp 89-91

[Review by Lt Gen S. A. Kuzovatkin of the book "Karel'skiy front v Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyne 1941-1945 gg. Voenno-istoricheskiy ocherk" (The Karelian Front During the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945. A Military History Essay), Moscow, Nauka, 1984, 360 pages]

[Text] The historiography of the Great Patriotic War has received yet another fundamental research. The Izdatel'stvo Nauka has published a military history essay "Karel'skiy front v Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyne 1941-1945 gg. Voenno-istoricheskiy ocherk" prepared by the Military History Institute of the USSR Ministry of Defense with the participation of a group of veterans from the Karelian Front.

The book contains an introduction, eight chapters and a conclusion. The introduction briefly describes the combat activities of the Karelian Front forces from the moment of its formation. The authors emphasize that the Karelian Front was established for covering the Northern Strategic Sector and existed for more than 3 years, until the threat was eliminated to the northern regions of our country.

An indisputable merit of the reviewed book is that it not only provides a description of combat operations on the Karelian Front over the entire length of the war but also analyzes in detail the conditions under which they were conducted. This is very important, since the particular features of nature, primarily the climate, in Karelia and the Arctic placed additional demands on organizing supply and support of the troops with everything necessary and, most importantly, upon preparing and conducting the defensive and offensive operations.

The first two chapters of the book convincingly show the enormous concern of the Communist Party and the Soviet government for strengthening our northern frontiers and the approaches to such important economic and strategic objectives as Murmansk and the Kirov Railroad.

The authors successively describe the combat operations in the Karelian tayga and the Arctic tundra and using specific examples bring out the unprecedented courage, tenacity and heroism of the Soviet troops. The men of the Karelian

Front halted and bled white the assault groupings of the Nazi and Finnish armies which had been specially trained for offensive operations under Northern conditions and forced them to go over to the defensive.

For the troops of the Karelian Front, the subsequent more than 2-year period (January 1942-June 1944) was a period of active defenses. The troops sought to improve the forward defensive edge and for reconnoitering in force in individual areas. Ski units and subunits operated in the enemy rear, and snipers were widely employed for knocking out enemy personnel. Certainly, the most effective form for upsetting the enemy defenses was the frequent offensive operations examined in the book and conducted by the troops of the Karelian Front on various sectors in the winter and spring of 1942.

The Karelian Front, as the authors correctly emphasize, carried out the missions confronting it in the defensive period, blocking the enemy from reaching Murmansk and the Kirov Railroad, having ground down its forces and thereby creating the necessary conditions for going over to the offensive.

In the subsequent chapters of the book, the offensive operations of the Karelian Front in 1944 are examined. Among these are the Svir-Petrozavodsk Offensive Operation which was aimed at liberating Karelia of Nazi troops and the Petsamo-Kirkenes Offensive Operation to liberate the Arctic.

For the first time in our historiography there has been such a detailed treatment of the operation conducted by the forces of the 19th and 26th Armies in Northern Karelia and as a result of this operation the enemy was finally ejected from Karelian land.

The authors quite correctly pay great attention to disclosing the important military-political significance of the successful operations by the troops of the Karelian Front in 1944. As is known, on 19 September 1944, a truce agreement was signed between the USSR and Finland. Due to the efforts of the Soviet Army, Finland pulled out of the war long before the complete collapse of Nazi Germany.

In the book a significant place has been given to a description of the Petsamo-Kirkenes Operation which was conducted by the forces of the 14th Army in an area bordering three states--the Soviet Union, Norway and Finland. The authors trace the course of preparations and conduct of this operation which actually marked an end to the war in Northern Europe. In the course of it a portion of Norwegian territory was liberated from Nazi occupiers. A characteristic feature of the operation was the close cooperation of the Karelian Front with the Northern Fleet and this has been thoroughly reflected in the book.

A special section in the work is devoted to the use of aviation and the National Air Defense Troops (the third chapter). Here the authors have devoted chief attention to the struggle for operational air supremacy during the period of the stable defense. They point out that the fight commenced from the very first days of the war and for this purpose the Air Forces Command employed chiefly fighter aviation which destroyed the enemy air force in the air, as well as bomber and ground attack aviation which attacked the enemy airfields.

The author collective has succeeded in fully showing the leading and inspirational role of the CPSU in organizing and carrying out the defeat of the Nazi troops in the Arctic and Karelia, in directing the rear as well as the partisan movement on enemy-occupied territory. The Central Committee of the Karelo-Finnish Communist Party, the Murmansk party obkom and Oblistpolkom provided enormous aid to the Karelian Front in securing everything essential.

Special sections of the book's chapters are devoted to showing and analyzing party-political and indoctrinational work in the troops both on the defensive and on the offensive. Many examples have been given of the courage, tenacity and high combat skill of the communists and Komsomol members and their vanguard role in combat. The mass heroism of the Soviet soldiers has been brought out. For the courage and valor shown, more than 140 persons were awarded the high title of Hero of the Soviet Union and 12 men of the Karelian Front became full winners of the Order of Glory.

Of course, one or another work can be better judged by the direct participants of the described events. I spent the entire war on the Karelian Front and should say with complete justification that the book correctly gets across the entire course of combat as well as the specific features of the everyday life and combat activities of the men under the special Arctic conditions. I consider this a major achievement for the author collective, since the season and even the time of day, the very climate and particular features of the terrain left their impression on the combat employment of the branches of troops and on the results of carrying out the combat missions and they demanded that the men constantly show courage, steadfastness and tenacity.

Undoubtedly, the reviewed work is not free of individual shortcomings. We feel that by a certain cutting of other chapters, a more detailed description should have been given to the summer-autumn battles for the troops of the front in 1941 as this was the most difficult defensive period and has not been so fully treated in our literature. Individual errors are encountered in the text in the spelling of names and there are errata in the numbering of the formations. Thus, the 14th Rifle Division for some reason is called the 14th Guards Rifle Division (p 268). But these inaccuracies do not reduce the indisputable accomplishments of the work "Karel'skiy front v Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyne 1941-1945 gg." which is marked by the profundity and timeliness of its contents. The new work also stands out over similar editions in its format. It has numerous illustrations and diagrams. The appendices give diverse information on the composition of the troops of the front and other questions. Each chapter gives a list of the literature and documents employed. All of this substantially increases the scientific value of the book.

The book offered to the reader will help in more profoundly studying the history of the Great Patriotic War, to use combat experience for further developing the modern theory of military art, and develop great respect for the defenders of the Soviet North who over the entire war had to fight the enemy under exceptionally difficult conditions.

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10272

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105